Jordi Brandts
Biographic Data
| ID | 111547 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Jordi Brandts |
| GIVEN NAMES | Jordi |
| FAMILY NAME | Brandts |
| SIGNATURE | BRANDTS J |
| AFFILIATIONS | Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-9082-9258 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 15 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 62 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 15 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2004 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 4 |
Bidding for better jobs
There is evidence from experiments, using real-effort tasks and tournament incentives, documenting women performing worse than men under competition. We question whether this perhaps is due to the very particular way in which competition is typically studied in lab experiments. We alternatively model competitive behavior in firms by letting experimental participants compete in bidding for salaries (prizes) of different sizes in flat or steep orga…
Managerial Leadership, Truth-Telling, and Efficient Coordination
We study the manager-agent game, a novel coordination game played between a manager and two agents. Unlike commonly studied coordination games, the manager-agent game stresses asymmetric information (agents know the state of the world, but managers do not) and asymmetric payoffs (for all states of the world, agents have opposing preferences over outcomes). Efficient coordination requires coordinating agents’ actions and utilising their private in…
Competition and Gender Inequality
This study uses data from a series of laboratory experiments to provide a comprehensive analysis of gender differences in performance caused by two different dimensions of competition—rivalry for resources and status ranking. It also examines two mechanisms behind such differences. The results indicate that in the absence of any competitive dimension the performance difference between men and women is not statistically significant at the usual le…
Dispelling misconceptions about economics
Some popular views about the workings of the economy are completely at odds with solid empirical evidence and congruent theoretical explanations and therefore can be qualified as misconceptions. Such beliefs lead to support for harmful policies. Cognitive biases may contribute to explaining why misconceptions persist even when scientific information is provided to people. We conduct two experimental studies to investigate, for the first time in e…
Advice from women and men and selection into competition
Political autonomy and independence
We use a game-theoretical model and results from laboratory experiments to study the process by which subordinated regions of a country can obtain a more favorable political status. In our theoretical model a dominant and a dominated region first interact through a political process. This process involves two referenda, one at the level of the country as a whole and one at the level of the subordinated region. If the political process succeeds, t…
Pivotal Suppliers and Market Power in Experimental Supply Function Competition
We use experiments to study market power with supply function competition, akin to the competition in electricity markets. Our treatments vary the distribution of demand levels as well as the amount and symmetry of the allocation of production capacity between different suppliers. We relate our results to a descriptive power index and to the predictions of two models: a supply function equilibrium (SFE) model and a multi-unit auction (MUA) model.…
The emergence of employer information networks in an experimental labor market
The Norm-Signaling Effects of Group Punishment
Punishment plays a crucial role in favoring and maintaining social order. Recent studies emphasize the effect of the norm-signaling function of punishment. However, very little attention has been paid so far to the potential of group punishment. We claim that when inflicted by an entire group, the recipient of punishment views it as expressing norms. The experiments performed in this work provide evidence that humans are motivated not only by mat…
El rompecabezas de las preferencias sociales
Presentamos un breve panorama de la literatura en economía experimental sobre preferencias sociales. En numerosos experimentos, participantes con incentivos económicos están dispuestos a sacrificar parte de sus ingresos materiales para compensar el comportamiento amable de otros o a pagar un precio positivo para castigar el comportamiento de individuos egoístas. En economía todas estas acciones reciben el calificativo de sociales, porque no hay u…
The strategy versus the direct-response method
In this paper, we present a first survey of the literature regarding whether the strategy method, in which a responder makes conditional decisions for each possible information set, leads to different experimental results than does the more standard direct-response method, in which the responder learns the action of the first mover and then chooses a response. Of the twenty-nine existing comparisons, sixteen find no difference, while four do find…
Competition with Forward Contracts
We use experiments to study the efficiency effects for a market as a whole of adding the possibility of forward contracting to a pre-existing spot market. We deal separately with the cases where spot market competition is in quantities and where it is in supply functions. In both cases we compare the effect of adding a contract market with the introduction of an additional competitor, changing the market structure from a triopoly to a quadropoly.…
Fair Procedures
Procedures are the area where fairness arguably has its largest influence on modern societies. The experiments we report provide an initial characterisation of that influence and suggest new interpretations for some well-known results. We find that procedural fairness is conceptually distinct from allocation fairness, although the evidence also indicates that the two are linked in important ways. "Post hoc" extension of one of the current models …
