Susan Webb Yackee
Dados Biográficos
| ID | 1129814 |
|---|---|
| NOME | Susan Webb Yackee |
| PRENOMES | Susan Webb |
| SOBRENOME | Yackee |
| ASSINATURA | YACKEE S W |
| AFILIAÇÕES | University of Wisconsin–Madison |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-1132-8434 |
| VERIFICADO | Sim |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 42 |
| TOTAL DE CITAÇÕES | 994 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 42 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMEIRO ANO DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2003 |
| ANO MAIS RECENTE DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2025 |
| ÍNDICE H | 18 |
Boosting Public Confidence in U.S. Agency Policymaking
Scholars have documented a steep decline in Americans' trust in the bureaucracy. This trend is problematic because it threatens the legitimacy of democratic policymaking by public sector agencies. We hypothesize that the participation of the bureaucracy's elected political principals in agency policy decision‐making increases public confidence in the regulatory process. To test this argument, we implement a vignette‐based survey experiment with r…
Embattled Past, Uncertain Future
The US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is one of the largest and most important regulators of public health worldwide. Throughout its history, it has sought to build a reputation of decision-making based on science and evidence. However, shrinking trust in political institutions, growing political polarization, and a recent pandemic have confronted the FDA with unprecedent challenges. In light of these developments, we first provide an overvie…
Procedural constraints and regulatory ossification in the US states
Scholars of the US regulatory process routinely assert that rulemaking is “ossified”—that it has become so encumbered with procedural constraints that it is difficult for agencies to issue socially desirable regulations. Yet, this claim has rarely been subject to empirical testing, and this is particularly true at the sub‐federal (i.e., US state) level. But the same factors that allegedly cause ossification in federal agencies also exist in the s…
I'm a Survivor
This article challenges the common assumption that the partisan identification of bureaucratic elites is fixed over time. Building on principal-agent and organization theory, we hypothesize that bureaucratic elites may respond to political turnover by adjusting their partisan identification toward that of their (new) elected principals. We test this prediction using data from the American State Administrators Project (ASAP) over the 1964-2008 per…
Executive policymaking influence via the administrative apparatus
Elected chief executives in the United States—that is, governors and presidents—routinely attempt to achieve their domestic policy goals by influencing the decision‐making of public agencies. I provide empirical assessments of the two most frequently theorized elected executive influence tactics: political appointments and the centralization of agency decision‐making. Using an expansive survey of the leaders in over 1800 state agencies, observati…
A new measure of US public agency policy discretion
The US bureaucracy routinely issues major public policy decisions that affect Americans’ lives. Government agency leaders make those decisions based on a subjective understanding of their agency’s available policy discretion. Over time, discretion has become a prominent theoretical construct in the bureaucratic politics and public administration literature, but it is rarely measured directly. In this article, we create a new measure of agency pol…
U.S. agency growth aspirations and the effect of ideological extremism
Does ideological extremism curb a public agency's desire to grow? This article theorizes that changes in the political environment affect a public agency leader's growth aspirations . Specifically, increased ideological extremism across an agency's elected principals leads an agency leader to be more cautious and less growth‐minded. The assessments of over 10,000 American state agency leaders are studied across 11 points in time from 1964 to 2018…
Handmaidens of the legislature? Understanding regulatory timing
When does legislation trigger regulation? The US Congress regularly passes laws that authorise government agencies to write legally binding regulations. Yet, when this occurs, agencies may take years to act – or, at times – may never act at all. We theorise that the breadth of the congressional statutory delegation drives the timing of agency policy production. In particular, when Congress expressly tells an agency to promulgate a rule, we expect…
When does the multiple principals hypothesis hold? The politics of U.S. agency policymaking autonomy
When the bureaucracy's political principals hold different preferences for policy, does this increase the bureaucracy's policymaking autonomy? Existing theory strongly suggests “yes.” We, however, argue that this pattern will materialize only when the bureaucracy's principals are all on the same side of the political divide. (i.e., unified government). Using data gathered from the American states at two time points, we capture preference divergen…
