Dorothy Kronick
Biographic Data
| ID | 1134904 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Dorothy Kronick |
| GIVEN NAMES | Dorothy |
| FAMILY NAME | Kronick |
| SIGNATURE | KRONICK D |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of California, Berkeley |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-9647-9842 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 13 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 97 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 13 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2020 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 4 |
Official vigilantism
On unfounded claims of electoral fraud
Preaching to the Choir
How Maduro Stole Venezuela's Vote
On July 28 of last year, an opposition candidate defeated Venezuelan president Nicolás Maduro at the polls—and then used the government's own voting technology to prove it. Yet Maduro remains in power. We explain why an elected autocrat would choose transparent, auditable vote-counting technology. Hugo Chávez, Maduro's predecessor, installed this technology when he was popular and needed to defend real electoral returns against false accusations …
Crime, Insecurity, and Community Policing
How can societies effectively reduce crime without exacerbating adversarial relationships between the police and citizens? In recent decades, perhaps the most celebrated innovation in police reform has been the introduction of community policing, where citizens are involved in building channels of dialogue and improving police-citizen collaboration. Despite the widespread adoption of community policing in the United States and increasingly in the…
Backsliding by surprise
How do elected autocrats come to power? Prominent explanations point to distributive conflict. We propose instead that some candidates advertise democratic deconsolidation as “deepening democracy,” which can have cross-cutting appeal. We evaluate this proposal through the election of Venezuela's Hugo Chávez, an emblematic elected autocrat. Using original data, we find that historical voting patterns and political rhetoric are consistent with our …
Do Shifts in Late-Counted Votes Signal Fraud? Evidence from Bolivia
Shifts in late-counted votes often spark unfounded claims of electoral fraud. These claims exploit the early-count mirage: the expedient illusion that, absent fraud, an early advantage will persist. We characterize the early-count mirage and evaluate associated fraud claims in four disputed elections, focusing on the case of Bolivia in 2019. When late-counted votes delivered a narrow victory for the incumbent, fraud accusations followed—with dram…
The Arbitrage Lobby
Foundational theories of trade politics emphasize a conflict between consumer welfare and protectionist lobbies. But these theories ignore other powerful lobbies that also shape trade policy. We propose a theory of trade distortion arising from conflict between consumer welfare and importer lobbies. We estimate the key parameter of the model—the government's weight on welfare—using original data from Venezuela, where Hugo Chávez used an exchange-…
Community policing does not build citizen trust in police or reduce crime in the Global South
Easier said than done High-profile instances of police brutality in the last few years have brought attention to patterns of abuse that have existed since the inception of modern policing. There have been many calls for police reform, a process that in many countries has taken the form of increased police engagement with communities. Blair et al . report the results of a large-scale experiment testing the effectiveness of this approach across six…
The Majoritarian Threat to Liberal Democracy
Incumbents often seek to wield power in ways that are formally legal but informally proscribed. Why do voters endorse these power grabs? Prior literature focuses on polarization. We propose instead that many voters are majoritarian , in that they view popularly elected leaders’ actions as inherently democratic – even when those actions undermine liberal democracy. We find support for this claim in two original survey experiments, arguing that maj…
Friends Don’t Let Friends Free Ride
Theory predicts that social sanctioning can solve the collective action problem, but only when people find out whether their peers participate. We evaluate this prediction using data from the near-universe of cell phone subscribers in Venezuela. Those whose behavior is more easily observed by peers are much more likely to protest and much more likely to sign a political petition than otherwise similar people in less-visible social network positio…
Profits and Violence in Illegal Markets
Some theories predict that profits facilitate peace in illegal markets, while others predict that profits fuel violence. I provide empirical evidence from drug trafficking in Venezuela. Using original data, I compare lethal violence trends in municipalities near a major trafficking route to trends elsewhere, both before and after counternarcotics policy in neighboring Colombia increased the use of Venezuelan transport routes. For thirty years pri…