How Universal is Behavior? A Four Country Comparison of Spite and Cooperation in Voluntary Contribution Mechanisms
Do Labour Market Conditions Affect Gift Exchange? Some Experimental Evidence
We study how two dimensions of market conditions affect behaviour in experimental gift-exchange markets with repeated interaction. First, we consider the impact of competitive imbalance, by varying whether there is an excess supply of firms or an excess supply of workers in the market. Second, we impose a minimum wage in the market with an excess supply of workers, and study the overall effect on wages and productivity. Perhaps surprisingly, the …
Fair Procedures
Procedures are the area where fairness arguably has its largest influence on modern societies. The experiments we report provide an initial characterisation of that influence and suggest new interpretations for some well-known results. We find that procedural fairness is conceptually distinct from allocation fairness, although the evidence also indicates that the two are linked in important ways. "Post hoc" extension of one of the current models …
How Universal is Behavior? A Four Country Comparison of Spite and Cooperation in Voluntary Contribution Mechanisms
Do Labour Market Conditions Affect Gift Exchange? Some Experimental Evidence
We study how two dimensions of market conditions affect behaviour in experimental gift-exchange markets with repeated interaction. First, we consider the impact of competitive imbalance, by varying whether there is an excess supply of firms or an excess supply of workers in the market. Second, we impose a minimum wage in the market with an excess supply of workers, and study the overall effect on wages and productivity. Perhaps surprisingly, the …
Competition with Forward Contracts
We use experiments to study the efficiency effects for a market as a whole of adding the possibility of forward contracting to a pre-existing spot market. We deal separately with the cases where spot market competition is in quantities and where it is in supply functions. In both cases we compare the effect of adding a contract market with the introduction of an additional competitor, changing the market structure from a triopoly to a quadropoly.…
Competition and Gender Inequality
This study uses data from a series of laboratory experiments to provide a comprehensive analysis of gender differences in performance caused by two different dimensions of competition—rivalry for resources and status ranking. It also examines two mechanisms behind such differences. The results indicate that in the absence of any competitive dimension the performance difference between men and women is not statistically significant at the usual le…
Dispelling misconceptions about economics
Some popular views about the workings of the economy are completely at odds with solid empirical evidence and congruent theoretical explanations and therefore can be qualified as misconceptions. Such beliefs lead to support for harmful policies. Cognitive biases may contribute to explaining why misconceptions persist even when scientific information is provided to people. We conduct two experimental studies to investigate, for the first time in e…
Advice from women and men and selection into competition
El rompecabezas de las preferencias sociales
Presentamos un breve panorama de la literatura en economía experimental sobre preferencias sociales. En numerosos experimentos, participantes con incentivos económicos están dispuestos a sacrificar parte de sus ingresos materiales para compensar el comportamiento amable de otros o a pagar un precio positivo para castigar el comportamiento de individuos egoístas. En economía todas estas acciones reciben el calificativo de sociales, porque no hay u…
Managerial Leadership, Truth-Telling, and Efficient Coordination
We study the manager-agent game, a novel coordination game played between a manager and two agents. Unlike commonly studied coordination games, the manager-agent game stresses asymmetric information (agents know the state of the world, but managers do not) and asymmetric payoffs (for all states of the world, agents have opposing preferences over outcomes). Efficient coordination requires coordinating agents’ actions and utilising their private in…
Political autonomy and independence
We use a game-theoretical model and results from laboratory experiments to study the process by which subordinated regions of a country can obtain a more favorable political status. In our theoretical model a dominant and a dominated region first interact through a political process. This process involves two referenda, one at the level of the country as a whole and one at the level of the subordinated region. If the political process succeeds, t…
Pivotal Suppliers and Market Power in Experimental Supply Function Competition
We use experiments to study market power with supply function competition, akin to the competition in electricity markets. Our treatments vary the distribution of demand levels as well as the amount and symmetry of the allocation of production capacity between different suppliers. We relate our results to a descriptive power index and to the predictions of two models: a supply function equilibrium (SFE) model and a multi-unit auction (MUA) model.…
How Universal is Behavior? A Four Country Comparison of Spite and Cooperation in Voluntary Contribution Mechanisms
Do Labour Market Conditions Affect Gift Exchange? Some Experimental Evidence
We study how two dimensions of market conditions affect behaviour in experimental gift-exchange markets with repeated interaction. First, we consider the impact of competitive imbalance, by varying whether there is an excess supply of firms or an excess supply of workers in the market. Second, we impose a minimum wage in the market with an excess supply of workers, and study the overall effect on wages and productivity. Perhaps surprisingly, the …