Regulatory Capture's Self‐Serving Application
Observers regularly assert that government regulations are captured—meaning the content of the regulation is diverted away from the public interest and toward the interests of regulated industry. I argue that the label of regulatory capture is often applied differently by policy losers than by policy winners. I hypothesize that when an entity is unsuccessful in achieving its goals during regulatory policy making, that entity is more likely to dee…
The “Science” of Policy Development During Administrative Rulemaking
The legitimacy of government agencies rests in part on the premise that public administrators use scientific evidence to make policy decisions. Yet, what happens when there is no consensus in the scientific evidence—i.e., when the science is in conflict? I theorize that scientific conflict yields greater policy change during administrative policymaking. I assess this claim using data from the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA). I identify po…
Out of the public’s eye? Lobbying the President’s Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs
The American State Administrators Project
We present the American State Administrators Project (ASAP), a decades‐long survey of state agency leaders. This remarkable dataset provides a 50‐state chronological portrait of state administrative leaders, what they think, and what their agencies do. The dataset has traditionally been closely held but is now being shared with the broader scholarly community for the first time. We use this article to demonstrate the dataset's potential to advanc…
Hidden Politics? Assessing Lobbying Success During US Agency Guidance Development
I test the proposition that interest groups achieve greater policy success when they lobby during the agency guidance document development process as opposed to the notice and comment process. Policymaking via guidance documents often receives lower levels of public attention, which provides greater flexibility to accommodate lobbying requests. I analyze the hypothesis during the creation of 41 rules by one US government agency—20 of which were p…
The Politics of Rulemaking in the United States
Rulemaking is a critical part of American government and governance. This article reviews the political underpinnings of modern rulemaking. Specifically, it highlights the process and impact of agency regulations, as well as the key tools used by the legislature, elected executive, and courts to oversee the rulemaking process. The article also reviews who participates in the rulemaking process, as well as who influences regulatory content. Finall…
Presidentially Directed Policy Change
US presidents—working through the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA)—influence administrative agencies by directing agencies to modify their regulatory policy proposals before finalization. We identify two competing hypotheses from the literature to explain this presidential intervention. First, some scholars hypothesize that presidents are more likely to change proposals when the submitting agency's political ideology differs fr…
Clerks or Kings? Partisan Alignment and Delegation to the US Bureaucracy
Scholars often assert that the delegation of policy discretion to administrative agencies is driven, in part, by partisanship. In short, the “ally principle” dictates that elected officials delegate more policy discretion to agency officials when their partisanship aligns because such an alignment reduces uncertainty about future policy choices. In contrast, we draw on insights from social identity theory to theorize that partisan alignment may, …
Influence and the Administrative Process
All administrative processes contain points of entry for politics, and the U.S. president's use of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to review government regulations is no exception. Specifically, OMB review can open up a pathway for interest groups to lobby for policy change. We theorize that interest group lobbying can be influential during OMB review, especially when there is consensus across groups. We use a selection model to test ou…
Invisible (and Visible) Lobbying
Most lobbying is invisible, meaning that interest groups routinely contact government officials “off the public record.” While such lobbying is ubiquitous, whether and how it may affect public policy decision-making remains largely unknown. I theorize that lobbying that employs both invisible and visible tactics is the most influential. I study the development of 38 health-related regulatory policies in Wisconsin to assess this argument. I employ…
Participant Voice in the Bureaucratic Policymaking Process
I examine whether citizens who participate in agency rulemaking in the United States believe they have a meaningful voice. Using data drawn from 388 individuals, I employ an innovative survey research design approach—anchoring vignettes—to measure political efficacy during rulemaking, as well as a randomized survey experiment to study causal drivers. Despite powerful arguments associated with low efficacy, participants report, on average, "a lot …
