Carolina Sartorio
Biographic Data
| ID | 1118236 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Carolina Sartorio |
| GIVEN NAMES | Carolina |
| FAMILY NAME | Sartorio |
| SIGNATURE | SARTORIO C |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Arizona |
| ORCID | 0009-0009-3797-6000 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 11 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 34 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 11 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2004 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 3 |
Causalism
This essay is based on the Gaos lectures given at UNAM in March 2025. The general topic is the metaphysical underpinnings of moral responsibility, both in its basic and non-basic forms. It motivates causalism as a general framework from which to understand both forms of responsibility. It consists of two parts. The focus of the first part is basic responsibility—in particular, the metaphysical condition for that form of responsibility: free actio…
A good cause
The grounds of our freedom
Frankfurt’s ‘Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility’ broke with the tradition of understanding the kind of freedom required for responsibility in terms of alternative possibilities. At the same time, it inspired and motivated a new family of views in its place: views that focus exclusively on actual sequences or the actual causes of behaviour. But, what exactly does that ‘exclusiveness’ claim amount to? At first sight, it may seem natur…
The concept of responsibility in the ethics of self-defense and war
Causation and Free Will
The author argues that only the actual causes of our behavior matter to our freedom. Although this simple view of freedom clashes with most theories of responsibility, including the most prominent "actual sequence" theories currently on offer, the author argues for its truth. The key, she claims, lies in a correct understanding of the role played by causation in a view of that kind. causation has some important features that make it a responsibil…
Making a Difference in a Deterministic World
Some philosophers have claimed that causally determined agents are not morally responsible because they cannot make a difference in the world. A recent response by philosophers who defend the compatibility of determinism and responsibility has been to concede that causally determined agents are incapable of making a difference, but to argue that responsibility is not grounded in difference making. These compatibilists have rested such a claim on …
Resultant Luck
The focus of this paper is the concept of resultant (moral) luck. Resultant luck is one of the four varieties of moral luck originally identified by Nagel in his (1979).1 It is the variety of moral luck that most plainly seems to illustrate the fact that commonsense morality is committed to the existence of moral luck and, also, for many, it is the most obviously problematic kind of luck. Resultant luck is usually characterized quite loosely, as …
Causation and Responsibility
In this article I examine the relation between causation and moral responsibility. I distinguish four possible views about that relation. One is the standard view: the view that an agent's moral responsibility for an outcome requires, and is grounded in, the agent's causal responsibility for it. I discuss several challenges to the standard view, which motivate the three remaining views. The final view - the view I argue for - is that causation is…
Failures to Act and Failures of Additivity
Causes As Difference-Makers
How To Be Responsible For Something Without Causing It
Causes As Difference-Makers
How To Be Responsible For Something Without Causing It
Causation and Responsibility
In this article I examine the relation between causation and moral responsibility. I distinguish four possible views about that relation. One is the standard view: the view that an agent's moral responsibility for an outcome requires, and is grounded in, the agent's causal responsibility for it. I discuss several challenges to the standard view, which motivate the three remaining views. The final view - the view I argue for - is that causation is…
Failures to Act and Failures of Additivity
Making a Difference in a Deterministic World
Some philosophers have claimed that causally determined agents are not morally responsible because they cannot make a difference in the world. A recent response by philosophers who defend the compatibility of determinism and responsibility has been to concede that causally determined agents are incapable of making a difference, but to argue that responsibility is not grounded in difference making. These compatibilists have rested such a claim on …
Resultant Luck
The focus of this paper is the concept of resultant (moral) luck. Resultant luck is one of the four varieties of moral luck originally identified by Nagel in his (1979).1 It is the variety of moral luck that most plainly seems to illustrate the fact that commonsense morality is committed to the existence of moral luck and, also, for many, it is the most obviously problematic kind of luck. Resultant luck is usually characterized quite loosely, as …
How To Be Responsible For Something Without Causing It
Causes As Difference-Makers
Failures to Act and Failures of Additivity
Causation and Responsibility
In this article I examine the relation between causation and moral responsibility. I distinguish four possible views about that relation. One is the standard view: the view that an agent's moral responsibility for an outcome requires, and is grounded in, the agent's causal responsibility for it. I discuss several challenges to the standard view, which motivate the three remaining views. The final view - the view I argue for - is that causation is…
Resultant Luck
The focus of this paper is the concept of resultant (moral) luck. Resultant luck is one of the four varieties of moral luck originally identified by Nagel in his (1979).1 It is the variety of moral luck that most plainly seems to illustrate the fact that commonsense morality is committed to the existence of moral luck and, also, for many, it is the most obviously problematic kind of luck. Resultant luck is usually characterized quite loosely, as …
Making a Difference in a Deterministic World
Some philosophers have claimed that causally determined agents are not morally responsible because they cannot make a difference in the world. A recent response by philosophers who defend the compatibility of determinism and responsibility has been to concede that causally determined agents are incapable of making a difference, but to argue that responsibility is not grounded in difference making. These compatibilists have rested such a claim on …
Causation and Free Will
The author argues that only the actual causes of our behavior matter to our freedom. Although this simple view of freedom clashes with most theories of responsibility, including the most prominent "actual sequence" theories currently on offer, the author argues for its truth. The key, she claims, lies in a correct understanding of the role played by causation in a view of that kind. causation has some important features that make it a responsibil…
The concept of responsibility in the ethics of self-defense and war
The grounds of our freedom
Frankfurt’s ‘Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility’ broke with the tradition of understanding the kind of freedom required for responsibility in terms of alternative possibilities. At the same time, it inspired and motivated a new family of views in its place: views that focus exclusively on actual sequences or the actual causes of behaviour. But, what exactly does that ‘exclusiveness’ claim amount to? At first sight, it may seem natur…
A good cause
Causalism
This essay is based on the Gaos lectures given at UNAM in March 2025. The general topic is the metaphysical underpinnings of moral responsibility, both in its basic and non-basic forms. It motivates causalism as a general framework from which to understand both forms of responsibility. It consists of two parts. The focus of the first part is basic responsibility—in particular, the metaphysical condition for that form of responsibility: free actio…
Free Will and Agency (10 works) · Epistemology (8 works) · Philosophical Ethics and Theory (7 works) · Philosophy (7 works) · Moral responsibility (6 works) · War, Ethics, and Justification (6 works) · Computer Science (5 works) · Metaphysics (5 works) · Political science (5 works) · Compatibilism (4 works)