Fair Procedures
Procedures are the area where fairness arguably has its largest influence on modern societies. The experiments we report provide an initial characterisation of that influence and suggest new interpretations for some well-known results. We find that procedural fairness is conceptually distinct from allocation fairness, although the evidence also indicates that the two are linked in important ways. "Post hoc" extension of one of the current models …
Competition with Forward Contracts
We use experiments to study the efficiency effects for a market as a whole of adding the possibility of forward contracting to a pre-existing spot market. We deal separately with the cases where spot market competition is in quantities and where it is in supply functions. In both cases we compare the effect of adding a contract market with the introduction of an additional competitor, changing the market structure from a triopoly to a quadropoly.…
The strategy versus the direct-response method
In this paper, we present a first survey of the literature regarding whether the strategy method, in which a responder makes conditional decisions for each possible information set, leads to different experimental results than does the more standard direct-response method, in which the responder learns the action of the first mover and then chooses a response. Of the twenty-nine existing comparisons, sixteen find no difference, while four do find…
El rompecabezas de las preferencias sociales
Presentamos un breve panorama de la literatura en economía experimental sobre preferencias sociales. En numerosos experimentos, participantes con incentivos económicos están dispuestos a sacrificar parte de sus ingresos materiales para compensar el comportamiento amable de otros o a pagar un precio positivo para castigar el comportamiento de individuos egoístas. En economía todas estas acciones reciben el calificativo de sociales, porque no hay u…
The emergence of employer information networks in an experimental labor market
The Norm-Signaling Effects of Group Punishment
Punishment plays a crucial role in favoring and maintaining social order. Recent studies emphasize the effect of the norm-signaling function of punishment. However, very little attention has been paid so far to the potential of group punishment. We claim that when inflicted by an entire group, the recipient of punishment views it as expressing norms. The experiments performed in this work provide evidence that humans are motivated not only by mat…
Pivotal Suppliers and Market Power in Experimental Supply Function Competition
We use experiments to study market power with supply function competition, akin to the competition in electricity markets. Our treatments vary the distribution of demand levels as well as the amount and symmetry of the allocation of production capacity between different suppliers. We relate our results to a descriptive power index and to the predictions of two models: a supply function equilibrium (SFE) model and a multi-unit auction (MUA) model.…
Political autonomy and independence
We use a game-theoretical model and results from laboratory experiments to study the process by which subordinated regions of a country can obtain a more favorable political status. In our theoretical model a dominant and a dominated region first interact through a political process. This process involves two referenda, one at the level of the country as a whole and one at the level of the subordinated region. If the political process succeeds, t…
Advice from women and men and selection into competition
Dispelling misconceptions about economics
Some popular views about the workings of the economy are completely at odds with solid empirical evidence and congruent theoretical explanations and therefore can be qualified as misconceptions. Such beliefs lead to support for harmful policies. Cognitive biases may contribute to explaining why misconceptions persist even when scientific information is provided to people. We conduct two experimental studies to investigate, for the first time in e…
Competition and Gender Inequality
This study uses data from a series of laboratory experiments to provide a comprehensive analysis of gender differences in performance caused by two different dimensions of competition—rivalry for resources and status ranking. It also examines two mechanisms behind such differences. The results indicate that in the absence of any competitive dimension the performance difference between men and women is not statistically significant at the usual le…
Managerial Leadership, Truth-Telling, and Efficient Coordination
We study the manager-agent game, a novel coordination game played between a manager and two agents. Unlike commonly studied coordination games, the manager-agent game stresses asymmetric information (agents know the state of the world, but managers do not) and asymmetric payoffs (for all states of the world, agents have opposing preferences over outcomes). Efficient coordination requires coordinating agents’ actions and utilising their private in…
Bidding for better jobs
There is evidence from experiments, using real-effort tasks and tournament incentives, documenting women performing worse than men under competition. We question whether this perhaps is due to the very particular way in which competition is typically studied in lab experiments. We alternatively model competitive behavior in firms by letting experimental participants compete in bidding for salaries (prizes) of different sizes in flat or steep orga…
Economics (12 works) · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies (11 works) · Computer Science (8 works) · Microeconomics (8 works) · Psychology (8 works) · Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics (6 works) · Social Psychology (5 works) · Auction Theory and Applications (4 works) · Business (4 works) · Competition (biology (4 works)