James Fanciullo
Biographic Data
| ID | 1119762 |
|---|---|
| NAME | James Fanciullo |
| GIVEN NAMES | James |
| FAMILY NAME | Fanciullo |
| SIGNATURE | FANCIULLO J |
| AFFILIATIONS | Arizona State University |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-9397-1951 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 7 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 3 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 7 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2019 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Human extinction and conditional value
Why should we prevent human beings from going extinct? Recently, several theorists have argued for “additional value views,” according to which our reasons to prevent extinction derive both from the value of the welfare of future lives, and from certain additional values relating to the existence of humanity (such as humanity’s intrinsic or “final” value). Even more recently, these theories have come under attack. In this paper, I first offer a p…
Unconscious Pleasure as Dispositional Pleasure
A good deal of recent debate over the nature of pleasure and pain has surrounded the alleged phenomenon of unconscious sensory pleasure and pain, or pleasures and pains whose subjects are entirely unaware of them while experiencing them. According to Ben Bramble, these putative pleasures and pains present a problem for attitudinal theories of pleasure and pain, since these theories claim that what makes something a sensory pleasure or pain is tha…
Why prevent human extinction
Many of us think human extinction would be a very bad thing, and that we have moral reasons to prevent it. But there is disagreement over what would make extinction so bad, and thus over what grounds these moral reasons. Recently, several theorists have argued that our reasons to prevent extinction stem not just from the value of the welfare of future lives, but also from certain additional values relating to the existence of humanity itself (for…
Alienation, Engagement, and Welfare
The alienation constraint on theories of well-being has been influentially expressed thus: 'what is intrinsically valuable for a person must have a connection with what he would find in some degree compelling or attractive .... It would be an intolerably alienated conception of someone's good to imagine that it might fail in any such way to engage him'. Many agree this claim expresses something true, but there is little consensus on how exactly t…
What’s wrong with virtue signaling
The psychological basis of collective action
Do Fitting Emotions Tell Us Anything About Well-Being
In a recent article in this journal, Tobias Fuchs has offered a ‘working test’ for well-being. According to this test, if it is fitting to feel compassion for a subject because they have some property, then the subject is badly off because they have that property. Since subjects of deception seem a fitting target for compassion, this test is said to imply that a number of important views, including hedonism, are false. I argue that this line of r…
Why prevent human extinction
Many of us think human extinction would be a very bad thing, and that we have moral reasons to prevent it. But there is disagreement over what would make extinction so bad, and thus over what grounds these moral reasons. Recently, several theorists have argued that our reasons to prevent extinction stem not just from the value of the welfare of future lives, but also from certain additional values relating to the existence of humanity itself (for…
What’s wrong with virtue signaling
Do Fitting Emotions Tell Us Anything About Well-Being
In a recent article in this journal, Tobias Fuchs has offered a ‘working test’ for well-being. According to this test, if it is fitting to feel compassion for a subject because they have some property, then the subject is badly off because they have that property. Since subjects of deception seem a fitting target for compassion, this test is said to imply that a number of important views, including hedonism, are false. I argue that this line of r…
The psychological basis of collective action
What’s wrong with virtue signaling
Unconscious Pleasure as Dispositional Pleasure
A good deal of recent debate over the nature of pleasure and pain has surrounded the alleged phenomenon of unconscious sensory pleasure and pain, or pleasures and pains whose subjects are entirely unaware of them while experiencing them. According to Ben Bramble, these putative pleasures and pains present a problem for attitudinal theories of pleasure and pain, since these theories claim that what makes something a sensory pleasure or pain is tha…
Why prevent human extinction
Many of us think human extinction would be a very bad thing, and that we have moral reasons to prevent it. But there is disagreement over what would make extinction so bad, and thus over what grounds these moral reasons. Recently, several theorists have argued that our reasons to prevent extinction stem not just from the value of the welfare of future lives, but also from certain additional values relating to the existence of humanity itself (for…
Alienation, Engagement, and Welfare
The alienation constraint on theories of well-being has been influentially expressed thus: 'what is intrinsically valuable for a person must have a connection with what he would find in some degree compelling or attractive .... It would be an intolerably alienated conception of someone's good to imagine that it might fail in any such way to engage him'. Many agree this claim expresses something true, but there is little consensus on how exactly t…
Human extinction and conditional value
Why should we prevent human beings from going extinct? Recently, several theorists have argued for “additional value views,” according to which our reasons to prevent extinction derive both from the value of the welfare of future lives, and from certain additional values relating to the existence of humanity (such as humanity’s intrinsic or “final” value). Even more recently, these theories have come under attack. In this paper, I first offer a p…
Philosophy (6 works) · Epistemology (5 works) · Psychology (5 works) · Philosophical Ethics and Theory (4 works) · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment (4 works) · Social Psychology (4 works) · Law (3 works) · Political science (3 works) · Economics (2 works) · Environmental ethics (2 works)