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Gene M Grossman

Biographic Data

ID1118409
NAMEGene M Grossman
GIVEN NAMESGene M
FAMILY NAMEGrossman
SIGNATUREGROSSMAN G M
AFFILIATIONSPrinceton University
VERIFIEDNo
TOTAL WORKS31
TOTAL CITATIONS239
AUTHOR COUNT30
EDITOR COUNT1
FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR1982
LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR2023
H-INDEX7
  • Electoral competition with fake news

    Open Access•Gene M Grossman, Elhanan Helpman•ARTICLE•European Journal of Political…•2023

  • Supply Chain Resilience: Should Policy Promote International Diversification or Reshoring

    Gene M Grossman, Elhanan Helpman et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•2023•Cited by: 6

    Little is known about optimal policy in the face of global supply chain disruptions. Should governments promote resilience by subsidizing backup sources of input supply in multiple countries? Should they encourage firms to source from safer domestic suppliers? We address these questions in a model of production with a critical input and exogenous risks of supply disturbances. With constant elasticity of substitution preferences, a subsidy for div…

  • Matching, Sorting, and the Distributional Effects of International Trade

    Gene M Grossman, Elhanan Helpman et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•2016•Cited by: 3•References: 2

    Electronically published December 16, 2016

  • Income Distribution, Product Quality, and International Trade

    Pablo Fajgelbaum, Gene M Grossman et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•2011•Cited by: 23•References: 1

    We develop a framework for studying trade in vertically and horizontally differentiated products. In our model, consumers with heterogeneous incomes and tastes purchase a homogeneous good as well as making a discrete choice of quality and variety of a differentiated product. The distribution of preferences in the population generates a nested logit demand structure. These demands are such that the fraction of consumers who buy a higher-quality pr…

  • Institutions and Economic Performance

    Daron Acemoglu, Kevin E Davis et al.•BOOK•Institutions and Economic…•2008

    Preface * Introduction Part One: History * The Impact of Administrative Power on Political and Economic Developments: Toward a Political Economy of Implementation Avner Greif * The Institutional Origins of the Industrial Revolution Joel Mokyr * Institutions and the Resource Curse in Early Modern Spain Mauricio Drelichman and Hans-Joachim Voth * Slavery, Inequality, and Economic Development in the Americas: An Examination of the Engerman-Sokoloff …

  • Outsourcing in a Global Economy

    Gene M Grossman, Elhanan Helpman•ARTICLE•The Review of Economic Studies•2005

    We study the determinants of the location of subcontracted activity in a general equilibrium model of outsourcing and trade. We model outsourcing as an activity that requires search for a partner and relationship-specific investments that are governed by incomplete contracts. The extent of international outsourcing depends inter alia on the thickness of the domestic and foreign market for input suppliers, the relative cost of searching in each ma…

  • The Distribution of Talent and the Pattern and Consequences of International Trade

    Gene M Grossman•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•2004•Cited by: 2•References: 1

    In an economy with imperfect labor contracts, differences in the distribution of talent can be an independent source of comparative advantage. I study a world economy with two activities, one in which an individual's contribution to production can be measured accurately and another in which workers engage in joint production. When individuals have private information about their own talents, the most able workers self-select into the occupation i…

  • Special Interest Politics

    Gene M Grossman, Elhanan Helpman•ARTICLE•Journal of Institutional and…•2002

    Special Interest Politics

  • Special Interest Politics

    Gene M Grossman, Elhanan Helpman•BOOK•Special Interest Politics•2001

  • The Dynamics of Political Compromise

    Avinash Dixit, Gene M Grossman et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•2000•Cited by: 35•References: 8

    We characterize efficient self‐enforcing divisions of political or economic surplus between two parties that interact repeatedly. The party in power can decide the allocation, and the parties' political strength changes according to a Markov process. We find that the share of the party currently in power depends not only on its current strength but also on whether it had previously been even stronger since it last came to power. We find that the …

  • Lori's Foes Fight Back

    Maria Livanos Cattaui, Gene M Grossman et al.•ARTICLE•Foreign Policy•2000

  • Intergenerational Redistribution with Short‐lived Governments

    Open Access•Gene M Grossman, Gene Grossman et al.•ARTICLE•The Economic Journal•1998•Cited by: 11•References: 3

