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Maria Lasonen‐aarnio

Biographic Data

ID1128526
NAMEMaria Lasonen‐aarnio
GIVEN NAMESMaria
FAMILY NAMELasonen‐aarnio
SIGNATUREAARNIO M L
AFFILIATIONSUniversity of Helsinki
ORCID0000-0002-7215-5824
VERIFIEDYes
TOTAL WORKS8
TOTAL CITATIONS67
AUTHOR COUNT8
EDITOR COUNT0
FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR2014
LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR2025
H-INDEX3
  • The prescriptive and the hypological: A radical detachment

    Open Access•Maria Lasonen‐aarnio•ARTICLE•Philosophical Studies•2025•Cited by: 1•References: 29

    My aim in this paper is to introduce and motivate a general normative framework, which I call feasibilism , and to sketch a view of the relationship between the prescriptive and the hypological in the epistemic domain by drawing on the theoretical resources provided by this framework. I then generalise the lesson to the moral domain. I begin by motivating feasibilism. A wide range of norms appear to leave uncharted an important part of the normat…

  • Perspectives and good dispositions

    Open Access•Maria Lasonen‐aarnio•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•2024•Cited by: 3•References: 3

    In some cases we can only conform to norms like Choose the best! by luck, in a way that is not creditable to us. According to the perspectivist diagnosis, the problem with such norms is that they make reference to facts that may lie outside our perspectives. The first aim of this paper is to argue that the perspectivist diagnosis of the problem of luck is not ultimately correct. The correct diagnosis, I argue, is feasibilist: in some situations i…

  • The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Evidence

    Maria Lasonen‐aarnio, Maria Lasonen-Aarnio et al.•BOOK•The Routledge Handbook of the…•2023•Cited by: 1

    "What one can know depends on one’s evidence. Good scientific theories are supported by evidence. Our experiences provide us with evidence. Any sort of inquiry involves the seeking of evidence. It is irrational to believe contrary to your evidence. For these reasons and more, evidence is one of the most fundamental notions in the field of epistemology and is emerging as a crucial topic across academic disciplines. The Routledge Handbook of the Ph…

  • Refuting two dilemmas for infallibilism

    Open Access•Giada Fratantonio, Maria Lasonen‐aarnio et al.•ARTICLE•Philosophical Studies•2022

  • The Cake Theory of Credit

    Jaako Hirvelä, Maria Lasonen‐aarnio et al.•ARTICLE•Philosophical Topics•2021

    The notion of credit plays a central role in virtue epistemology and in the literature on moral worth. While virtue epistemologists and ethicists have devoted a significant amount of work to providing an account of creditable success, a unified theory of credit applicable to both epistemology and ethics, as well as a discussion of the general form it should take, are largely missing from the literature. Our goal is to lay out a theory of credit t…

  • The rationality of epistemic akrasia

    Open Access•John Hawthorne, Yoaav Isaacs et al.•ARTICLE•Philosophical Perspectives•2021•Cited by: 4•References: 6

  • Not So Phenomenal

    John Hawthorne, Maria Lasonen‐aarnio et al.•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Review•2021

    The main aims in this article are to discuss and criticize the core thesis of a position that has become known as phenomenal conservatism. According to this thesis, its seeming to one that p provides enough justification for a belief in p to be prima facie justified (a thesis the article labels Standard Phenomenal Conservatism). This thesis captures the special kind of epistemic import that seemings are claimed to have. To get clearer on this the…

  • Higher‐Order Evidence and the Limits of Defeat

    Open Access•Maria Lasonen‐aarnio•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•2014•Cited by: 58•References: 2

    Recent authors have drawn attention to a kind of defeating evidence commonly referred to as higher-order evidence.Such evidence works by inducing doubts that one's doxastic state is the result of a flawed process -for instance, a process brought about by a reason-distorting drug.I argue that accommodating defeat by higher-order evidence requires a two-tiered theory of justification, and that the phenomenon gives rise to a puzzle.The puzzle is tha…

  • Higher‐Order Evidence and the Limits of Defeat

    Open Access•Maria Lasonen‐aarnio•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•2014•Cited by: 58•References: 2

    Recent authors have drawn attention to a kind of defeating evidence commonly referred to as higher-order evidence.Such evidence works by inducing doubts that one's doxastic state is the result of a flawed process -for instance, a process brought about by a reason-distorting drug.I argue that accommodating defeat by higher-order evidence requires a two-tiered theory of justification, and that the phenomenon gives rise to a puzzle.The puzzle is tha…

  • The rationality of epistemic akrasia

    Open Access•John Hawthorne, Yoaav Isaacs et al.•ARTICLE•Philosophical Perspectives•2021•Cited by: 4•References: 6

  • Perspectives and good dispositions

    Open Access•Maria Lasonen‐aarnio•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•2024•Cited by: 3•References: 3

