Scott H Ainsworth
Biographic Data
| ID | 1122118 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Scott H Ainsworth |
| GIVEN NAMES | Scott H |
| FAMILY NAME | Ainsworth |
| SIGNATURE | AINSWORTH S H |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Georgia |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 15 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 205 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 15 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1993 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2024 |
| H-INDEX | 5 |
Public Response to Trump’s Unilateral Policy Making: The Case of Daca
Insuring hedged bets with lobbying
Congressional Response to Statements of Administration Policy and Presidential Signing Statements
We explore the sensitivity of Congress to statements of administration policy (SAPs) and signing statements in the struggle with the executive over policy. We hypothesize that the nature and use of objections contained in these presidential communications generates additional congressional oversight. To test whether this happens, we developed a dataset with all SAPs, signing statements, and congressional oversight hearings from 1997 through 2007.…
Congressional Response to Presidential Signing Statements
Popular and scholarly accounts argue that signing statements are important tools for presidents to shape the implementation of policy. Although signing statements might be important presidential tools, the legislative branch stands in the most immediate and direct competition with the executive for ultimate control of the bureaucracy. In this article, we assess whether congressional committees react to presidential signing statements with increas…
Methodological Perspectives on Interest Groups
This article uses many interest group classics as well as a wide range of new works to show key methodological concerns for the interest group subfield. Each of the main sections of this article starts with a highly condensed discussion of some classical approaches to interest group studies and then introduces some newer work with important methodological advances. It then describes the pluralism and sociological models. It also reports the descr…
Delegation and Discretion in Anticipation of Coalitional Drift
If legislators are sensitive to coalitional drift, they must perforce be forward looking. In this article, we propose that legislators anticipate change in government—and any associated coalitional drift. That is, legislators recognize that the government could move from unified to divided or divided to unified. As such, how legislators structure an agency’s discretion may be affected by the current partisan control of the Congress and the White …
Modeling Political Efficacy and Interest Group Membership
The Role of Legislators in the Determination of Interest Group Influence
In addition to structuring the rules governing legislator-lobbyist interactions, legislators also affect their interactions with lobbyists by promoting lobbying enterprises, which are groups of like-minded lobbyists and their legislative allies, all of whom seek to coordinate their efforts. The long-term relationships inherent in lobbying enterprises reduce uncertainties, insure ready access to legislators, and allow lobbyists to reach undecided …
Representation and Institutional Stability
In a developing legislature, two types of stability are crucial for maintaining institutional viability. The first type of stability identifies legislative proposals that are invulnerable to majority rule voting cycles. The research addressing the implications of majority rule voting cycles has been rich and sustained, allowing scholars to address committee structures of institutionalized legislatures and norms. However, many formal theories of m…
The Logic and Rationale of Lobbying Regulations
Notwithstanding the recent adoption of stricter lobbying regulations, legislators have a variety of informal means to control lobbying activity. In this paper, I analyze how individual legislators structure their interactions with lobbyists so as to limit their vulnerability to undue interest group influence. I conclude that informal means of regulating lobbyists address some of the concerns raised by proponents of stricter disclosure laws
Bill sponsorship and legislative success among freshmen senators, 1954–1986
Freshmen senators of the 1980s are often portrayed as more individualistic and activist than the freshmen of the 1950s. Freshmen today possess greater resources and appear much more likely to use those resources in whatever policy areas are of interest to them. One indication of this increased activism in the Senate is the dramatic increase in floor activity. Freshmen senators tightly bound by formal and informal restrictions in the 1950s have si…
National Grange Influence on the Supreme Court Confirmation of Stanley Matthews
Unanimous Consent Agreements as Leadership Tools
Regulating Lobbyists and Interest Group Influence
In this paper, I analyze how legislators structure their interactions with lobbyists so as to limit undue interest group influence. A simple game theoretic model is developed to show that legislators have various means by which to control lobbying activity, even in the absence of stringent lobbying regulations. The costliness of the lobbyist's signals limit the lobbyist's ability to exaggerate claims
