Livio Di Lonardo
Biographic Data
| ID | 1122844 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Livio Di Lonardo |
| GIVEN NAMES | Livio |
| FAMILY NAME | Di Lonardo |
| SIGNATURE | DI LONARDO L |
| AFFILIATIONS | Bocconi University |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-5442-0671 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 8 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 78 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 8 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2017 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 4 |
When salience undermines representation: Democratic Dilemmas in Security and Counterterrorism Policy
Congruence between the policies implemented by elected representatives and voters’ policy preferences is fundamental to representation and democratic accountability. Can we anticipate a closer alignment between voters’ policy preferences and the policies explicitly adopted by elected representatives on the more electorally significant issues? We address this question using a simple game theoretic model, where we demonstrate that greater salience …
Constraining to deter
Governments use a variety of tools to discourage, impede, or limit the ability of foreign adversaries to purse their ambitions. Some of these measures seek to constrain an opponent's capacity, while others seek to deter an opponent to take (or not) a particular action. We develop a theory to study how constraining and coercive threats interact strategically. Building on canonical models of deterrence, we first identify how coercive measures, in i…
The Political Consequences of Green Policies: Evidence from Italy
For many governments, enacting green policies is a priority, but such policies often impose on citizens substantial and uneven costs. How does the introduction of green policies affect voting? We study this question in the context of a major ban on polluting cars introduced in Milan, which was strongly opposed by the populist right party Lega. Using several inferential strategies, we show that owners of banned vehicles-who incurred a median loss …
Political Instability and the Failure of Deterrence
To study the conceptual foundations of deterrence, we develop a model of an international crisis between a country seeking to maintain a peaceful status quo (Defender), and a potential aggressor (Attacker). Attacker's leader is politically insecure and may be unseated by domestic elites. Leaders and elites can each be hawkish, benefiting from conflict, or dovish and prefer peace. We show that the ability to maintain peace through deterrence cruci…
Counterterrorism Policy in an Uncertain World
Terrorism prevention is a priority for most democratic polities; however, governments are often unable to precisely assess the threat posed by various terrorist groups. How does a government’s uncertainty about terrorists’ capacity affect the probability of a terror attack occurring? We develop a game-theoretic model to show that the probability of a successful terrorist attack increases when the government expects to face a terror group with low…
Autocratic Stability in the Shadow of Foreign Threats
Autocrats confront a number of threats to their power, some from within the regime and others from foreign actors. To understand how these threats interact and affect autocratic survival, we build a model where an autocratic leader can be ousted by a domestic opposition and a foreign actor. We concentrate on the impact that foreign threats have on the stability of autocratic leadership and show that the presence of foreign threats increases the p…
The Partisan Politics of Counterterrorism: Reputations, Policy Transparency, and Electoral Outcomes
The prevention of terrorist attacks is an important concern for many governments. In democracies, officials also fear the electoral consequences of successful attacks. As a result, counterterrorism policy-making and electoral concerns are tightly intertwined. To understand the implications of this link, I develop a game-theoretic model and show that left-wing incumbents respond to terror threats more aggressively than their right-wing counterpart…
Valence uncertainty and the nature of the candidate pool in elections
Political parties in US politics are becoming increasingly polarized, with a growing number of extreme candidates entering electoral races. Why would extremists challenge more moderate opponents, since their chances of winning are supposedly very slim? I develop a model of electoral competition and endogenous entry to show that extremists rely on the possibility that the campaign might reveal information about the opponents’ quality that can indu…
The Political Consequences of Green Policies: Evidence from Italy
For many governments, enacting green policies is a priority, but such policies often impose on citizens substantial and uneven costs. How does the introduction of green policies affect voting? We study this question in the context of a major ban on polluting cars introduced in Milan, which was strongly opposed by the populist right party Lega. Using several inferential strategies, we show that owners of banned vehicles-who incurred a median loss …
Autocratic Stability in the Shadow of Foreign Threats
Autocrats confront a number of threats to their power, some from within the regime and others from foreign actors. To understand how these threats interact and affect autocratic survival, we build a model where an autocratic leader can be ousted by a domestic opposition and a foreign actor. We concentrate on the impact that foreign threats have on the stability of autocratic leadership and show that the presence of foreign threats increases the p…
The Partisan Politics of Counterterrorism: Reputations, Policy Transparency, and Electoral Outcomes
The prevention of terrorist attacks is an important concern for many governments. In democracies, officials also fear the electoral consequences of successful attacks. As a result, counterterrorism policy-making and electoral concerns are tightly intertwined. To understand the implications of this link, I develop a game-theoretic model and show that left-wing incumbents respond to terror threats more aggressively than their right-wing counterpart…
Political Instability and the Failure of Deterrence