    Journal Article Intergenerational Redistribution with Short‐lived Governments Get access Gene Grossman, Gene Grossman Princeton University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Elhanan Helpman Elhanan Helpman Harvard University, Tel Aviv University and CIAR Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Economic Journal, Volume 108, Issue 450, 1 September 1998, Pages 1299–1329, http…

  • Common Agency and Coordination: General Theory and Application to Government Policy Making

    Avinash Dixit, Gene M Grossman et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•1997•Cited by: 68•References: 2

    The authors develop a model of common agency with complete information and general preferences with nontransferable utility, and they prove that the principals' Nash equilibrium in truthful strategies implements an efficient action. The authors apply this theory to the construction of a positive model of public finance, where organized special interests can lobby the government for consumer and producer taxes or subsidies and targeted lump-sum ta…

  • Electoral Competition and Special Interest Politics

    Gene M Grossman, Elhanan Helpman•ARTICLE•The Review of Economic Studies•1996

    We study the competition between two political parties for seats in a legislature. The parties have fixed positions on some issues, but vary their positions on others in order to attract votes and campaign contributions. In this context, we examine whether special interest groups are governed by an electoral motive or an influence in their campaign giving, and how their contributions affect the equilibrium platforms. We show that each party is in…

  • Economic Growth and the Environment

    Gene M Grossman, Alan B Krueger•ARTICLE•The Quarterly Journal of Economics•1995

    We examine the reduced-form relationship between per capita income and various environmental indicators. Our study covers four types of indicators: urban air pollution, the state of the oxygen regime in river basins, fecal contamination of river basins, and contamination of river basins by heavy metals. We find no evidence that environmental quality deteriorates steadily with economic growth. Rather, for most indicators, economic growth brings an…

  • Handbook of International Economics Volume 3 (Handbooks in Economics)

    Kenneth S Rogoff, Gene M Grossman et al.•BOOK•Handbook of International…•1995

  • Preface to the handbook

    Gene M Grossman, Kenneth Rogoff•CHAPTER•Handbook of International…•1995

  • Trade Wars and Trade Talks

    Gene M Grossman, Elhanan Helpman•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•1995•Cited by: 16

    Whether governments clash in trade disputes or negotiate over trade agreements, their actions in the international arena reflect political conditions back home. Previous studies of cooperative and noncooperative trade relations have focused on governments that are immune from political pressures and that act as benevolent servants of the public interest. Here we take a first step toward introducing domestic politics into the analysis of internati…

  • Electoral Competition and Special Interest Politics

    Gene M Grossman, Gene Grossman et al.•REPORT•National Bureau of Economic…•1994

    We study the competition between two political parties for seats in a parliament. The parliament will set two types of policies: ideological and non-ideological. The parties have fixed positions on the ideological issues, but choose their non-ideological platforms to attract voters and campaign contributions. In this context, we ask: Flow do the equilibrium contributions from special interest groups influence the platforms of the parties? We show…

  • Endogenous Innovation in the Theory of Growth

    Open Access•Gene M Grossman, Elhanan Helpman•ARTICLE•The Journal of Economic…•1994•Cited by: 41•References: 21

    This paper makes the case that purposive, profit-seeking investments in knowledge play a critical role in the long-run growth process. First, the authors review the implications of neoclassical growth theory and the more recent theories of 'endogenous growth.' Then they discuss the empirical evidence that bears on the modeling of long-run growth. Finally, the authors describe in more detail a model of growth based on endogenous technological prog…

  • Innovation and growth in the global economy

    Gene M Grossman•BOOK•Innovation and growth in the…•1991

  • Quality Ladders in the Theory of Growth

    Gene M Grossman, Elhanan Helpman•ARTICLE•The Review of Economic Studies•1991

    We develop a model of repeated product improvements in a continuum of sectors. Each product follows a stochastic progression up a quality ladder. Progress is not uniform across sectors, so an equilibrium distribution of qualities evolves over time. But the rate of aggregate growth is constant. The growth rate responds to profit incentives in the R&D sector. We explore the welfare properties of our model. Then we relate our approach to an alternat…