Regulation in the American States
done the scholarly community a service in their new book, The Politics of Regulatory Reform.The book provides some of the first empirical traction on the imposition and effects of regulatory reforms across the 50 American states-a topic that has long been recognized as important but has been infrequently investigated systematically.In part, this topic has escaped close scrutiny because the data necessary to compare across these 50 different gover…
Regulatory Delay and Rulemaking Deadlines
Regulatory delay is one of the most cited problems with US administrative policymaking, and lawmakers frequently impose statutory deadlines on agencies to combat it. Using data on federal rules proposed over a 10-year period, we estimate the impact of statutory deadlines on the probability that proposed rules were finalized as well as their impact on the error with which agencies forecasted when rules would be finalized. We find that agencies wer…
Assessing Regulatory Participation by Health Professionals
Do health and health policy professionals (HHPPs) participate in the formation of agency health regulations? Passage of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) of 2010 has necessitated the writing of many health‐related national and state regulations. This article examines the participation patterns ofHHPPsduring rulemaking to gain insights that may be transferable to future health‐related administrative decision making. The author s…
Forthcoming Articles
Oversight as Constraint or Catalyst? Explaining Agency Influence on State Policy Decision Making
Do agency officials hold influence over the policy decisions made by state legislators and governors? For years, scholars have asserted the important informational role that bureaucrats play within the U.S. policy-making process. However, we have only limited knowledge of the theoretical mechanisms that may allow for this influence, or ultimately, whether this influence matters to public policy outcomes. We theorize that the political oversight o…
A Bias Towards Business? Assessing Interest Group Influence on the U.S. Bureaucracy
We test the proposition that the federal bureaucracy exhibits a “bias toward business” during notice and comment rulemaking. We analyze over 30 bureaucratic rules and almost 1,700 comments over the period of 1994 to 2001. We find that business commenters, but not nonbusiness commenters, hold important influence over the content of final rules. We also demonstrate that as the proportion of business commenters increases, so too does the influence o…
Sweet-Talking the Fourth Branch
Students of politics have identified a variety of actors who appear to influence the federal bureaucracy's implementation of public policy, including Congress, the president, and interest groups. These lines of research, however, have often portrayed interest groups as actors with indirect influence (who, for example, work through or with Congress), rather than assessing the direct influence of interest groups on bureaucratic policy outputs. I co…
Lobbying Coalitions and Government Policy Change
Coalition lobbying is one of the most frequently employed influence tactics used by interest groups today. Yet, surprisingly, the existing literature measuring its policy effects finds either no relationship or a negative association between coalition lobbying and policy change. We theorize the conditions under which coalition lobbying will influence policy and then test for its policy effects. We expect greater influence when there is consensus …
Influence and the Administrative Process
All administrative processes contain points of entry for politics, and the U.S. president's use of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to review government regulations is no exception. Specifically, OMB review can open up a pathway for interest groups to lobby for policy change. We theorize that interest group lobbying can be influential during OMB review, especially when there is consensus across groups. We use a selection model to test ou…
The Politics of Ex Parte Lobbying
Scholars generally agree that interest groups are active and at times influential during the notice and comment period of regulatory policymaking (or "rulemaking"). But current research often ignores the agenda setting that may take place during the pre-proposal stage of rulemaking. During proposal development, interest groups may lobby to: (1) influence the content of proposed regulations or (2) block items from the regulatory agenda altogether.…
Administrative Procedures and Bureaucratic Performance
We provide the first empirical assessment of the ossification thesis, the widely accepted notion that procedural constraints on federal agencies have greatly hindered the ability of those agencies to formulate policy through notice and comment rule-making. Using data that cover all active federal rule-writing agencies from 1983 to 2006, our results largely disconfirm the ossification thesis. Agencies appear readily able to issue a sizeable number…
A Political Consequence of Contracting
