M Vittoria Levati
Biographic Data
| ID | 1119264 |
|---|---|
| NAME | M Vittoria Levati |
| GIVEN NAMES | M Vittoria |
| FAMILY NAME | Levati |
| SIGNATURE | LEVATI M V |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Verona |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-5416-3759 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 12 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 42 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 12 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2005 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 3 |
Social and moral distance in risky settings
While many socially desirable actions are risky and involve non-anonymous others, it remains largely untested whether lower subject-subject anonymity affects behavior under risk. In variations of the dictator game, we vary the party who is exposed to risk and manipulate anonymity by reducing the social and moral distance between parties. We propose a model that allows for ex ante and ex post fairness as well as for context-dependent altruism. Con…
Letting third parties who suffer from petty corruption talk: Evidence from a collusive bribery experiment
High‐powered Contracts, Self‐selection and Welfare in Settings with Externalities
We extend the experimental analysis of sorting and effort effects of high‐powered contracts on welfare to situations with negative externalities. Participants solve brainteasers from Raven's matrices. The difference between right and wrong answers represents our measure of welfare per capita. We compare two contract schemes: fixed‐wage and bonus contracts that reward subjects for the number of correct answers, regardless of the number of wrong an…
Risk Preferences and the Role of Emotions
There is a large volume of research showing that emotions have relevant effects on decision‐making. We contribute to this literature by experimentally investigating the impact of four specific emotional states—joviality, sadness, fear and anger—on risk attitudes. In order to do so, we fit two models of behaviour under risk: the expected utility model and the rank dependent expected utility model, assuming several functional forms of the weighting…
Does Procedural Fairness Crowd Out Other-Regarding Concerns? A Bidding Experiment
Bidding rules that guarantee procedural fairness may induce more equilibrium bidding and moderate other-regarding concerns. Here, we investigate procedural fairness as in Güth (2011). In our experiment, we assume commonly known true values and only two bidders to implement a best-case scenario for other-regarding concerns. The two-by-two factorial design varies ownership of the single indivisible commodity and the price rule. We find more equilib…
Context and interpretation in laboratory experiments: The case of reciprocity
Mutual interdependence versus repeated interaction: An experiment studying voluntary social exchange
Relations of mutual interdependence have been regarded as necessary for human cooperation to evolve. However, many studies in the social sciences indicate that repeated interaction suffices to establish cooperation. We examine this issue by means of a voluntary social exchange experiment where mutually interdependent players coexist with merely dependent ones. We systematically vary the degree of mutual interdependence and the length of the time …
Voluntary contributions with imperfect information: An experimental study
This paper uses a two-person linear voluntary contribution mechanism with stochastic marginal benefits from a public good to examine the effect of imperfect information on contributions. Estimates of individual risk preferences are obtained using data from second-price auctions over lotteries. The results show that limited information about the value of the public good significantly lowers average contributions in all periods but the last. Moreov…
On the Coevolution of Retribution and Trustworthiness: An (Indirect) Evolutionary and Experimental Analysis
Standard economic explanations of good conduct in trade rely almost exclusively on future-directed extrinsic motivations induced by material incentives. But intrinsic motives to behave trustworthily and to punish untrustworthiness do support trade. In our model, intrinsically motivated players are aware of their own type and observe the population share of other types. The material success of various types and their coevolution are analyzed, and …
Buying a pig in a poke: An experimental study of unconditional veto power
Leading by Example in a Public Goods Experiment with Heterogeneity and Incomplete Information
We study the effects of leadership on the private provision of a public good when group members are heterogeneously endowed. Leadership is implemented as a sequential public goods game where one group member contributes first and all the others follow. Our results show that the presence of a leader increases average contribution levels but less so than in case of homogeneous endowments. Leadership is almost ineffective, though, if participants do…
Indirect reciprocity in cyclical networks
Leading by Example in a Public Goods Experiment with Heterogeneity and Incomplete Information
We study the effects of leadership on the private provision of a public good when group members are heterogeneously endowed. Leadership is implemented as a sequential public goods game where one group member contributes first and all the others follow. Our results show that the presence of a leader increases average contribution levels but less so than in case of homogeneous endowments. Leadership is almost ineffective, though, if participants do…
Indirect reciprocity in cyclical networks
Risk Preferences and the Role of Emotions
