Jed Devaro
Biographic Data
| ID | 1135286 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Jed Devaro |
| GIVEN NAMES | Jed |
| FAMILY NAME | Devaro |
| SIGNATURE | DEVARO J |
| AFFILIATIONS | California State University, East Bay |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-4849-1489 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 10 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 50 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 10 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2007 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 3 |
Work schedules
Performance pay, working hours, and health‐related absenteeism
Analysis of broad, U.K. worker‐establishment matched panel data from 2004 to 2011 reveals that working hours increase with the fraction of an establishment's workers receiving performance‐based pay, if the cutoff for “long weekly hours” is from 35 to 39, but not beyond a sharp discontinuity at 40. Long hours are found to be unrelated to various workplace health problems but positively related to health‐related absenteeism. Combined with complemen…
Democratic Subversion: Elite Cooptation and Opposition Fragmentation
Incumbents in electoral regimes often retain power despite having to regularly compete in multiparty elections. We examine a specific channel through which incumbents can seek to prevent the emergence of a strong opposition that might threaten them in future elections. We present a formal model demonstrating that incumbents can strategically induce opposition fragmentation by appointing some opposition members to ministerial cabinet positions. Op…
Internal and External Hiring
Using large-scale, linked, employer-employee, Finnish panel data, the authors examine firms' internal versus external hiring decisions more comprehensively than has prior literature. The results show that vacancies in job hierarchies are filled more often by horizontal moves than by promotions. Most horizontal moves are external and within the same job functions, so that internally promoted workers face external competitors occupying higher job l…
Non‐performance Pay and Relational Contracting: Evidence from CEO Compensation
CEOs are routinely compensated for aspects of firm performance that are beyond their control. This is puzzling from an agency perspective, which assumes performance pay should be efficient. Working within an agency framework, we provide a rational for this seemingly inefficient feature of CEO compensation by invoking the idea of informal agreements, specifically the theory of relational contracting. We derive observable implications to distinguis…
Performance Pay and Work-Related Health Problems: A Longitudinal Study of Establishments
Using panel data from 2004 and 2011, the authors find an elevated incidence of work-related ailments (associated with bones, muscles, and joints) in U.K. establishments that use individual performance pay, even after accounting for establishment fixed effects. Fixed-effect estimates also confirm a positive relationship between absence due to illness and performance pay. The elevated rates of ailments associated with performance pay appear to redu…
Multiskilling
The article defines multiskilling, and discusses its advantages and disadvantages. It then explores trade‐offs of multiskilled and specialized workers, and discusses international comparison of multiskilling and related practices.
A theoretical analysis of relational job design and compensation
In an analysis that blends ideas from organizational behavior and economics, I propose a new theoretical model that integrates relational job design and compensation. In the model, employers choose both a level of compensation and levels of relational job architecture (both the degree to which workers have contact with the beneficiaries of their work, and the degree to which a job offers opportunities for employees to affect the lives of benefici…
An Empirical Analysis of Risk, Incentives and the Delegation of Worker Authority
The authors empirically test Prendergast's (2002) theory that incorporates the delegation of worker authority into the principal-agent model to explain the lack of consistent empirical support for a tradeoff between risk and incentives. Using data from the 1998 British WERS, the authors investigate whether there is: 1) evidence of a risk-incentives tradeoff as predicted by the principal-agent model; 2) evidence of a positive relationship between …
Promotions and Incentives in Nonprofit and for-Profit Organizations
Using data from the 1992-95 Multi-City Study of Urban Inequality, an employer survey, the authors document a new empirical finding that workers are less likely to receive promotions in nonprofit organizations than in for-profit firms. The study also uncovers evidence that wage increases associated with promotion were of comparable magnitudes in the two sectors, as was the potential for within-job wage growth; nonprofits were less likely than for-…
Democratic Subversion: Elite Cooptation and Opposition Fragmentation
Incumbents in electoral regimes often retain power despite having to regularly compete in multiparty elections. We examine a specific channel through which incumbents can seek to prevent the emergence of a strong opposition that might threaten them in future elections. We present a formal model demonstrating that incumbents can strategically induce opposition fragmentation by appointing some opposition members to ministerial cabinet positions. Op…
Internal and External Hiring
Using large-scale, linked, employer-employee, Finnish panel data, the authors examine firms' internal versus external hiring decisions more comprehensively than has prior literature. The results show that vacancies in job hierarchies are filled more often by horizontal moves than by promotions. Most horizontal moves are external and within the same job functions, so that internally promoted workers face external competitors occupying higher job l…
Promotions and Incentives in Nonprofit and for-Profit Organizations
Using data from the 1992-95 Multi-City Study of Urban Inequality, an employer survey, the authors document a new empirical finding that workers are less likely to receive promotions in nonprofit organizations than in for-profit firms. The study also uncovers evidence that wage increases associated with promotion were of comparable magnitudes in the two sectors, as was the potential for within-job wage growth; nonprofits were less likely than for-…