We argue that contracting opens a pathway for organized interests to lobby public managers. Using multilevel modeling techniques, we test this proposition with data from administrative agencies in the American states. We find that interactions between organized interests and managers increase in the presence of contracting. We then demonstrate that the influence of organized interests over key state agency decision making is driven, in part, by w…
Interest Group Competition on Federal Agency Rules
In the lobbying literature, the effects of competition—two or more interests lobbying on opposing sides of a policy debate—have not been assessed with regard to government agency policymaking. Consequently, neither the amount nor the effect of competitive lobbying is well understood. Using nearly 1,700 comments on 40 federal agency rules, we evaluate two questions: Do government agencies respond to lobbying by changing agency policies? and Does l…
Understanding commenter influence during agency rule development
We provide the first empirical assessment of commenter influence during the rule development stage of administrative rulemaking. We argue that public com‐menters play a critical agenda‐setting role during rule development. To test this proposition, we analyze data from 36 Department of Transportation rules and almost 500 comments. Each of these rules began with an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking—a procedure that allows us to track the forma…
The Politics of Rulemaking in the United States
Rulemaking is a critical part of American government and governance. This article reviews the political underpinnings of modern rulemaking. Specifically, it highlights the process and impact of agency regulations, as well as the key tools used by the legislature, elected executive, and courts to oversee the rulemaking process. The article also reviews who participates in the rulemaking process, as well as who influences regulatory content. Finall…
Participant Voice in the Bureaucratic Policymaking Process
I examine whether citizens who participate in agency rulemaking in the United States believe they have a meaningful voice. Using data drawn from 388 individuals, I employ an innovative survey research design approach—anchoring vignettes—to measure political efficacy during rulemaking, as well as a randomized survey experiment to study causal drivers. Despite powerful arguments associated with low efficacy, participants report, on average, "a lot …
Invisible (and Visible) Lobbying
Most lobbying is invisible, meaning that interest groups routinely contact government officials “off the public record.” While such lobbying is ubiquitous, whether and how it may affect public policy decision-making remains largely unknown. I theorize that lobbying that employs both invisible and visible tactics is the most influential. I study the development of 38 health-related regulatory policies in Wisconsin to assess this argument. I employ…
Regulatory Delay and Rulemaking Deadlines
Regulatory delay is one of the most cited problems with US administrative policymaking, and lawmakers frequently impose statutory deadlines on agencies to combat it. Using data on federal rules proposed over a 10-year period, we estimate the impact of statutory deadlines on the probability that proposed rules were finalized as well as their impact on the error with which agencies forecasted when rules would be finalized. We find that agencies wer…
Divided government and US federal rulemaking
Despite paying a great deal of attention to the effects of divided government on legislative outputs, scholars of American politics have surprisingly ignored the potential impact of divided government on bureaucratic regulatory outputs. In this article we argue that divided government should reduce the volume of federal agency rulemaking. We test this hypothesis against a data set covering 21,000 rules from 1983 to 2005. Our study is one of the f…
An Empirical Assessment of Devolution's Policy Impact
This article evaluates the influence of devolution on perceived and actual policy outcomes at the local level in the United States. Proponents of devolution often argue that the transfer of policymaking authority to a lower level of government allows subnational officials to more effectively address problems on the government's agenda. We provide one of the first empirical evaluations of this implicit assumption of devolution. We utilize data fro…
Clerks or Kings? Partisan Alignment and Delegation to the US Bureaucracy
Scholars often assert that the delegation of policy discretion to administrative agencies is driven, in part, by partisanship. In short, the “ally principle” dictates that elected officials delegate more policy discretion to agency officials when their partisanship aligns because such an alignment reduces uncertainty about future policy choices. In contrast, we draw on insights from social identity theory to theorize that partisan alignment may, …
Assessing Inter-Institutional Attention to and Influence on Government Regulations
The US federal bureaucracy implements the nation's laws while juggling its own preferences and the preferences of numerous stakeholders. This article begins to unpack the conditions under which the bureaucracy responds to its stakeholders during rule making, and it is argued that bureaucratic responsiveness is conditioned on the level of attention provided by Congress and the President. This argument is tested with a dataset of forty rules and 1,…