There is a large volume of research showing that emotions have relevant effects on decision‐making. We contribute to this literature by experimentally investigating the impact of four specific emotional states—joviality, sadness, fear and anger—on risk attitudes. In order to do so, we fit two models of behaviour under risk: the expected utility model and the rank dependent expected utility model, assuming several functional forms of the weighting…
Context and interpretation in laboratory experiments: The case of reciprocity
Mutual interdependence versus repeated interaction: An experiment studying voluntary social exchange
Relations of mutual interdependence have been regarded as necessary for human cooperation to evolve. However, many studies in the social sciences indicate that repeated interaction suffices to establish cooperation. We examine this issue by means of a voluntary social exchange experiment where mutually interdependent players coexist with merely dependent ones. We systematically vary the degree of mutual interdependence and the length of the time …
Buying a pig in a poke: An experimental study of unconditional veto power
Indirect reciprocity in cyclical networks
On the Coevolution of Retribution and Trustworthiness: An (Indirect) Evolutionary and Experimental Analysis
Standard economic explanations of good conduct in trade rely almost exclusively on future-directed extrinsic motivations induced by material incentives. But intrinsic motives to behave trustworthily and to punish untrustworthiness do support trade. In our model, intrinsically motivated players are aware of their own type and observe the population share of other types. The material success of various types and their coevolution are analyzed, and …
Buying a pig in a poke: An experimental study of unconditional veto power
Leading by Example in a Public Goods Experiment with Heterogeneity and Incomplete Information
We study the effects of leadership on the private provision of a public good when group members are heterogeneously endowed. Leadership is implemented as a sequential public goods game where one group member contributes first and all the others follow. Our results show that the presence of a leader increases average contribution levels but less so than in case of homogeneous endowments. Leadership is almost ineffective, though, if participants do…
Voluntary contributions with imperfect information: An experimental study
This paper uses a two-person linear voluntary contribution mechanism with stochastic marginal benefits from a public good to examine the effect of imperfect information on contributions. Estimates of individual risk preferences are obtained using data from second-price auctions over lotteries. The results show that limited information about the value of the public good significantly lowers average contributions in all periods but the last. Moreov…
Mutual interdependence versus repeated interaction: An experiment studying voluntary social exchange
Relations of mutual interdependence have been regarded as necessary for human cooperation to evolve. However, many studies in the social sciences indicate that repeated interaction suffices to establish cooperation. We examine this issue by means of a voluntary social exchange experiment where mutually interdependent players coexist with merely dependent ones. We systematically vary the degree of mutual interdependence and the length of the time …
Context and interpretation in laboratory experiments: The case of reciprocity
Does Procedural Fairness Crowd Out Other-Regarding Concerns? A Bidding Experiment
Bidding rules that guarantee procedural fairness may induce more equilibrium bidding and moderate other-regarding concerns. Here, we investigate procedural fairness as in Güth (2011). In our experiment, we assume commonly known true values and only two bidders to implement a best-case scenario for other-regarding concerns. The two-by-two factorial design varies ownership of the single indivisible commodity and the price rule. We find more equilib…
Risk Preferences and the Role of Emotions
There is a large volume of research showing that emotions have relevant effects on decision‐making. We contribute to this literature by experimentally investigating the impact of four specific emotional states—joviality, sadness, fear and anger—on risk attitudes. In order to do so, we fit two models of behaviour under risk: the expected utility model and the rank dependent expected utility model, assuming several functional forms of the weighting…
High‐powered Contracts, Self‐selection and Welfare in Settings with Externalities
We extend the experimental analysis of sorting and effort effects of high‐powered contracts on welfare to situations with negative externalities. Participants solve brainteasers from Raven's matrices. The difference between right and wrong answers represents our measure of welfare per capita. We compare two contract schemes: fixed‐wage and bonus contracts that reward subjects for the number of correct answers, regardless of the number of wrong an…
Letting third parties who suffer from petty corruption talk: Evidence from a collusive bribery experiment
Social and moral distance in risky settings
While many socially desirable actions are risky and involve non-anonymous others, it remains largely untested whether lower subject-subject anonymity affects behavior under risk. In variations of the dictator game, we vary the party who is exposed to risk and manipulate anonymity by reducing the social and moral distance between parties. We propose a model that allows for ex ante and ex post fairness as well as for context-dependent altruism. Con…
Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies (12 works) · Economics (11 works) · Microeconomics (9 works) · Psychology (9 works) · Social Psychology (8 works) · Computer Science (5 works) · Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics (4 works) · Social Psychology (4 works) · Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation (3 works) · Game Theory and Applications (3 works)