A theoretical analysis of relational job design and compensation
In an analysis that blends ideas from organizational behavior and economics, I propose a new theoretical model that integrates relational job design and compensation. In the model, employers choose both a level of compensation and levels of relational job architecture (both the degree to which workers have contact with the beneficiaries of their work, and the degree to which a job offers opportunities for employees to affect the lives of benefici…
An Empirical Analysis of Risk, Incentives and the Delegation of Worker Authority
The authors empirically test Prendergast's (2002) theory that incorporates the delegation of worker authority into the principal-agent model to explain the lack of consistent empirical support for a tradeoff between risk and incentives. Using data from the 1998 British WERS, the authors investigate whether there is: 1) evidence of a risk-incentives tradeoff as predicted by the principal-agent model; 2) evidence of a positive relationship between …
Performance Pay and Work-Related Health Problems: A Longitudinal Study of Establishments
Using panel data from 2004 and 2011, the authors find an elevated incidence of work-related ailments (associated with bones, muscles, and joints) in U.K. establishments that use individual performance pay, even after accounting for establishment fixed effects. Fixed-effect estimates also confirm a positive relationship between absence due to illness and performance pay. The elevated rates of ailments associated with performance pay appear to redu…
Promotions and Incentives in Nonprofit and for-Profit Organizations
Using data from the 1992-95 Multi-City Study of Urban Inequality, an employer survey, the authors document a new empirical finding that workers are less likely to receive promotions in nonprofit organizations than in for-profit firms. The study also uncovers evidence that wage increases associated with promotion were of comparable magnitudes in the two sectors, as was the potential for within-job wage growth; nonprofits were less likely than for-…
A theoretical analysis of relational job design and compensation
In an analysis that blends ideas from organizational behavior and economics, I propose a new theoretical model that integrates relational job design and compensation. In the model, employers choose both a level of compensation and levels of relational job architecture (both the degree to which workers have contact with the beneficiaries of their work, and the degree to which a job offers opportunities for employees to affect the lives of benefici…
An Empirical Analysis of Risk, Incentives and the Delegation of Worker Authority
The authors empirically test Prendergast's (2002) theory that incorporates the delegation of worker authority into the principal-agent model to explain the lack of consistent empirical support for a tradeoff between risk and incentives. Using data from the 1998 British WERS, the authors investigate whether there is: 1) evidence of a risk-incentives tradeoff as predicted by the principal-agent model; 2) evidence of a positive relationship between …
Multiskilling
The article defines multiskilling, and discusses its advantages and disadvantages. It then explores trade‐offs of multiskilled and specialized workers, and discusses international comparison of multiskilling and related practices.
Performance Pay and Work-Related Health Problems: A Longitudinal Study of Establishments
Using panel data from 2004 and 2011, the authors find an elevated incidence of work-related ailments (associated with bones, muscles, and joints) in U.K. establishments that use individual performance pay, even after accounting for establishment fixed effects. Fixed-effect estimates also confirm a positive relationship between absence due to illness and performance pay. The elevated rates of ailments associated with performance pay appear to redu…
Non‐performance Pay and Relational Contracting: Evidence from CEO Compensation
CEOs are routinely compensated for aspects of firm performance that are beyond their control. This is puzzling from an agency perspective, which assumes performance pay should be efficient. Working within an agency framework, we provide a rational for this seemingly inefficient feature of CEO compensation by invoking the idea of informal agreements, specifically the theory of relational contracting. We derive observable implications to distinguis…
Internal and External Hiring
Using large-scale, linked, employer-employee, Finnish panel data, the authors examine firms' internal versus external hiring decisions more comprehensively than has prior literature. The results show that vacancies in job hierarchies are filled more often by horizontal moves than by promotions. Most horizontal moves are external and within the same job functions, so that internally promoted workers face external competitors occupying higher job l…
Democratic Subversion: Elite Cooptation and Opposition Fragmentation
Incumbents in electoral regimes often retain power despite having to regularly compete in multiparty elections. We examine a specific channel through which incumbents can seek to prevent the emergence of a strong opposition that might threaten them in future elections. We present a formal model demonstrating that incumbents can strategically induce opposition fragmentation by appointing some opposition members to ministerial cabinet positions. Op…
Performance pay, working hours, and health‐related absenteeism
Analysis of broad, U.K. worker‐establishment matched panel data from 2004 to 2011 reveals that working hours increase with the fraction of an establishment's workers receiving performance‐based pay, if the cutoff for “long weekly hours” is from 35 to 39, but not beyond a sharp discontinuity at 40. Long hours are found to be unrelated to various workplace health problems but positively related to health‐related absenteeism. Combined with complemen…
Work schedules
Economics (8 works) · Business (6 works) · Microeconomics (5 works) · Demographic economics (4 works) · Incentive (4 works) · Computer Science (3 works) · Employment and Welfare Studies (3 works) · Engineering (3 works) · Finance (3 works) · Finance (3 works)