Jenny Hung
Biographic Data
| ID | 1121769 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Jenny Hung |
| GIVEN NAMES | Jenny |
| FAMILY NAME | Hung |
| SIGNATURE | HUNG J |
| AFFILIATIONS | Hong Kong University of Science and Technology |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-1526-9278 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 8 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 1 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 8 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2018 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
In Search of Qi Immortality
Immortality has recently become a prominent topic of discussion, particularly in light of advancing technologies aimed at enhancing human life expectancy. Proposed scenarios encompass improved treatments for various diseases and the development of longevity medicine. In this essay, I examine the theory of the self and the concept of immortality as presented in Heshanggong’s commentary on the Daodejing. This analysis serves as a case study aimed a…
We are the Same Mind! A Study of Zongmi’s Idea of the True Mind
This article presents a novel interpretation of True Mind theories in Buddhism, drawing inspiration from Zongmi’s teachings, according to which: (1) we are the same mind as the cosmic True Mind, and (2) the essence of the True Mind is reflexive awareness devoid of content, whereas its conditioned function is reflexive awareness with content. This proposal aims to reconcile the tension between the concept of the permanent True Mind as our True Sel…
Is Emptiness Non-Empty? Jizang's Conception of Buddha-Nature
Jizang (549-623) is regarded as a prominent figure in Sanlun Buddhism (三論宗) and a revitalizer of Nāgārjuna's Mādhyamaka tradition in China. In this essay, I argue that Jizang's concept of non-empty Buddha-nature is compatible with the idea of universal emptiness. My argument unfolds in three steps. First, I argue that, for Jizang, Buddha-nature is the Middle Way (zhongdao 中道), which signifies a spiritual state that avoids the extremes of both emp…
Reflexive awareness and reflexivity
In recent years, much debate has centered on the same-order representational theory of consciousness. According to this theory, (1) conscious mental episodes are episodes of which we are aware; and (2) the awareness of an external object and the immediate, reflexive awareness of the mental episode together constitute a single episode. In this paper, I propose that the reflexive-referential theory of content developed by Korta and Perry can be use…
Animal consciousness and phenomenal concepts
A phenomenal concept is a concept that one possesses only if one has the relevant experience. In this essay, I argue that phenomenal concept theorists, namely, those who believe that we acquire phenomenal concepts through being acquainted with the relevant experience, can never succeed in determining which species of non-human animals are phenomenally conscious because they prohibit any a priori correlation between phenomenal and non-phenomenal c…
A Gricean Interpretation of Nāgārjuna’s Catuṣkoṭi and the No-Thesis View
Nāgārjuna (c. 150–250 CE), the famous founder of the Madhyamika School, proposed the positive catuṣkoṭi in his seminal work, Mūlamadhyamakakārikā: ‘All is real, or all is unreal, all is both real and unreal, all is neither unreal nor real; this is the graded teaching of the Buddha’. He also proposed the negative catuṣkoṭi: ‘“It is empty” is not to be said, nor “It is non-empty,” nor that it is both, nor that it is neither; [“empty”] is said only …
Is dharma-nature identical to ignorance? A study of ‘ ji 即’ in early Tiantai Buddhism
Zhiyi (智顗) (538–597) is the most important scholar of Tiantai Buddhism. He uses the term ‘ji即,’ which is normally translated as ‘equals to’ or ‘is identical to,’ to illustrate the relation between two contradictory properties. Some examples are ‘ignorance equals ji 即 dharma-nature (wuming ji faxing 無明即法性),’ ‘saṃsāra ji 即 nirvāṇa (shengsi ji niepan 生死即涅槃),’ and ‘suffering ji 即 enlightenment (fannao ji puti 煩惱即菩提).’ In this essay, I investigate the…
The early Yogācāra theory of no-self
I reconstruct early Yogācāra theory of no-self based on works by Asaṅga and Vasubandhu. I introduce the idea of the cognitive schema (CS) of the self, a conception borrowed from the developmental psychologist, Jean Piaget. A fundamental CS is a psychological function that guides the formation of perceptions. I propose that Manas can be understood in terms of being the CS of the self, a psychological mechanism from which perceptions of external ob…
Is Emptiness Non-Empty? Jizang's Conception of Buddha-Nature
