Erte Xiao
Biographic Data
| ID | 1114401 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Erte Xiao |
| GIVEN NAMES | Erte |
| FAMILY NAME | Xiao |
| SIGNATURE | XIAO E |
| AFFILIATIONS | Monash University |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-3920-7979 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 15 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 151 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 15 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2007 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2024 |
| H-INDEX | 4 |
Optional disclosure and observational learning
Persuadable or Dissuadable Altruists? The Impact of Information of Recipient Characteristics on Giving
We investigate how information about recipients’ characteristics affects donors’ giving as opposed to when no information is available. In a rational model in which information causes a donor to update their assessment of the recipient's deservingness, we introduce the idea that altruism can be ‘persuadable’ (‘dissuadable’) by information about positive (negative) characteristics. We report data from three experiments in which donors are provided…
Leadership selection
Tax liability side equivalence and time delayed externalities
Third-party punishment
Punishment and Cooperation in Stochastic Social Dilemmas
Previous findings on punishment have focused on deterministic environments in which the outcomes are known with certainty. In this article, we conduct experiments to investigate how punishment affects cooperation in stochastic social dilemmas where each person can decide whether to cooperate, when the outcomes of alternative strategies are specified probabilistically. Two types of punishment mechanisms are studied: (1) an unrestricted punishment …
House money effects on trust and reciprocity
Justification and Legitimate Punishment
Punishment can lose its legitimacy if the enforcer can profit from delivering punishment. We examine how justification can promote the legitimacy of punishment in a one-shot sender-receiver game where an independent third party can punish the sender upon seeing whether the sender lied. Most third parties who can profit from punishment punish the senders regardless of how the senders behave. However, when they have to provide explanations for thei…
Words or deeds? Choosing what to know about others
Trustworthiness is a social norm, but trusting is not
Previous literature has demonstrated the important role that trust plays in developing and maintaining well-functioning societies. However, if we are to learn how to increase levels of trust in society, we must first understand why people choose to trust others. One potential answer to this is that people view trust as normative: there is a social norm for trusting that imposes punishment for noncompliance. To test this, we report data from a sur…
Competing demands of prosociality and equity in monkeys
When equality trumps reciprocity
Avoiding the sharp tongue
Do the right thing
Social norms play an important role in individual decision making. We argue that two different expectations influence our choice to obey a norm: what we expect others to do (empirical expectations) and what we believe others think we ought to do (normative expectations). Little is known about the relative importance of these two types of expectation in individuals' decisions, an issue that is particularly important when normative and empirical ex…
Combining Brain and Behavioral Data to Improve Econometric Policy Analysis
For an economist, ultimate goals of neuroeconomic research include improving economic policy analysis. One path toward this goal is to use neuroeconomic data to advance economic theory, and productive efforts have been made towards that end. Equally important, though less studied, is how neuroeconomics can provide quantitative evidence on policy, and in particular the way in which it might inform structural econometric inference. This paper is a …
Do the right thing
Social norms play an important role in individual decision making. We argue that two different expectations influence our choice to obey a norm: what we expect others to do (empirical expectations) and what we believe others think we ought to do (normative expectations). Little is known about the relative importance of these two types of expectation in individuals' decisions, an issue that is particularly important when normative and empirical ex…
When equality trumps reciprocity
Trustworthiness is a social norm, but trusting is not
Previous literature has demonstrated the important role that trust plays in developing and maintaining well-functioning societies. However, if we are to learn how to increase levels of trust in society, we must first understand why people choose to trust others. One potential answer to this is that people view trust as normative: there is a social norm for trusting that imposes punishment for noncompliance. To test this, we report data from a sur…
Avoiding the sharp tongue
Punishment and Cooperation in Stochastic Social Dilemmas
Previous findings on punishment have focused on deterministic environments in which the outcomes are known with certainty. In this article, we conduct experiments to investigate how punishment affects cooperation in stochastic social dilemmas where each person can decide whether to cooperate, when the outcomes of alternative strategies are specified probabilistically. Two types of punishment mechanisms are studied: (1) an unrestricted punishment …
Persuadable or Dissuadable Altruists? The Impact of Information of Recipient Characteristics on Giving
We investigate how information about recipients’ characteristics affects donors’ giving as opposed to when no information is available. In a rational model in which information causes a donor to update their assessment of the recipient's deservingness, we introduce the idea that altruism can be ‘persuadable’ (‘dissuadable’) by information about positive (negative) characteristics. We report data from three experiments in which donors are provided…
Third-party punishment
Combining Brain and Behavioral Data to Improve Econometric Policy Analysis
For an economist, ultimate goals of neuroeconomic research include improving economic policy analysis. One path toward this goal is to use neuroeconomic data to advance economic theory, and productive efforts have been made towards that end. Equally important, though less studied, is how neuroeconomics can provide quantitative evidence on policy, and in particular the way in which it might inform structural econometric inference. This paper is a …
Do the right thing
Social norms play an important role in individual decision making. We argue that two different expectations influence our choice to obey a norm: what we expect others to do (empirical expectations) and what we believe others think we ought to do (normative expectations). Little is known about the relative importance of these two types of expectation in individuals' decisions, an issue that is particularly important when normative and empirical ex…
Avoiding the sharp tongue
Competing demands of prosociality and equity in monkeys
When equality trumps reciprocity
Trustworthiness is a social norm, but trusting is not
Previous literature has demonstrated the important role that trust plays in developing and maintaining well-functioning societies. However, if we are to learn how to increase levels of trust in society, we must first understand why people choose to trust others. One potential answer to this is that people view trust as normative: there is a social norm for trusting that imposes punishment for noncompliance. To test this, we report data from a sur…
Words or deeds? Choosing what to know about others
Justification and Legitimate Punishment
Punishment can lose its legitimacy if the enforcer can profit from delivering punishment. We examine how justification can promote the legitimacy of punishment in a one-shot sender-receiver game where an independent third party can punish the sender upon seeing whether the sender lied. Most third parties who can profit from punishment punish the senders regardless of how the senders behave. However, when they have to provide explanations for thei…
House money effects on trust and reciprocity
Punishment and Cooperation in Stochastic Social Dilemmas
Previous findings on punishment have focused on deterministic environments in which the outcomes are known with certainty. In this article, we conduct experiments to investigate how punishment affects cooperation in stochastic social dilemmas where each person can decide whether to cooperate, when the outcomes of alternative strategies are specified probabilistically. Two types of punishment mechanisms are studied: (1) an unrestricted punishment …
Third-party punishment
Leadership selection
Tax liability side equivalence and time delayed externalities
Persuadable or Dissuadable Altruists? The Impact of Information of Recipient Characteristics on Giving
We investigate how information about recipients’ characteristics affects donors’ giving as opposed to when no information is available. In a rational model in which information causes a donor to update their assessment of the recipient's deservingness, we introduce the idea that altruism can be ‘persuadable’ (‘dissuadable’) by information about positive (negative) characteristics. We report data from three experiments in which donors are provided…
Optional disclosure and observational learning
Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies (12 works) · Psychology (12 works) · Social Psychology (11 works) · Economics (10 works) · Law (9 works) · Microeconomics (9 works) · Political science (7 works) · Social Psychology (7 works) · Culture, Economy, and Development Studies (5 works) · Dictator game (5 works)