To study the conceptual foundations of deterrence, we develop a model of an international crisis between a country seeking to maintain a peaceful status quo (Defender), and a potential aggressor (Attacker). Attacker's leader is politically insecure and may be unseated by domestic elites. Leaders and elites can each be hawkish, benefiting from conflict, or dovish and prefer peace. We show that the ability to maintain peace through deterrence cruci…
Counterterrorism Policy in an Uncertain World
Terrorism prevention is a priority for most democratic polities; however, governments are often unable to precisely assess the threat posed by various terrorist groups. How does a government’s uncertainty about terrorists’ capacity affect the probability of a terror attack occurring? We develop a game-theoretic model to show that the probability of a successful terrorist attack increases when the government expects to face a terror group with low…
Constraining to deter
Governments use a variety of tools to discourage, impede, or limit the ability of foreign adversaries to purse their ambitions. Some of these measures seek to constrain an opponent's capacity, while others seek to deter an opponent to take (or not) a particular action. We develop a theory to study how constraining and coercive threats interact strategically. Building on canonical models of deterrence, we first identify how coercive measures, in i…
Valence uncertainty and the nature of the candidate pool in elections
Political parties in US politics are becoming increasingly polarized, with a growing number of extreme candidates entering electoral races. Why would extremists challenge more moderate opponents, since their chances of winning are supposedly very slim? I develop a model of electoral competition and endogenous entry to show that extremists rely on the possibility that the campaign might reveal information about the opponents’ quality that can indu…
Valence uncertainty and the nature of the candidate pool in elections
Political parties in US politics are becoming increasingly polarized, with a growing number of extreme candidates entering electoral races. Why would extremists challenge more moderate opponents, since their chances of winning are supposedly very slim? I develop a model of electoral competition and endogenous entry to show that extremists rely on the possibility that the campaign might reveal information about the opponents’ quality that can indu…
The Partisan Politics of Counterterrorism: Reputations, Policy Transparency, and Electoral Outcomes
The prevention of terrorist attacks is an important concern for many governments. In democracies, officials also fear the electoral consequences of successful attacks. As a result, counterterrorism policy-making and electoral concerns are tightly intertwined. To understand the implications of this link, I develop a game-theoretic model and show that left-wing incumbents respond to terror threats more aggressively than their right-wing counterpart…
Autocratic Stability in the Shadow of Foreign Threats
Autocrats confront a number of threats to their power, some from within the regime and others from foreign actors. To understand how these threats interact and affect autocratic survival, we build a model where an autocratic leader can be ousted by a domestic opposition and a foreign actor. We concentrate on the impact that foreign threats have on the stability of autocratic leadership and show that the presence of foreign threats increases the p…
Counterterrorism Policy in an Uncertain World
Terrorism prevention is a priority for most democratic polities; however, governments are often unable to precisely assess the threat posed by various terrorist groups. How does a government’s uncertainty about terrorists’ capacity affect the probability of a terror attack occurring? We develop a game-theoretic model to show that the probability of a successful terrorist attack increases when the government expects to face a terror group with low…
Political Instability and the Failure of Deterrence
To study the conceptual foundations of deterrence, we develop a model of an international crisis between a country seeking to maintain a peaceful status quo (Defender), and a potential aggressor (Attacker). Attacker's leader is politically insecure and may be unseated by domestic elites. Leaders and elites can each be hawkish, benefiting from conflict, or dovish and prefer peace. We show that the ability to maintain peace through deterrence cruci…
Constraining to deter
Governments use a variety of tools to discourage, impede, or limit the ability of foreign adversaries to purse their ambitions. Some of these measures seek to constrain an opponent's capacity, while others seek to deter an opponent to take (or not) a particular action. We develop a theory to study how constraining and coercive threats interact strategically. Building on canonical models of deterrence, we first identify how coercive measures, in i…
The Political Consequences of Green Policies: Evidence from Italy
For many governments, enacting green policies is a priority, but such policies often impose on citizens substantial and uneven costs. How does the introduction of green policies affect voting? We study this question in the context of a major ban on polluting cars introduced in Milan, which was strongly opposed by the populist right party Lega. Using several inferential strategies, we show that owners of banned vehicles-who incurred a median loss …
When salience undermines representation: Democratic Dilemmas in Security and Counterterrorism Policy
Congruence between the policies implemented by elected representatives and voters’ policy preferences is fundamental to representation and democratic accountability. Can we anticipate a closer alignment between voters’ policy preferences and the policies explicitly adopted by elected representatives on the more electorally significant issues? We address this question using a simple game theoretic model, where we demonstrate that greater salience …
Political science (7 works) · Economics (6 works) · Law (6 works) · Law (6 works) · Political economy (6 works) · Politics (6 works) · Political Conflict and Governance (5 works) · Electoral Systems and Political Participation (4 works) · Terrorism, Counterterrorism, and Political Violence (4 works) · Computer security (2 works)