  • Quality Ladders and Product Cycles

    Gene M Grossman, Elhanan Helpman•ARTICLE•The Quarterly Journal of Economics•1991

    We develop a two-country model of endogenous innovation and imitation in order to study the interactions between these two processes. Firms in the North race to bring out the next generation of a set of technology-intensive products. Each product potentially can be improved a countably infinite number of times, but quality improvements require the investment of resources and entail uncertain prospects of success. In the South entrepreneurs invest…

  • Trade, knowledge spillovers, and growth

    Open Access•Gene M Grossman, Elhanan Helpman•ARTICLE•European Economic Review•1991

  • Environmental Impacts of a North American Free Trade Agreement

    Gene M Grossman, Gene Grossman et al.•REPORT•National Bureau of Economic…•1991

    A reduction in trade barriers generally will affect the environment by expanding the scale of economic activity, by altering the composition of economic activity, and by bringing about a change in the techniques of production. We present empirical evidence to assess the relative magnitudes of these three effects as they apply to further trade liberalization in Mexico.

Next
  • Common Agency and Coordination: General Theory and Application to Government Policy Making

    Avinash Dixit, Gene M Grossman et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•1997•Cited by: 68•References: 2

    The authors develop a model of common agency with complete information and general preferences with nontransferable utility, and they prove that the principals' Nash equilibrium in truthful strategies implements an efficient action. The authors apply this theory to the construction of a positive model of public finance, where organized special interests can lobby the government for consumer and producer taxes or subsidies and targeted lump-sum ta…

  • Endogenous Innovation in the Theory of Growth

    Open Access•Gene M Grossman, Elhanan Helpman•ARTICLE•The Journal of Economic…•1994•Cited by: 41•References: 21

    This paper makes the case that purposive, profit-seeking investments in knowledge play a critical role in the long-run growth process. First, the authors review the implications of neoclassical growth theory and the more recent theories of 'endogenous growth.' Then they discuss the empirical evidence that bears on the modeling of long-run growth. Finally, the authors describe in more detail a model of growth based on endogenous technological prog…

  • The Dynamics of Political Compromise

    Avinash Dixit, Gene M Grossman et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•2000•Cited by: 35•References: 8

    We characterize efficient self‐enforcing divisions of political or economic surplus between two parties that interact repeatedly. The party in power can decide the allocation, and the parties' political strength changes according to a Markov process. We find that the share of the party currently in power depends not only on its current strength but also on whether it had previously been even stronger since it last came to power. We find that the …

  • Income Distribution, Product Quality, and International Trade

    Pablo Fajgelbaum, Gene M Grossman et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•2011•Cited by: 23•References: 1

    We develop a framework for studying trade in vertically and horizontally differentiated products. In our model, consumers with heterogeneous incomes and tastes purchase a homogeneous good as well as making a discrete choice of quality and variety of a differentiated product. The distribution of preferences in the population generates a nested logit demand structure. These demands are such that the fraction of consumers who buy a higher-quality pr…

  • Endogenous Product Cycles

    Gene M Grossman, Elhanan Helpman•ARTICLE•The Economic Journal•1991•Cited by: 17

    Journal Article Endogenous Product Cycles Get access Gene M. Grossman, Gene M. Grossman Princeton University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Elhanan Helpman Elhanan Helpman Tel Aviv University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Economic Journal, Volume 101, Issue 408, 1 September 1991, Pages 1214–1229, https://doi.org/10.2307/2234437 Published: 01 September 1991

  • Trade Wars and Trade Talks

    Gene M Grossman, Elhanan Helpman•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•1995•Cited by: 16

    Whether governments clash in trade disputes or negotiate over trade agreements, their actions in the international arena reflect political conditions back home. Previous studies of cooperative and noncooperative trade relations have focused on governments that are immune from political pressures and that act as benevolent servants of the public interest. Here we take a first step toward introducing domestic politics into the analysis of internati…

  • Intergenerational Redistribution with Short‐lived Governments

    Open Access•Gene M Grossman, Gene Grossman et al.•ARTICLE•The Economic Journal•1998•Cited by: 11•References: 3