The Role of Lobbyists: Entrepreneurs with Two Audiences
When fulfilling its linkage function, an interest group acts as a conduit between constituents and government officials. To help maintain the group's raison d' etre, a lobbyist, or interest group entrepreneur (IGE), must interact successfully with two distinct sets of individuals: members (and potential members) of the associated group and government officials. An IGE's overall success depends on his or her success with each of these distinct set…
Regulating Lobbyists and Interest Group Influence
In this paper, I analyze how legislators structure their interactions with lobbyists so as to limit undue interest group influence. A simple game theoretic model is developed to show that legislators have various means by which to control lobbying activity, even in the absence of stringent lobbying regulations. The costliness of the lobbyist's signals limit the lobbyist's ability to exaggerate claims
The Role of Lobbyists: Entrepreneurs with Two Audiences
When fulfilling its linkage function, an interest group acts as a conduit between constituents and government officials. To help maintain the group's raison d' etre, a lobbyist, or interest group entrepreneur (IGE), must interact successfully with two distinct sets of individuals: members (and potential members) of the associated group and government officials. An IGE's overall success depends on his or her success with each of these distinct set…
The Role of Legislators in the Determination of Interest Group Influence
In addition to structuring the rules governing legislator-lobbyist interactions, legislators also affect their interactions with lobbyists by promoting lobbying enterprises, which are groups of like-minded lobbyists and their legislative allies, all of whom seek to coordinate their efforts. The long-term relationships inherent in lobbying enterprises reduce uncertainties, insure ready access to legislators, and allow lobbyists to reach undecided …
Unanimous Consent Agreements as Leadership Tools
Modeling Political Efficacy and Interest Group Membership
Bill sponsorship and legislative success among freshmen senators, 1954–1986
Freshmen senators of the 1980s are often portrayed as more individualistic and activist than the freshmen of the 1950s. Freshmen today possess greater resources and appear much more likely to use those resources in whatever policy areas are of interest to them. One indication of this increased activism in the Senate is the dramatic increase in floor activity. Freshmen senators tightly bound by formal and informal restrictions in the 1950s have si…
Congressional Response to Presidential Signing Statements
Popular and scholarly accounts argue that signing statements are important tools for presidents to shape the implementation of policy. Although signing statements might be important presidential tools, the legislative branch stands in the most immediate and direct competition with the executive for ultimate control of the bureaucracy. In this article, we assess whether congressional committees react to presidential signing statements with increas…
Congressional Response to Statements of Administration Policy and Presidential Signing Statements
We explore the sensitivity of Congress to statements of administration policy (SAPs) and signing statements in the struggle with the executive over policy. We hypothesize that the nature and use of objections contained in these presidential communications generates additional congressional oversight. To test whether this happens, we developed a dataset with all SAPs, signing statements, and congressional oversight hearings from 1997 through 2007.…
Delegation and Discretion in Anticipation of Coalitional Drift
If legislators are sensitive to coalitional drift, they must perforce be forward looking. In this article, we propose that legislators anticipate change in government—and any associated coalitional drift. That is, legislators recognize that the government could move from unified to divided or divided to unified. As such, how legislators structure an agency’s discretion may be affected by the current partisan control of the Congress and the White …
Representation and Institutional Stability
In a developing legislature, two types of stability are crucial for maintaining institutional viability. The first type of stability identifies legislative proposals that are invulnerable to majority rule voting cycles. The research addressing the implications of majority rule voting cycles has been rich and sustained, allowing scholars to address committee structures of institutionalized legislatures and norms. However, many formal theories of m…
Regulating Lobbyists and Interest Group Influence
In this paper, I analyze how legislators structure their interactions with lobbyists so as to limit undue interest group influence. A simple game theoretic model is developed to show that legislators have various means by which to control lobbying activity, even in the absence of stringent lobbying regulations. The costliness of the lobbyist's signals limit the lobbyist's ability to exaggerate claims
