Laura Schroeter
Biographic Data
| ID | 1122628 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Laura Schroeter |
| GIVEN NAMES | Laura |
| FAMILY NAME | Schroeter |
| SIGNATURE | SCHROETER L |
| AFFILIATIONS | The University of Melbourne |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-2561-9021 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 11 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 22 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 11 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1998 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2024 |
| H-INDEX | 3 |
Meanings as species in communication and inquiry
Can mere conceptual competence explain the apriori? Many contemporary theorists believe that conceptual competence grounds apriori conceptual truths – and that this fact helps explain how thinkers can have apriori justification for accepting these truths and reasoning in accord with them. In this chapter, I'll examine several contemporary defenses of the conceptual approach to apriority in order to clarify their core commitments about the nature …
The Limits of Metalinguistic Negotiation
According to philosophical orthodoxy, the parties to moral or legal disputes genuinely disagree only if their uses of key normative terms in the dispute express the same meaning. Recently, however, this orthodoxy has been challenged. According to an influential alternative view, genuine moral and legal disagreements should be understood as metalinguistic negotiations over which meaning a given term should have. In this paper, we argue that the sh…
Bad News for Ardent Normative Realists
According to Ardent Normative Realists, reality favors certain ways of valuing and acting. Matti Eklund has recently argued that Ardent Normative Realists are committed to Referential Normativity, i.e., the thesis that the action-guiding and motivational roles associated with normative predicates determine their reference. In this paper, we argue that Referential Normativity should be rejected
A New Interpretivist Metasemantics for Fundamental Legal Disagreements
What does it take for lawyers and others to think or talk about the same legal topic—e.g., defamation, culpability? We argue that people are able to think or talk about the same topic not when they possess a matching substantive understanding of the topic, as traditional metasemantics says, but instead when their thoughts or utterances are related to each other in certain ways. And what determines the content of thoughts and utterances is what wo…
Inscrutability and Its Discontents
Our main focus in this paper is Herman Cappelen’s claim, defended in Fixing Language , that reference is radically inscrutable. We argue that Cappelen’s inscrutability thesis should be rejected. We also highlight how rejecting inscrutability undermines Cappelen’s most radical conclusions about conceptual engineering. In addition, we raise a worry about his positive account of topic continuity through inquiry and debate
Two-Dimensional Semantics and Sameness of Meaning
In recent years, two-dimensional (2D) semantics has been used to develop a broadly descriptivist approach to meaning that seeks to accommodate externalists' counterexamples to traditional descriptivism. The 2D possible worlds framework can be used to capture a speaker's implicit dispositions to identify the reference of her words on the basis of empirical information about her actual environment. Proponents of 2D semantics argue that this aspect …
Bootstrapping our way to samesaying
Why Be an Anti‐Individualist
Anti‐individualists claim that concepts are individuated with an eye to purely external facts about a subject’s environment about which she may be ignorant or mistaken. This paper offers a novel reason for thinking that anti‐individualistic concepts are an ineliminable part of commonsense psychology. Our commitment to anti‐individualism, I argue, is ultimately grounded in a rational epistemic agent’s commitment to refining her own representationa…
Against A Priori Reductions
According to David Chalmers and Frank Jackson, conceptual competence puts one in a position to have a priori knowledge of conditional claims of the form ‘If my environment is thus and so, then water = H2O’. The rationale for this position, I argue, rests on controversial semantic assumptions about the individuation of meanings or concepts. I sketch a new model of conceptual competence, which undermines the apriority of such conditionals
Is Gibbard a Realist
In Thinking How to Live, Allan Gibbard claims that expressivists can vindicate realism about moral discourse. This paper argues that Gibbard’s expressivism does not provide such a vindication
He Would of Rode a Harley
Would of Rode a Directed by Mary Beth Bresolin and Laura Schroeter. 1995. 1/2 Video, Color. 45 min. 1608.5 Cerro Gordo, Los Angeles, CA 90026. Fifty years ago several biker gangs converged on the small town of Hollister, California. The bikers shook the town and the country to its core. They were loud, obnoxious, and somewhat violent. They also got a lot of national press. Thus was born the rebel biker into the American consciousness. Today Harle…
Why Be an Anti‐Individualist
Anti‐individualists claim that concepts are individuated with an eye to purely external facts about a subject’s environment about which she may be ignorant or mistaken. This paper offers a novel reason for thinking that anti‐individualistic concepts are an ineliminable part of commonsense psychology. Our commitment to anti‐individualism, I argue, is ultimately grounded in a rational epistemic agent’s commitment to refining her own representationa…