    Journal Article Intergenerational Redistribution with Short‐lived Governments Get access Gene Grossman, Gene Grossman Princeton University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Elhanan Helpman Elhanan Helpman Harvard University, Tel Aviv University and CIAR Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Economic Journal, Volume 108, Issue 450, 1 September 1998, Pages 1299–1329, http…

  • Dynamic R & D Competition

    Gene M Grossman, Carl Shapiro•ARTICLE•The Economic Journal•1987•Cited by: 7

    Journal Article Dynamic R & D Competition Get access Gene M. Grossman, Gene M. Grossman Princeton University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Carl Shapiro Carl Shapiro Princeton University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Economic Journal, Volume 97, Issue 386, 1 June 1987, Pages 372–387, https://doi.org/10.2307/2232884 Published: 01 June 1987

  • Supply Chain Resilience: Should Policy Promote International Diversification or Reshoring

    Gene M Grossman, Elhanan Helpman et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•2023•Cited by: 6

    Little is known about optimal policy in the face of global supply chain disruptions. Should governments promote resilience by subsidizing backup sources of input supply in multiple countries? Should they encourage firms to source from safer domestic suppliers? We address these questions in a model of production with a critical input and exogenous risks of supply disturbances. With constant elasticity of substitution preferences, a subsidy for div…

  • Product Development and International Trade

    Gene M Grossman, Elhanan Helpman•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•1989•Cited by: 5

    The authors develop a multicountry, dynamic general equilibrium model of product innovation and international trade to study the creation of comparative advantage through R$50D and the evolution of world trade over time. In their model, firms must incur resource costs to introduce new products, and forward-looking potential producers conduct R$50D and enter the product market whenever profit opportunities exist. Trade has both intraindustry and i…

  • A Theory of Factor Mobility

    Gene M Grossman, Carl D Shapiro et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•1982•Cited by: 5•References: 2

    In this paper we study the determinants of intersectoral factor mobility. Mobility is the outgrowth of a prior investment decision. In particular, we focus on the human capital (i.e., training) decisions of workers. Uncertainty isa critical feature in such training decisions. The acquisition of general (vs. specific) skills allows a worker to select the more favorable sector after uncertainty is resolved. Thus general training has option value, w…

  • Matching, Sorting, and the Distributional Effects of International Trade

    Gene M Grossman, Elhanan Helpman et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•2016•Cited by: 3•References: 2

    Electronically published December 16, 2016

  • The Distribution of Talent and the Pattern and Consequences of International Trade

    Gene M Grossman•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•2004•Cited by: 2•References: 1

    In an economy with imperfect labor contracts, differences in the distribution of talent can be an independent source of comparative advantage. I study a world economy with two activities, one in which an individual's contribution to production can be measured accurately and another in which workers engage in joint production. When individuals have private information about their own talents, the most able workers self-select into the occupation i…

  • Import Competition from Developed and Developing Countries

    Gene M Grossman•ARTICLE•The Review of Economics and…•1982

    Separate demand equations for imports from less-developed countries (LDCs) and imports from developed countries (DCs) were estimated for each of eleven representative product groups. Imports were found to compete quite readily with domestically produced goods, with plausible own-price and cross-price elasticities. Whereas the quantity of each type of import was found to be quite responsive to changes in the price of US home goods, each appears to…

  • A Theory of Factor Mobility

    Gene M Grossman, Carl D Shapiro et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•1982•Cited by: 5•References: 2

    In this paper we study the determinants of intersectoral factor mobility. Mobility is the outgrowth of a prior investment decision. In particular, we focus on the human capital (i.e., training) decisions of workers. Uncertainty isa critical feature in such training decisions. The acquisition of general (vs. specific) skills allows a worker to select the more favorable sector after uncertainty is resolved. Thus general training has option value, w…

  • International Capital Movements under Uncertainty

    Gene M Grossman, Assaf Razin•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•1984

    In this paper we analyze the determinants of international movements of physical capital in a model with uncertainty and international trade in goods and securities. In our model, the world allocation of capital is governed, to some extent, by the asset preferences of risk-averse consumer-investors. In a one-good variant in the spirit of the MacDougall model, we find that relative factor abundance, relative labor force size, and relative producti…