The Role of Lobbyists: Entrepreneurs with Two Audiences
When fulfilling its linkage function, an interest group acts as a conduit between constituents and government officials. To help maintain the group's raison d' etre, a lobbyist, or interest group entrepreneur (IGE), must interact successfully with two distinct sets of individuals: members (and potential members) of the associated group and government officials. An IGE's overall success depends on his or her success with each of these distinct set…
Unanimous Consent Agreements as Leadership Tools
The Logic and Rationale of Lobbying Regulations
Notwithstanding the recent adoption of stricter lobbying regulations, legislators have a variety of informal means to control lobbying activity. In this paper, I analyze how individual legislators structure their interactions with lobbyists so as to limit their vulnerability to undue interest group influence. I conclude that informal means of regulating lobbyists address some of the concerns raised by proponents of stricter disclosure laws
Bill sponsorship and legislative success among freshmen senators, 1954–1986
Freshmen senators of the 1980s are often portrayed as more individualistic and activist than the freshmen of the 1950s. Freshmen today possess greater resources and appear much more likely to use those resources in whatever policy areas are of interest to them. One indication of this increased activism in the Senate is the dramatic increase in floor activity. Freshmen senators tightly bound by formal and informal restrictions in the 1950s have si…
National Grange Influence on the Supreme Court Confirmation of Stanley Matthews
The Role of Legislators in the Determination of Interest Group Influence
In addition to structuring the rules governing legislator-lobbyist interactions, legislators also affect their interactions with lobbyists by promoting lobbying enterprises, which are groups of like-minded lobbyists and their legislative allies, all of whom seek to coordinate their efforts. The long-term relationships inherent in lobbying enterprises reduce uncertainties, insure ready access to legislators, and allow lobbyists to reach undecided …
Representation and Institutional Stability
In a developing legislature, two types of stability are crucial for maintaining institutional viability. The first type of stability identifies legislative proposals that are invulnerable to majority rule voting cycles. The research addressing the implications of majority rule voting cycles has been rich and sustained, allowing scholars to address committee structures of institutionalized legislatures and norms. However, many formal theories of m…
Modeling Political Efficacy and Interest Group Membership
Delegation and Discretion in Anticipation of Coalitional Drift
If legislators are sensitive to coalitional drift, they must perforce be forward looking. In this article, we propose that legislators anticipate change in government—and any associated coalitional drift. That is, legislators recognize that the government could move from unified to divided or divided to unified. As such, how legislators structure an agency’s discretion may be affected by the current partisan control of the Congress and the White …
Methodological Perspectives on Interest Groups
This article uses many interest group classics as well as a wide range of new works to show key methodological concerns for the interest group subfield. Each of the main sections of this article starts with a highly condensed discussion of some classical approaches to interest group studies and then introduces some newer work with important methodological advances. It then describes the pluralism and sociological models. It also reports the descr…
Congressional Response to Presidential Signing Statements
Popular and scholarly accounts argue that signing statements are important tools for presidents to shape the implementation of policy. Although signing statements might be important presidential tools, the legislative branch stands in the most immediate and direct competition with the executive for ultimate control of the bureaucracy. In this article, we assess whether congressional committees react to presidential signing statements with increas…
Congressional Response to Statements of Administration Policy and Presidential Signing Statements
We explore the sensitivity of Congress to statements of administration policy (SAPs) and signing statements in the struggle with the executive over policy. We hypothesize that the nature and use of objections contained in these presidential communications generates additional congressional oversight. To test whether this happens, we developed a dataset with all SAPs, signing statements, and congressional oversight hearings from 1997 through 2007.…
Insuring hedged bets with lobbying
Public Response to Trump’s Unilateral Policy Making: The Case of Daca
Political science (15 works) · Law (12 works) · Law (10 works) · Politics (10 works) · Economics (9 works) · Electoral Systems and Political Participation (7 works) · Law and economics (7 works) · Political Influence and Corporate Strategies (7 works) · Public Administration (6 works) · Business (5 works)