The American State Administrators Project
We present the American State Administrators Project (ASAP), a decades‐long survey of state agency leaders. This remarkable dataset provides a 50‐state chronological portrait of state administrative leaders, what they think, and what their agencies do. The dataset has traditionally been closely held but is now being shared with the broader scholarly community for the first time. We use this article to demonstrate the dataset's potential to advanc…
Who’s Whispering in Your Ear? The Influence of Third Parties Over State Agency Decisions
This article expands our understanding regarding the level of influence and the strategies used by third parties on the decisions and policies of state agencies. In particular, we seek to explain the ability of three actors—governors, legislators, and interest groups—to shape policy outputs in state agencies. We highlight one of the most straightforward and largely overlooked strategies for third party influence—the use of routine, informal inter…
Presidentially Directed Policy Change
US presidents—working through the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA)—influence administrative agencies by directing agencies to modify their regulatory policy proposals before finalization. We identify two competing hypotheses from the literature to explain this presidential intervention. First, some scholars hypothesize that presidents are more likely to change proposals when the submitting agency's political ideology differs fr…
Hidden Politics? Assessing Lobbying Success During US Agency Guidance Development
I test the proposition that interest groups achieve greater policy success when they lobby during the agency guidance document development process as opposed to the notice and comment process. Policymaking via guidance documents often receives lower levels of public attention, which provides greater flexibility to accommodate lobbying requests. I analyze the hypothesis during the creation of 41 rules by one US government agency—20 of which were p…
Handmaidens of the legislature? Understanding regulatory timing
When does legislation trigger regulation? The US Congress regularly passes laws that authorise government agencies to write legally binding regulations. Yet, when this occurs, agencies may take years to act – or, at times – may never act at all. We theorise that the breadth of the congressional statutory delegation drives the timing of agency policy production. In particular, when Congress expressly tells an agency to promulgate a rule, we expect…
Reexamining the Dynamic Model of Divided Partisan Government
We reexamine the dynamic model of divided partisan government in the American states developed by Alt and Lowry(2000), a model that purports to provide strong evidence that patterns of partisan control of state government institutions have a substantial impact on state revenues. Given the complexity of the model, however, many of its key implications are not as obvious as they might be. Further, several of these nonobvious implications are, if no…
When does the multiple principals hypothesis hold? The politics of U.S. agency policymaking autonomy
When the bureaucracy's political principals hold different preferences for policy, does this increase the bureaucracy's policymaking autonomy? Existing theory strongly suggests “yes.” We, however, argue that this pattern will materialize only when the bureaucracy's principals are all on the same side of the political divide. (i.e., unified government). Using data gathered from the American states at two time points, we capture preference divergen…
Out of the public’s eye? Lobbying the President’s Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs
Punctuating the Congressional Agenda
Reexamining the Dynamic Model of Divided Partisan Government
We reexamine the dynamic model of divided partisan government in the American states developed by Alt and Lowry(2000), a model that purports to provide strong evidence that patterns of partisan control of state government institutions have a substantial impact on state revenues. Given the complexity of the model, however, many of its key implications are not as obvious as they might be. Further, several of these nonobvious implications are, if no…
Punctuating the Congressional Agenda
Despite general agreement that indicates deadlines “matter” to legislative behavior, there have been few empirical investigations of the use of deadlines in Congress. This study focuses on the use of recess deadlines (such as the August recess). I hypothesize that congressional leaders schedule votes before major recesses to create additional deadlines within the congressional term where votes can be taken under the pressures of time constraint. …
An Empirical Assessment of Devolution's Policy Impact