  • Dynamic R & D Competition

    Gene M Grossman, Carl Shapiro•ARTICLE•The Economic Journal•1987•Cited by: 7

    Journal Article Dynamic R & D Competition Get access Gene M. Grossman, Gene M. Grossman Princeton University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Carl Shapiro Carl Shapiro Princeton University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Economic Journal, Volume 97, Issue 386, 1 June 1987, Pages 372–387, https://doi.org/10.2307/2232884 Published: 01 June 1987

  • Product Development and International Trade

    Gene M Grossman, Elhanan Helpman•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•1989•Cited by: 5

    The authors develop a multicountry, dynamic general equilibrium model of product innovation and international trade to study the creation of comparative advantage through R$50D and the evolution of world trade over time. In their model, firms must incur resource costs to introduce new products, and forward-looking potential producers conduct R$50D and enter the product market whenever profit opportunities exist. Trade has both intraindustry and i…

  • Innovation and growth in the global economy

    Gene M Grossman•BOOK•Innovation and growth in the…•1991

  • Quality Ladders in the Theory of Growth

    Gene M Grossman, Elhanan Helpman•ARTICLE•The Review of Economic Studies•1991

    We develop a model of repeated product improvements in a continuum of sectors. Each product follows a stochastic progression up a quality ladder. Progress is not uniform across sectors, so an equilibrium distribution of qualities evolves over time. But the rate of aggregate growth is constant. The growth rate responds to profit incentives in the R&D sector. We explore the welfare properties of our model. Then we relate our approach to an alternat…

  • Quality Ladders and Product Cycles

    Gene M Grossman, Elhanan Helpman•ARTICLE•The Quarterly Journal of Economics•1991

    We develop a two-country model of endogenous innovation and imitation in order to study the interactions between these two processes. Firms in the North race to bring out the next generation of a set of technology-intensive products. Each product potentially can be improved a countably infinite number of times, but quality improvements require the investment of resources and entail uncertain prospects of success. In the South entrepreneurs invest…

  • Trade, knowledge spillovers, and growth

    Open Access•Gene M Grossman, Elhanan Helpman•ARTICLE•European Economic Review•1991

  • Environmental Impacts of a North American Free Trade Agreement

    Gene M Grossman, Gene Grossman et al.•REPORT•National Bureau of Economic…•1991

    A reduction in trade barriers generally will affect the environment by expanding the scale of economic activity, by altering the composition of economic activity, and by bringing about a change in the techniques of production. We present empirical evidence to assess the relative magnitudes of these three effects as they apply to further trade liberalization in Mexico.

  • Endogenous Product Cycles

    Gene M Grossman, Elhanan Helpman•ARTICLE•The Economic Journal•1991•Cited by: 17

    Journal Article Endogenous Product Cycles Get access Gene M. Grossman, Gene M. Grossman Princeton University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Elhanan Helpman Elhanan Helpman Tel Aviv University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Economic Journal, Volume 101, Issue 408, 1 September 1991, Pages 1214–1229, https://doi.org/10.2307/2234437 Published: 01 September 1991

  • Electoral Competition and Special Interest Politics

    Gene M Grossman, Gene Grossman et al.•REPORT•National Bureau of Economic…•1994

    We study the competition between two political parties for seats in a parliament. The parliament will set two types of policies: ideological and non-ideological. The parties have fixed positions on the ideological issues, but choose their non-ideological platforms to attract voters and campaign contributions. In this context, we ask: Flow do the equilibrium contributions from special interest groups influence the platforms of the parties? We show…

  • Endogenous Innovation in the Theory of Growth

    Open Access•Gene M Grossman, Elhanan Helpman•ARTICLE•The Journal of Economic…•1994•Cited by: 41•References: 21

    This paper makes the case that purposive, profit-seeking investments in knowledge play a critical role in the long-run growth process. First, the authors review the implications of neoclassical growth theory and the more recent theories of 'endogenous growth.' Then they discuss the empirical evidence that bears on the modeling of long-run growth. Finally, the authors describe in more detail a model of growth based on endogenous technological prog…