The Logic of Violence in Drug War
Drug traffickers sometimes share profits peacefully. Other times they fight. We propose a model to investigate this variation, focusing on the role of the state. Seizing illegal goods can paradoxically increase traffickers' profits, and higher profits fuel violence. Killing kingpins makes crime bosses short-sighted, also fueling conflict. Only by targeting the most violent traffickers can the state reduce violence without increasing supply. These…
The Majoritarian Threat to Liberal Democracy
Incumbents often seek to wield power in ways that are formally legal but informally proscribed. Why do voters endorse these power grabs? Prior literature focuses on polarization. We propose instead that many voters are majoritarian , in that they view popularly elected leaders’ actions as inherently democratic – even when those actions undermine liberal democracy. We find support for this claim in two original survey experiments, arguing that maj…
The Logic of Violence in Drug War
Drug traffickers sometimes share profits peacefully. Other times they fight. We propose a model to investigate this variation, focusing on the role of the state. Seizing illegal goods can paradoxically increase traffickers' profits, and higher profits fuel violence. Killing kingpins makes crime bosses short-sighted, also fueling conflict. Only by targeting the most violent traffickers can the state reduce violence without increasing supply. These…
Profits and Violence in Illegal Markets
Some theories predict that profits facilitate peace in illegal markets, while others predict that profits fuel violence. I provide empirical evidence from drug trafficking in Venezuela. Using original data, I compare lethal violence trends in municipalities near a major trafficking route to trends elsewhere, both before and after counternarcotics policy in neighboring Colombia increased the use of Venezuelan transport routes. For thirty years pri…
Do Shifts in Late-Counted Votes Signal Fraud? Evidence from Bolivia
Shifts in late-counted votes often spark unfounded claims of electoral fraud. These claims exploit the early-count mirage: the expedient illusion that, absent fraud, an early advantage will persist. We characterize the early-count mirage and evaluate associated fraud claims in four disputed elections, focusing on the case of Bolivia in 2019. When late-counted votes delivered a narrow victory for the incumbent, fraud accusations followed—with dram…
How Maduro Stole Venezuela's Vote
On July 28 of last year, an opposition candidate defeated Venezuelan president Nicolás Maduro at the polls—and then used the government's own voting technology to prove it. Yet Maduro remains in power. We explain why an elected autocrat would choose transparent, auditable vote-counting technology. Hugo Chávez, Maduro's predecessor, installed this technology when he was popular and needed to defend real electoral returns against false accusations …
Backsliding by surprise
How do elected autocrats come to power? Prominent explanations point to distributive conflict. We propose instead that some candidates advertise democratic deconsolidation as “deepening democracy,” which can have cross-cutting appeal. We evaluate this proposal through the election of Venezuela's Hugo Chávez, an emblematic elected autocrat. Using original data, we find that historical voting patterns and political rhetoric are consistent with our …
Preaching to the Choir
The Arbitrage Lobby
Foundational theories of trade politics emphasize a conflict between consumer welfare and protectionist lobbies. But these theories ignore other powerful lobbies that also shape trade policy. We propose a theory of trade distortion arising from conflict between consumer welfare and importer lobbies. We estimate the key parameter of the model—the government's weight on welfare—using original data from Venezuela, where Hugo Chávez used an exchange-…
Friends Don’t Let Friends Free Ride
Theory predicts that social sanctioning can solve the collective action problem, but only when people find out whether their peers participate. We evaluate this prediction using data from the near-universe of cell phone subscribers in Venezuela. Those whose behavior is more easily observed by peers are much more likely to protest and much more likely to sign a political petition than otherwise similar people in less-visible social network positio…
Profits and Violence in Illegal Markets
Some theories predict that profits facilitate peace in illegal markets, while others predict that profits fuel violence. I provide empirical evidence from drug trafficking in Venezuela. Using original data, I compare lethal violence trends in municipalities near a major trafficking route to trends elsewhere, both before and after counternarcotics policy in neighboring Colombia increased the use of Venezuelan transport routes. For thirty years pri…