This article evaluates the influence of devolution on perceived and actual policy outcomes at the local level in the United States. Proponents of devolution often argue that the transfer of policymaking authority to a lower level of government allows subnational officials to more effectively address problems on the government's agenda. We provide one of the first empirical evaluations of this implicit assumption of devolution. We utilize data fro…
Sweet-Talking the Fourth Branch
Students of politics have identified a variety of actors who appear to influence the federal bureaucracy's implementation of public policy, including Congress, the president, and interest groups. These lines of research, however, have often portrayed interest groups as actors with indirect influence (who, for example, work through or with Congress), rather than assessing the direct influence of interest groups on bureaucratic policy outputs. I co…
A Bias Towards Business? Assessing Interest Group Influence on the U.S. Bureaucracy
We test the proposition that the federal bureaucracy exhibits a “bias toward business” during notice and comment rulemaking. We analyze over 30 bureaucratic rules and almost 1,700 comments over the period of 1994 to 2001. We find that business commenters, but not nonbusiness commenters, hold important influence over the content of final rules. We also demonstrate that as the proportion of business commenters increases, so too does the influence o…
Who’s Whispering in Your Ear? The Influence of Third Parties Over State Agency Decisions
This article expands our understanding regarding the level of influence and the strategies used by third parties on the decisions and policies of state agencies. In particular, we seek to explain the ability of three actors—governors, legislators, and interest groups—to shape policy outputs in state agencies. We highlight one of the most straightforward and largely overlooked strategies for third party influence—the use of routine, informal inter…
Assessing Inter-Institutional Attention to and Influence on Government Regulations
The US federal bureaucracy implements the nation's laws while juggling its own preferences and the preferences of numerous stakeholders. This article begins to unpack the conditions under which the bureaucracy responds to its stakeholders during rule making, and it is argued that bureaucratic responsiveness is conditioned on the level of attention provided by Congress and the President. This argument is tested with a dataset of forty rules and 1,…
Interest Group Competition on Federal Agency Rules
In the lobbying literature, the effects of competition—two or more interests lobbying on opposing sides of a policy debate—have not been assessed with regard to government agency policymaking. Consequently, neither the amount nor the effect of competitive lobbying is well understood. Using nearly 1,700 comments on 40 federal agency rules, we evaluate two questions: Do government agencies respond to lobbying by changing agency policies? and Does l…
Understanding commenter influence during agency rule development
We provide the first empirical assessment of commenter influence during the rule development stage of administrative rulemaking. We argue that public com‐menters play a critical agenda‐setting role during rule development. To test this proposition, we analyze data from 36 Department of Transportation rules and almost 500 comments. Each of these rules began with an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking—a procedure that allows us to track the forma…
Divided government and US federal rulemaking
Despite paying a great deal of attention to the effects of divided government on legislative outputs, scholars of American politics have surprisingly ignored the potential impact of divided government on bureaucratic regulatory outputs. In this article we argue that divided government should reduce the volume of federal agency rulemaking. We test this hypothesis against a data set covering 21,000 rules from 1983 to 2005. Our study is one of the f…
Private Conflict and Policy Passage
James Madison argued in Federalist 10 that “rival political factions” work against the public good. In contrast to Madison's pessimistic account, I suggest that factional conflict can lead to more representative public policy, and thus further the will of the people. I theorize that elected officials often seek a safe political position—one that corresponds to the preferences of the public at large—during periods of high conflict. I assess this t…
A Political Consequence of Contracting
We argue that contracting opens a pathway for organized interests to lobby public managers. Using multilevel modeling techniques, we test this proposition with data from administrative agencies in the American states. We find that interactions between organized interests and managers increase in the presence of contracting. We then demonstrate that the influence of organized interests over key state agency decision making is driven, in part, by w…
Lobbying and Policy Change
Journal Article Lobbying and Policy Change: Who Wins, Who Loses, and Why by Frank R. Baumgartner, Jeffrey M. Berry, Marie Hojnacki, David C. Kimball, and Beth L. Leech Get access Lobbying and Policy Change: Who Wins, Who Loses, and Whyby Frank R. Baumgartner, Jeffrey M. Berry, Marie Hojnacki, David C. Kimballand Beth L. Leech. Chicago, IL, University of Chicago Press, 2009. 360pp. Cloth, $66.00; paper, $24.00. Susan Webb Yackee Susan Webb Yackee …