Jizang (549-623) is regarded as a prominent figure in Sanlun Buddhism (三論宗) and a revitalizer of Nāgārjuna's Mādhyamaka tradition in China. In this essay, I argue that Jizang's concept of non-empty Buddha-nature is compatible with the idea of universal emptiness. My argument unfolds in three steps. First, I argue that, for Jizang, Buddha-nature is the Middle Way (zhongdao 中道), which signifies a spiritual state that avoids the extremes of both emp…
The early Yogācāra theory of no-self
I reconstruct early Yogācāra theory of no-self based on works by Asaṅga and Vasubandhu. I introduce the idea of the cognitive schema (CS) of the self, a conception borrowed from the developmental psychologist, Jean Piaget. A fundamental CS is a psychological function that guides the formation of perceptions. I propose that Manas can be understood in terms of being the CS of the self, a psychological mechanism from which perceptions of external ob…
A Gricean Interpretation of Nāgārjuna’s Catuṣkoṭi and the No-Thesis View
Nāgārjuna (c. 150–250 CE), the famous founder of the Madhyamika School, proposed the positive catuṣkoṭi in his seminal work, Mūlamadhyamakakārikā: ‘All is real, or all is unreal, all is both real and unreal, all is neither unreal nor real; this is the graded teaching of the Buddha’. He also proposed the negative catuṣkoṭi: ‘“It is empty” is not to be said, nor “It is non-empty,” nor that it is both, nor that it is neither; [“empty”] is said only …
Is dharma-nature identical to ignorance? A study of ‘ ji 即’ in early Tiantai Buddhism
Zhiyi (智顗) (538–597) is the most important scholar of Tiantai Buddhism. He uses the term ‘ji即,’ which is normally translated as ‘equals to’ or ‘is identical to,’ to illustrate the relation between two contradictory properties. Some examples are ‘ignorance equals ji 即 dharma-nature (wuming ji faxing 無明即法性),’ ‘saṃsāra ji 即 nirvāṇa (shengsi ji niepan 生死即涅槃),’ and ‘suffering ji 即 enlightenment (fannao ji puti 煩惱即菩提).’ In this essay, I investigate the…
Animal consciousness and phenomenal concepts
A phenomenal concept is a concept that one possesses only if one has the relevant experience. In this essay, I argue that phenomenal concept theorists, namely, those who believe that we acquire phenomenal concepts through being acquainted with the relevant experience, can never succeed in determining which species of non-human animals are phenomenally conscious because they prohibit any a priori correlation between phenomenal and non-phenomenal c…
Reflexive awareness and reflexivity
In recent years, much debate has centered on the same-order representational theory of consciousness. According to this theory, (1) conscious mental episodes are episodes of which we are aware; and (2) the awareness of an external object and the immediate, reflexive awareness of the mental episode together constitute a single episode. In this paper, I propose that the reflexive-referential theory of content developed by Korta and Perry can be use…
In Search of Qi Immortality
Immortality has recently become a prominent topic of discussion, particularly in light of advancing technologies aimed at enhancing human life expectancy. Proposed scenarios encompass improved treatments for various diseases and the development of longevity medicine. In this essay, I examine the theory of the self and the concept of immortality as presented in Heshanggong’s commentary on the Daodejing. This analysis serves as a case study aimed a…
We are the Same Mind! A Study of Zongmi’s Idea of the True Mind
This article presents a novel interpretation of True Mind theories in Buddhism, drawing inspiration from Zongmi’s teachings, according to which: (1) we are the same mind as the cosmic True Mind, and (2) the essence of the True Mind is reflexive awareness devoid of content, whereas its conditioned function is reflexive awareness with content. This proposal aims to reconcile the tension between the concept of the permanent True Mind as our True Sel…
Is Emptiness Non-Empty? Jizang's Conception of Buddha-Nature
Jizang (549-623) is regarded as a prominent figure in Sanlun Buddhism (三論宗) and a revitalizer of Nāgārjuna's Mādhyamaka tradition in China. In this essay, I argue that Jizang's concept of non-empty Buddha-nature is compatible with the idea of universal emptiness. My argument unfolds in three steps. First, I argue that, for Jizang, Buddha-nature is the Middle Way (zhongdao 中道), which signifies a spiritual state that avoids the extremes of both emp…
Philosophy (7 works) · Epistemology (6 works) · Buddhism (4 works) · Indian and Buddhist Studies (4 works) · Psychology (4 works) · Chinese history and philosophy (3 works) · Theology (3 works) · Aesthetics (2 works) · Consciousness (2 works) · Dharma (2 works)