Mehmet Bac
Biographic Data
| ID | 1117174 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Mehmet Bac |
| GIVEN NAMES | Mehmet |
| FAMILY NAME | Bac |
| SIGNATURE | BAC M |
| AFFILIATIONS | Sabancı Üniversitesi |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-7067-9982 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 4 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 10 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 4 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2001 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2024 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Ex ante transparency and corruption by networks
This paper explains the structure of corruption networks as response to ex ante transparency, defined as visibility of authorities whose cooperation clients may need, in due course, to execute corrupt transactions. It also characterizes the optimal transparency policy given the network response, as a function of connection costs, sanctions, the corruption surplus and the detection probability (hence the anti‐corruption budget and ex post transpar…
Two Types of Collusion in a Model of Hierarchical Agency
The standard ex post type of collusion is a supervisor-agent agreement to misrepresent the outcome of supervision. Under ex ante collusion the agent makes a side transfer to the supervisor, who, in return, stops monitoring the agent's productivity. Extending Tirole's [1986] model of hierarchy to include ex ante collusion and supervision costs, we show that the principal can ignore ex ante collusion and the supervisor's incentive constraint if sup…
Beneficial collusion in corruption control
Corruption, Connections and Transparency
Corruption, Connections and Transparency
Two Types of Collusion in a Model of Hierarchical Agency
The standard ex post type of collusion is a supervisor-agent agreement to misrepresent the outcome of supervision. Under ex ante collusion the agent makes a side transfer to the supervisor, who, in return, stops monitoring the agent's productivity. Extending Tirole's [1986] model of hierarchy to include ex ante collusion and supervision costs, we show that the principal can ignore ex ante collusion and the supervisor's incentive constraint if sup…
Beneficial collusion in corruption control
Ex ante transparency and corruption by networks
This paper explains the structure of corruption networks as response to ex ante transparency, defined as visibility of authorities whose cooperation clients may need, in due course, to execute corrupt transactions. It also characterizes the optimal transparency policy given the network response, as a function of connection costs, sanctions, the corruption surplus and the detection probability (hence the anti‐corruption budget and ex post transpar…
Business (4 works) · Economics (4 works) · Auction Theory and Applications (3 works) · Computer Science (3 works) · Computer security (3 works) · Corruption and Economic Development (3 works) · Language change (3 works) · Law (3 works) · Microeconomics (3 works) · Political science (3 works)