Caj Strandberg
Biographic Data
| ID | 1123361 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Caj Strandberg |
| GIVEN NAMES | Caj |
| FAMILY NAME | Strandberg |
| SIGNATURE | STRANDBERG C |
| AFFILIATIONS | Lund University |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-4547-933X |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 11 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 10 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 10 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 1 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1999 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Shifting Scope
The paper develops a new model of instrumental rationality: There is a general concept of instrumental rationality that has two types of instances that differ with regard to coherence and scope. The ‘primary aspect’ applies in effect only to cases where an agent has reason to do what she intends to do and corresponds to a narrow‐scope requirement. The ‘secondary aspect’ applies also to cases where an agent does not have reason to do what she inte…
Realist dependence and irrealist butterflies
In this paper, I argue that a realist account of the modality of moral supervenience is superior to a non-cognitivist account. According to the recommended realist account, moral supervenience amounts to strong supervenience where the outer ‘necessary’ is conceptual and the inner metaphysical. It is argued that non-cognitivism faces a critical choice between weak and strong supervenience where both options are implausible on this view. However, n…
Moral blame and rational criticism
A central issue in practical philosophy concerns the relation between moral blameworthiness and normative reasons. As there has been little of direct exchange between the debate on reasons and the debate on blameworthiness, this topic has not received the attention it deserves. In this paper, I consider two notions about blameworthiness and reasons that are fundamental in respective field. The two notions might seem incontrovertible when consider…
Motivational internalism
A Dual Aspect Account of Moral Language
It is often observed in metaethics that moral language displays a certain duality in as much as it seems to concern both objective facts in the world and subjective attitudes that move to action. In this paper, I defend The Dual Aspect Account which is intended to capture this duality: A person’s utterance of a sentence according to which φing has a moral characteristic, such as “φing is wrong,” conveys two things: The sentence expresses, in virt…
The Pragmatics of Moral Motivation
A Structural Disanalogy between Aesthetic and Ethical Value Judgements
It is often suggested that aesthetic and ethical value judgements are similar in such a way that they should be analysed in analogous manners. In this paper, I argue that the two types of judgements share four important, features concerning disagreement, motivation, categoricity, and argumentation. This, I maintain, helps to explain why many philosophers have thought that aesthetic and ethical value judgements can be analysed in accordance with t…
Metaethical Subjectivism ? Richard Double
In this short and lucid book, Richard Double defends what he calls ‘meta‐ethical subjectivism’. Put very generally, Double's case for this view is that since our moral views and normative theories conflict in a number of ways and to a very large extent, there can be no normative truths, or at least no objective normative truths. As can be assumed from this short outline, Double does not understand subjectivism as it is commonly construed in meta‐…
In Defence of the Open Question Argument
Aristotle's Internalism in the Nichomachean Ethics
Dispositional Moral Properties and Moral Motivation
Inspired by an analogy between moral and secondary properties, some moral philosophers have argued that moral properties are dispositions. According to one version of this view, most clearly represented by Jonathan Dancy, a moral property is the property of being such, having base properties such, that an entity with the property elicits morally merited and motivating responses. Its proponents have argued that this notion can explain how moral ju…
A Dual Aspect Account of Moral Language
It is often observed in metaethics that moral language displays a certain duality in as much as it seems to concern both objective facts in the world and subjective attitudes that move to action. In this paper, I defend The Dual Aspect Account which is intended to capture this duality: A person’s utterance of a sentence according to which φing has a moral characteristic, such as “φing is wrong,” conveys two things: The sentence expresses, in virt…
A Structural Disanalogy between Aesthetic and Ethical Value Judgements
It is often suggested that aesthetic and ethical value judgements are similar in such a way that they should be analysed in analogous manners. In this paper, I argue that the two types of judgements share four important, features concerning disagreement, motivation, categoricity, and argumentation. This, I maintain, helps to explain why many philosophers have thought that aesthetic and ethical value judgements can be analysed in accordance with t…
In Defence of the Open Question Argument
Dispositional Moral Properties and Moral Motivation
Inspired by an analogy between moral and secondary properties, some moral philosophers have argued that moral properties are dispositions. According to one version of this view, most clearly represented by Jonathan Dancy, a moral property is the property of being such, having base properties such, that an entity with the property elicits morally merited and motivating responses. Its proponents have argued that this notion can explain how moral ju…
Aristotle's Internalism in the Nichomachean Ethics
In Defence of the Open Question Argument
Metaethical Subjectivism ? Richard Double
In this short and lucid book, Richard Double defends what he calls ‘meta‐ethical subjectivism’. Put very generally, Double's case for this view is that since our moral views and normative theories conflict in a number of ways and to a very large extent, there can be no normative truths, or at least no objective normative truths. As can be assumed from this short outline, Double does not understand subjectivism as it is commonly construed in meta‐…
A Dual Aspect Account of Moral Language
It is often observed in metaethics that moral language displays a certain duality in as much as it seems to concern both objective facts in the world and subjective attitudes that move to action. In this paper, I defend The Dual Aspect Account which is intended to capture this duality: A person’s utterance of a sentence according to which φing has a moral characteristic, such as “φing is wrong,” conveys two things: The sentence expresses, in virt…
The Pragmatics of Moral Motivation
A Structural Disanalogy between Aesthetic and Ethical Value Judgements
It is often suggested that aesthetic and ethical value judgements are similar in such a way that they should be analysed in analogous manners. In this paper, I argue that the two types of judgements share four important, features concerning disagreement, motivation, categoricity, and argumentation. This, I maintain, helps to explain why many philosophers have thought that aesthetic and ethical value judgements can be analysed in accordance with t…
Motivational internalism
Moral blame and rational criticism
A central issue in practical philosophy concerns the relation between moral blameworthiness and normative reasons. As there has been little of direct exchange between the debate on reasons and the debate on blameworthiness, this topic has not received the attention it deserves. In this paper, I consider two notions about blameworthiness and reasons that are fundamental in respective field. The two notions might seem incontrovertible when consider…
Realist dependence and irrealist butterflies
In this paper, I argue that a realist account of the modality of moral supervenience is superior to a non-cognitivist account. According to the recommended realist account, moral supervenience amounts to strong supervenience where the outer ‘necessary’ is conceptual and the inner metaphysical. It is argued that non-cognitivism faces a critical choice between weak and strong supervenience where both options are implausible on this view. However, n…
Shifting Scope
The paper develops a new model of instrumental rationality: There is a general concept of instrumental rationality that has two types of instances that differ with regard to coherence and scope. The ‘primary aspect’ applies in effect only to cases where an agent has reason to do what she intends to do and corresponds to a narrow‐scope requirement. The ‘secondary aspect’ applies also to cases where an agent does not have reason to do what she inte…
Epistemology (10 works) · Philosophical Ethics and Theory (10 works) · Philosophy (8 works) · Psychology (7 works) · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment (6 works) · Free Will and Agency (5 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (4 works) · Philosophy (4 works) · Internalism and externalism (3 works) · Metaphysics (3 works)