    In some cases we can only conform to norms like Choose the best! by luck, in a way that is not creditable to us. According to the perspectivist diagnosis, the problem with such norms is that they make reference to facts that may lie outside our perspectives. The first aim of this paper is to argue that the perspectivist diagnosis of the problem of luck is not ultimately correct. The correct diagnosis, I argue, is feasibilist: in some situations i…

  • The prescriptive and the hypological: A radical detachment

    Open Access•Maria Lasonen‐aarnio•ARTICLE•Philosophical Studies•2025•Cited by: 1•References: 29

    My aim in this paper is to introduce and motivate a general normative framework, which I call feasibilism , and to sketch a view of the relationship between the prescriptive and the hypological in the epistemic domain by drawing on the theoretical resources provided by this framework. I then generalise the lesson to the moral domain. I begin by motivating feasibilism. A wide range of norms appear to leave uncharted an important part of the normat…

  • The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Evidence

    Maria Lasonen‐aarnio, Maria Lasonen-Aarnio et al.•BOOK•The Routledge Handbook of the…•2023•Cited by: 1

    "What one can know depends on one’s evidence. Good scientific theories are supported by evidence. Our experiences provide us with evidence. Any sort of inquiry involves the seeking of evidence. It is irrational to believe contrary to your evidence. For these reasons and more, evidence is one of the most fundamental notions in the field of epistemology and is emerging as a crucial topic across academic disciplines. The Routledge Handbook of the Ph…

  • Higher‐Order Evidence and the Limits of Defeat

    Open Access•Maria Lasonen‐aarnio•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•2014•Cited by: 58•References: 2

    Recent authors have drawn attention to a kind of defeating evidence commonly referred to as higher-order evidence.Such evidence works by inducing doubts that one's doxastic state is the result of a flawed process -for instance, a process brought about by a reason-distorting drug.I argue that accommodating defeat by higher-order evidence requires a two-tiered theory of justification, and that the phenomenon gives rise to a puzzle.The puzzle is tha…

  • The Cake Theory of Credit

    Jaako Hirvelä, Maria Lasonen‐aarnio et al.•ARTICLE•Philosophical Topics•2021

    The notion of credit plays a central role in virtue epistemology and in the literature on moral worth. While virtue epistemologists and ethicists have devoted a significant amount of work to providing an account of creditable success, a unified theory of credit applicable to both epistemology and ethics, as well as a discussion of the general form it should take, are largely missing from the literature. Our goal is to lay out a theory of credit t…

  • The rationality of epistemic akrasia

    Open Access•John Hawthorne, Yoaav Isaacs et al.•ARTICLE•Philosophical Perspectives•2021•Cited by: 4•References: 6

  • Not So Phenomenal

    John Hawthorne, Maria Lasonen‐aarnio et al.•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Review•2021

    The main aims in this article are to discuss and criticize the core thesis of a position that has become known as phenomenal conservatism. According to this thesis, its seeming to one that p provides enough justification for a belief in p to be prima facie justified (a thesis the article labels Standard Phenomenal Conservatism). This thesis captures the special kind of epistemic import that seemings are claimed to have. To get clearer on this the…

  • Refuting two dilemmas for infallibilism

    Open Access•Giada Fratantonio, Maria Lasonen‐aarnio et al.•ARTICLE•Philosophical Studies•2022

  • The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Evidence

    Maria Lasonen‐aarnio, Maria Lasonen-Aarnio et al.•BOOK•The Routledge Handbook of the…•2023•Cited by: 1

    "What one can know depends on one’s evidence. Good scientific theories are supported by evidence. Our experiences provide us with evidence. Any sort of inquiry involves the seeking of evidence. It is irrational to believe contrary to your evidence. For these reasons and more, evidence is one of the most fundamental notions in the field of epistemology and is emerging as a crucial topic across academic disciplines. The Routledge Handbook of the Ph…

  • Perspectives and good dispositions

    Open Access•Maria Lasonen‐aarnio•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•2024•Cited by: 3•References: 3

    In some cases we can only conform to norms like Choose the best! by luck, in a way that is not creditable to us. According to the perspectivist diagnosis, the problem with such norms is that they make reference to facts that may lie outside our perspectives. The first aim of this paper is to argue that the perspectivist diagnosis of the problem of luck is not ultimately correct. The correct diagnosis, I argue, is feasibilist: in some situations i…

  • The prescriptive and the hypological: A radical detachment

    Open Access•Maria Lasonen‐aarnio•ARTICLE•Philosophical Studies•2025•Cited by: 1•References: 29

    My aim in this paper is to introduce and motivate a general normative framework, which I call feasibilism , and to sketch a view of the relationship between the prescriptive and the hypological in the epistemic domain by drawing on the theoretical resources provided by this framework. I then generalise the lesson to the moral domain. I begin by motivating feasibilism. A wide range of norms appear to leave uncharted an important part of the normat…

Epistemology (7 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (7 works) · Philosophy (7 works) · Computer Science (3 works) · Free Will and Agency (3 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (3 works) · Psychology (3 works) · Citation (2 works) · Economics (2 works) · Ethics in medical practice (2 works)

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