  • Economic Growth and the Environment

    Gene M Grossman, Alan B Krueger•ARTICLE•The Quarterly Journal of Economics•1995

    We examine the reduced-form relationship between per capita income and various environmental indicators. Our study covers four types of indicators: urban air pollution, the state of the oxygen regime in river basins, fecal contamination of river basins, and contamination of river basins by heavy metals. We find no evidence that environmental quality deteriorates steadily with economic growth. Rather, for most indicators, economic growth brings an…

  • Handbook of International Economics Volume 3 (Handbooks in Economics)

    Kenneth S Rogoff, Gene M Grossman et al.•BOOK•Handbook of International…•1995

  • Preface to the handbook

    Gene M Grossman, Kenneth Rogoff•CHAPTER•Handbook of International…•1995

  • Trade Wars and Trade Talks

    Gene M Grossman, Elhanan Helpman•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•1995•Cited by: 16

    Whether governments clash in trade disputes or negotiate over trade agreements, their actions in the international arena reflect political conditions back home. Previous studies of cooperative and noncooperative trade relations have focused on governments that are immune from political pressures and that act as benevolent servants of the public interest. Here we take a first step toward introducing domestic politics into the analysis of internati…

  • Electoral Competition and Special Interest Politics

    Gene M Grossman, Elhanan Helpman•ARTICLE•The Review of Economic Studies•1996

    We study the competition between two political parties for seats in a legislature. The parties have fixed positions on some issues, but vary their positions on others in order to attract votes and campaign contributions. In this context, we examine whether special interest groups are governed by an electoral motive or an influence in their campaign giving, and how their contributions affect the equilibrium platforms. We show that each party is in…

  • Common Agency and Coordination: General Theory and Application to Government Policy Making

    Avinash Dixit, Gene M Grossman et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•1997•Cited by: 68•References: 2

    The authors develop a model of common agency with complete information and general preferences with nontransferable utility, and they prove that the principals' Nash equilibrium in truthful strategies implements an efficient action. The authors apply this theory to the construction of a positive model of public finance, where organized special interests can lobby the government for consumer and producer taxes or subsidies and targeted lump-sum ta…

  • Intergenerational Redistribution with Short‐lived Governments

    Open Access•Gene M Grossman, Gene Grossman et al.•ARTICLE•The Economic Journal•1998•Cited by: 11•References: 3

    Journal Article Intergenerational Redistribution with Short‐lived Governments Get access Gene Grossman, Gene Grossman Princeton University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Elhanan Helpman Elhanan Helpman Harvard University, Tel Aviv University and CIAR Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Economic Journal, Volume 108, Issue 450, 1 September 1998, Pages 1299–1329, http…

  • The Dynamics of Political Compromise

    Avinash Dixit, Gene M Grossman et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•2000•Cited by: 35•References: 8

    We characterize efficient self‐enforcing divisions of political or economic surplus between two parties that interact repeatedly. The party in power can decide the allocation, and the parties' political strength changes according to a Markov process. We find that the share of the party currently in power depends not only on its current strength but also on whether it had previously been even stronger since it last came to power. We find that the …

  • Lori's Foes Fight Back

    Maria Livanos Cattaui, Gene M Grossman et al.•ARTICLE•Foreign Policy•2000

  • Special Interest Politics

    Gene M Grossman, Elhanan Helpman•BOOK•Special Interest Politics•2001

  • Special Interest Politics

    Gene M Grossman, Elhanan Helpman•ARTICLE•Journal of Institutional and…•2002

    Special Interest Politics

  • The Distribution of Talent and the Pattern and Consequences of International Trade

    Gene M Grossman•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•2004•Cited by: 2•References: 1

    In an economy with imperfect labor contracts, differences in the distribution of talent can be an independent source of comparative advantage. I study a world economy with two activities, one in which an individual's contribution to production can be measured accurately and another in which workers engage in joint production. When individuals have private information about their own talents, the most able workers self-select into the occupation i…

Economics (27 works) · Political science (13 works) · Microeconomics (11 works) · Law (9 works) · Politics (9 works) · Business (8 works) · Computer Science (8 works) · Economic Growth and Productivity (8 works) · Global trade and economics (8 works) · International trade (6 works)

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