Administrative Procedures and Bureaucratic Performance
We provide the first empirical assessment of the ossification thesis, the widely accepted notion that procedural constraints on federal agencies have greatly hindered the ability of those agencies to formulate policy through notice and comment rule-making. Using data that cover all active federal rule-writing agencies from 1983 to 2006, our results largely disconfirm the ossification thesis. Agencies appear readily able to issue a sizeable number…
Forthcoming Articles
Oversight as Constraint or Catalyst? Explaining Agency Influence on State Policy Decision Making
Do agency officials hold influence over the policy decisions made by state legislators and governors? For years, scholars have asserted the important informational role that bureaucrats play within the U.S. policy-making process. However, we have only limited knowledge of the theoretical mechanisms that may allow for this influence, or ultimately, whether this influence matters to public policy outcomes. We theorize that the political oversight o…
Lobbying Coalitions and Government Policy Change
Coalition lobbying is one of the most frequently employed influence tactics used by interest groups today. Yet, surprisingly, the existing literature measuring its policy effects finds either no relationship or a negative association between coalition lobbying and policy change. We theorize the conditions under which coalition lobbying will influence policy and then test for its policy effects. We expect greater influence when there is consensus …
The Politics of Ex Parte Lobbying
Scholars generally agree that interest groups are active and at times influential during the notice and comment period of regulatory policymaking (or "rulemaking"). But current research often ignores the agenda setting that may take place during the pre-proposal stage of rulemaking. During proposal development, interest groups may lobby to: (1) influence the content of proposed regulations or (2) block items from the regulatory agenda altogether.…
Assessing Regulatory Participation by Health Professionals
Do health and health policy professionals (HHPPs) participate in the formation of agency health regulations? Passage of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) of 2010 has necessitated the writing of many health‐related national and state regulations. This article examines the participation patterns ofHHPPsduring rulemaking to gain insights that may be transferable to future health‐related administrative decision making. The author s…
Regulation in the American States
done the scholarly community a service in their new book, The Politics of Regulatory Reform.The book provides some of the first empirical traction on the imposition and effects of regulatory reforms across the 50 American states-a topic that has long been recognized as important but has been infrequently investigated systematically.In part, this topic has escaped close scrutiny because the data necessary to compare across these 50 different gover…
Regulatory Delay and Rulemaking Deadlines
Regulatory delay is one of the most cited problems with US administrative policymaking, and lawmakers frequently impose statutory deadlines on agencies to combat it. Using data on federal rules proposed over a 10-year period, we estimate the impact of statutory deadlines on the probability that proposed rules were finalized as well as their impact on the error with which agencies forecasted when rules would be finalized. We find that agencies wer…
Influence and the Administrative Process
All administrative processes contain points of entry for politics, and the U.S. president's use of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to review government regulations is no exception. Specifically, OMB review can open up a pathway for interest groups to lobby for policy change. We theorize that interest group lobbying can be influential during OMB review, especially when there is consensus across groups. We use a selection model to test ou…
Invisible (and Visible) Lobbying
Most lobbying is invisible, meaning that interest groups routinely contact government officials “off the public record.” While such lobbying is ubiquitous, whether and how it may affect public policy decision-making remains largely unknown. I theorize that lobbying that employs both invisible and visible tactics is the most influential. I study the development of 38 health-related regulatory policies in Wisconsin to assess this argument. I employ…
Participant Voice in the Bureaucratic Policymaking Process
I examine whether citizens who participate in agency rulemaking in the United States believe they have a meaningful voice. Using data drawn from 388 individuals, I employ an innovative survey research design approach—anchoring vignettes—to measure political efficacy during rulemaking, as well as a randomized survey experiment to study causal drivers. Despite powerful arguments associated with low efficacy, participants report, on average, "a lot …
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