Bootstrapping our way to samesaying
Against A Priori Reductions
According to David Chalmers and Frank Jackson, conceptual competence puts one in a position to have a priori knowledge of conditional claims of the form ‘If my environment is thus and so, then water = H2O’. The rationale for this position, I argue, rests on controversial semantic assumptions about the individuation of meanings or concepts. I sketch a new model of conceptual competence, which undermines the apriority of such conditionals
He Would of Rode a Harley
Would of Rode a Directed by Mary Beth Bresolin and Laura Schroeter. 1995. 1/2 Video, Color. 45 min. 1608.5 Cerro Gordo, Los Angeles, CA 90026. Fifty years ago several biker gangs converged on the small town of Hollister, California. The bikers shook the town and the country to its core. They were loud, obnoxious, and somewhat violent. They also got a lot of national press. Thus was born the rebel biker into the American consciousness. Today Harle…
Is Gibbard a Realist
In Thinking How to Live, Allan Gibbard claims that expressivists can vindicate realism about moral discourse. This paper argues that Gibbard’s expressivism does not provide such a vindication
Against A Priori Reductions
According to David Chalmers and Frank Jackson, conceptual competence puts one in a position to have a priori knowledge of conditional claims of the form ‘If my environment is thus and so, then water = H2O’. The rationale for this position, I argue, rests on controversial semantic assumptions about the individuation of meanings or concepts. I sketch a new model of conceptual competence, which undermines the apriority of such conditionals
Why Be an Anti‐Individualist
Anti‐individualists claim that concepts are individuated with an eye to purely external facts about a subject’s environment about which she may be ignorant or mistaken. This paper offers a novel reason for thinking that anti‐individualistic concepts are an ineliminable part of commonsense psychology. Our commitment to anti‐individualism, I argue, is ultimately grounded in a rational epistemic agent’s commitment to refining her own representationa…
Bootstrapping our way to samesaying
Two-Dimensional Semantics and Sameness of Meaning
In recent years, two-dimensional (2D) semantics has been used to develop a broadly descriptivist approach to meaning that seeks to accommodate externalists' counterexamples to traditional descriptivism. The 2D possible worlds framework can be used to capture a speaker's implicit dispositions to identify the reference of her words on the basis of empirical information about her actual environment. Proponents of 2D semantics argue that this aspect …
A New Interpretivist Metasemantics for Fundamental Legal Disagreements
What does it take for lawyers and others to think or talk about the same legal topic—e.g., defamation, culpability? We argue that people are able to think or talk about the same topic not when they possess a matching substantive understanding of the topic, as traditional metasemantics says, but instead when their thoughts or utterances are related to each other in certain ways. And what determines the content of thoughts and utterances is what wo…
Inscrutability and Its Discontents
Our main focus in this paper is Herman Cappelen’s claim, defended in Fixing Language , that reference is radically inscrutable. We argue that Cappelen’s inscrutability thesis should be rejected. We also highlight how rejecting inscrutability undermines Cappelen’s most radical conclusions about conceptual engineering. In addition, we raise a worry about his positive account of topic continuity through inquiry and debate
Bad News for Ardent Normative Realists
According to Ardent Normative Realists, reality favors certain ways of valuing and acting. Matti Eklund has recently argued that Ardent Normative Realists are committed to Referential Normativity, i.e., the thesis that the action-guiding and motivational roles associated with normative predicates determine their reference. In this paper, we argue that Referential Normativity should be rejected
The Limits of Metalinguistic Negotiation
According to philosophical orthodoxy, the parties to moral or legal disputes genuinely disagree only if their uses of key normative terms in the dispute express the same meaning. Recently, however, this orthodoxy has been challenged. According to an influential alternative view, genuine moral and legal disagreements should be understood as metalinguistic negotiations over which meaning a given term should have. In this paper, we argue that the sh…
Meanings as species in communication and inquiry
Can mere conceptual competence explain the apriori? Many contemporary theorists believe that conceptual competence grounds apriori conceptual truths – and that this fact helps explain how thinkers can have apriori justification for accepting these truths and reasoning in accord with them. In this chapter, I'll examine several contemporary defenses of the conceptual approach to apriority in order to clarify their core commitments about the nature …
Epistemology (10 works) · Philosophy (10 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (8 works) · Sociology (8 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (7 works) · Computer Science (6 works) · Psychology (5 works) · Philosophy and History of Science (4 works) · Linguistics (3 works) · A priori and a posteriori (2 works)