Haixin Dang
Biographic Data
| ID | 1124720 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Haixin Dang |
| GIVEN NAMES | Haixin |
| FAMILY NAME | Dang |
| SIGNATURE | DANG H |
| AFFILIATIONS | Case Western Reserve University |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-8039-4876 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 6 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 8 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 6 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2019 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Summativism and non-summativism about groups
Jessica Brown’s Groups as Epistemic and Moral Agents defends non-summativism, the view that groups can hold beliefs and knowledge independently of their members’ states, via a functionalist framework. While divergence cases – where group and member properties differ – challenge summativism, I argue they support a refined minimal summativism: group properties must be grounded in member properties, though not sufficiently determined by them. Examin…
Divergence Arguments in Collective Epistemology
Many have argued that the lives of groups and their members may diverge. For example, that groups can believe or know propositions that none of their members know or believe. This article gives an overview of a prominent type of argument, called divergence argument, which aims to support this view. In particular, the article will work out a conceptual map that enables us to discuss underlying theoretical assumptions and categorise different types…
Minority Reports: Registering Dissent in Science
Consensus reporting is valuable for presenting unified scientific evidence to the public. When a consensus does not exist, I argue that scientists ought not to default to majority reporting in its place. Majority reporting has several epistemic drawbacks because it can obscure underlying justifications and lines of evidence, which may be in conflict or contested. I argue that minority reporting, in conjunction with majority reporting, is an epist…
What’s the Point of Authors
In this paper, I want to start to untangle some of the philosophical issues associated with our practices of ascribing authorship for collaborative work, with an eye to formulating better guidelines for authorship. I will focus on the following questions: 1. What epistemic, social, and ethical functions are played by our practices of ascribing authorship for academic papers? 2. What ways of ascribing authorship would best address these functions?…
Scientific conclusions need not be accurate, justified, or believed by their authors
We argue that the main results of scientific papers may appropriately be published even if they are false, unjustified, and not believed to be true or justified by their author. To defend this claim we draw upon the literature studying the norms of assertion, and consider how they would apply if one attempted to hold claims made in scientific papers to their strictures, as assertions and discovery claims in scientific papers seem naturally analog…
Do Collaborators in Science Need to Agree
I argue that collaborators do not need to reach broad agreement over the justification of a consensus claim. This is because maintaining a diversity of justifiers within a scientific collaboration has important epistemic value. I develop a view of collective justification that depends on the diversity of epistemic perspectives present in a group. I argue that a group can be collectively justified in asserting that P as long as the disagreement am…
Do Collaborators in Science Need to Agree
I argue that collaborators do not need to reach broad agreement over the justification of a consensus claim. This is because maintaining a diversity of justifiers within a scientific collaboration has important epistemic value. I develop a view of collective justification that depends on the diversity of epistemic perspectives present in a group. I argue that a group can be collectively justified in asserting that P as long as the disagreement am…
What’s the Point of Authors
In this paper, I want to start to untangle some of the philosophical issues associated with our practices of ascribing authorship for collaborative work, with an eye to formulating better guidelines for authorship. I will focus on the following questions: 1. What epistemic, social, and ethical functions are played by our practices of ascribing authorship for academic papers? 2. What ways of ascribing authorship would best address these functions?…
Do Collaborators in Science Need to Agree
I argue that collaborators do not need to reach broad agreement over the justification of a consensus claim. This is because maintaining a diversity of justifiers within a scientific collaboration has important epistemic value. I develop a view of collective justification that depends on the diversity of epistemic perspectives present in a group. I argue that a group can be collectively justified in asserting that P as long as the disagreement am…
Scientific conclusions need not be accurate, justified, or believed by their authors
We argue that the main results of scientific papers may appropriately be published even if they are false, unjustified, and not believed to be true or justified by their author. To defend this claim we draw upon the literature studying the norms of assertion, and consider how they would apply if one attempted to hold claims made in scientific papers to their strictures, as assertions and discovery claims in scientific papers seem naturally analog…
Minority Reports: Registering Dissent in Science
Consensus reporting is valuable for presenting unified scientific evidence to the public. When a consensus does not exist, I argue that scientists ought not to default to majority reporting in its place. Majority reporting has several epistemic drawbacks because it can obscure underlying justifications and lines of evidence, which may be in conflict or contested. I argue that minority reporting, in conjunction with majority reporting, is an epist…
What’s the Point of Authors
In this paper, I want to start to untangle some of the philosophical issues associated with our practices of ascribing authorship for collaborative work, with an eye to formulating better guidelines for authorship. I will focus on the following questions: 1. What epistemic, social, and ethical functions are played by our practices of ascribing authorship for academic papers? 2. What ways of ascribing authorship would best address these functions?…
Divergence Arguments in Collective Epistemology
Many have argued that the lives of groups and their members may diverge. For example, that groups can believe or know propositions that none of their members know or believe. This article gives an overview of a prominent type of argument, called divergence argument, which aims to support this view. In particular, the article will work out a conceptual map that enables us to discuss underlying theoretical assumptions and categorise different types…
Summativism and non-summativism about groups
Jessica Brown’s Groups as Epistemic and Moral Agents defends non-summativism, the view that groups can hold beliefs and knowledge independently of their members’ states, via a functionalist framework. While divergence cases – where group and member properties differ – challenge summativism, I argue they support a refined minimal summativism: group properties must be grounded in member properties, though not sufficiently determined by them. Examin…
Philosophy and History of Science (5 works) · Epistemology (4 works) · Philosophy (4 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (3 works) · scientometrics and bibliometrics research (3 works) · Computer Science (2 works) · Sociology (2 works) · Academic Publishing and Open Access (1 works) · Agency (philosophy) (1 works) · Assertion (1 works)