The Logic of Violence in Drug War
Drug traffickers sometimes share profits peacefully. Other times they fight. We propose a model to investigate this variation, focusing on the role of the state. Seizing illegal goods can paradoxically increase traffickers' profits, and higher profits fuel violence. Killing kingpins makes crime bosses short-sighted, also fueling conflict. Only by targeting the most violent traffickers can the state reduce violence without increasing supply. These…
Community policing does not build citizen trust in police or reduce crime in the Global South
Easier said than done High-profile instances of police brutality in the last few years have brought attention to patterns of abuse that have existed since the inception of modern policing. There have been many calls for police reform, a process that in many countries has taken the form of increased police engagement with communities. Blair et al . report the results of a large-scale experiment testing the effectiveness of this approach across six…
The Majoritarian Threat to Liberal Democracy
Incumbents often seek to wield power in ways that are formally legal but informally proscribed. Why do voters endorse these power grabs? Prior literature focuses on polarization. We propose instead that many voters are majoritarian , in that they view popularly elected leaders’ actions as inherently democratic – even when those actions undermine liberal democracy. We find support for this claim in two original survey experiments, arguing that maj…
Friends Don’t Let Friends Free Ride
Theory predicts that social sanctioning can solve the collective action problem, but only when people find out whether their peers participate. We evaluate this prediction using data from the near-universe of cell phone subscribers in Venezuela. Those whose behavior is more easily observed by peers are much more likely to protest and much more likely to sign a political petition than otherwise similar people in less-visible social network positio…
Do Shifts in Late-Counted Votes Signal Fraud? Evidence from Bolivia
Shifts in late-counted votes often spark unfounded claims of electoral fraud. These claims exploit the early-count mirage: the expedient illusion that, absent fraud, an early advantage will persist. We characterize the early-count mirage and evaluate associated fraud claims in four disputed elections, focusing on the case of Bolivia in 2019. When late-counted votes delivered a narrow victory for the incumbent, fraud accusations followed—with dram…
The Arbitrage Lobby
Foundational theories of trade politics emphasize a conflict between consumer welfare and protectionist lobbies. But these theories ignore other powerful lobbies that also shape trade policy. We propose a theory of trade distortion arising from conflict between consumer welfare and importer lobbies. We estimate the key parameter of the model—the government's weight on welfare—using original data from Venezuela, where Hugo Chávez used an exchange-…
Backsliding by surprise
How do elected autocrats come to power? Prominent explanations point to distributive conflict. We propose instead that some candidates advertise democratic deconsolidation as “deepening democracy,” which can have cross-cutting appeal. We evaluate this proposal through the election of Venezuela's Hugo Chávez, an emblematic elected autocrat. Using original data, we find that historical voting patterns and political rhetoric are consistent with our …
Crime, Insecurity, and Community Policing
How can societies effectively reduce crime without exacerbating adversarial relationships between the police and citizens? In recent decades, perhaps the most celebrated innovation in police reform has been the introduction of community policing, where citizens are involved in building channels of dialogue and improving police-citizen collaboration. Despite the widespread adoption of community policing in the United States and increasingly in the…
Official vigilantism
On unfounded claims of electoral fraud
Preaching to the Choir
How Maduro Stole Venezuela's Vote
On July 28 of last year, an opposition candidate defeated Venezuelan president Nicolás Maduro at the polls—and then used the government's own voting technology to prove it. Yet Maduro remains in power. We explain why an elected autocrat would choose transparent, auditable vote-counting technology. Hugo Chávez, Maduro's predecessor, installed this technology when he was popular and needed to defend real electoral returns against false accusations …
Political science (10 works) · Sociology (8 works) · Law (7 works) · Law (6 works) · Politics (5 works) · Crime, Illicit Activities, and Governance (4 works) · Criminology (4 works) · Computer Science (3 works) · Crime Patterns and Interventions (3 works) · Economics (3 works)