Mark Eli Kalderon
Biographic Data
| ID | 1139073 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Mark Eli Kalderon |
| GIVEN NAMES | Mark Eli |
| FAMILY NAME | Kalderon |
| SIGNATURE | KALDERON M E |
| AFFILIATIONS | University College London |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 14 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 44 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 13 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 1 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2000 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2017 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Priscian on Perception
An aporia posed by Theophrastus prompts Priscian to describe the process by which perception formally assimilates to its object as a progressive perfection. I present an interpretation of Priscian’s account of perception’s progressive perfection, and I consider a dilemma for the general class of accounts to which Priscian’s belongs based on related problems raised by Plotinus and Aquinas. Doing so reveals the explanatory structure of Priscian’s a…
Form without Matter
"Mark Eli Kalderon presents an original study in the philosophy of perception written in the medium of historiography. He considers the phenomenology and metaphysics of sensory presentation through the examination of an ancient aporia. Specifically, he argues that a puzzle about perception at a distance is behind Empedocles' theory of vision. Empedocles conceives of perception as a mode of material assimilation, but this raises a puzzle about col…
Epistemic Relativism
In Fear of Knowledge, Paul Boghossian argues against the very coherence of epistemic relativism. This essay does two things. First, without questioning the truth of his conclusion, it argues that Boghossian's argument for that conclusion fails. Second, it argues that the avowed aim of Fear of Knowledge, to dislodge relativistic conviction, could not be served even if Boghossian's argument worked perfectly on its own terms. The eponymous fear, and…
Summary
Color Pluralism
Research Article| October 01 2007 Color Pluralism Mark Eli Kalderon Mark Eli Kalderon Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google The Philosophical Review (2007) 116 (4): 563–601. https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-2007-014 Cite Icon Cite Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn MailTo Permissions Search Site Citation Mark Eli Kalderon; Color Pluralism. The Philosophical Review 1 October 2007; 116 (4): 563–601. doi: https://doi.org…
Varieties of Moral Irrealism
This chapter demonstrates that there are forms of noncognitivism that eschew nonfactualism. An important obstacle to standard noncognitivism has been its apparent commitment to an implausible expressivist form of nonfactualism. However, noncognitivism — the claim that moral acceptance is some attitude other than belief — is not the exclusive province of nonfactualism. A novel alternative to moral realism, moral fictionalism, can vindicate noncogn…
Attitude, Affect, and Authority
This chapter argues that renewed moral inquiry might have a number of outcomes. At one end of the spectrum, a revision of moral practice is both theoretically and practically required. At the other end of the spectrum, no such revision is required. But there are interim possibilities. Perhaps moral practice would remain fictionalist even after a renewed moral inquiry but the character of the fiction would change. Perhaps, while benign moral ficti…
Moral Pyrrhonism and Noncognitivism
This chapter argues that moral acceptance is noncognitive. Specifically, moral acceptance centrally involves a certain kind of affect, what Scanlon (1998) describes as a desire in the directed attention sense. In accepting a moral sentence that he understands, a competent speaker reconfigures his affective sensibility so as to render salient, in a phenomenologically vivid manner, the moral reasons apparentlyavailable in the circumstance, as he un…
The Pragmatic Fallacy
Noncognitivism, in its primary sense, is a claim about moral acceptance. However, as standardly developed, it is a part of a syndrome of ideas that include negative and positive claims about moral semantics. Standard noncognitivists are nonfactualists in that they deny that the content of a moral sentence is a moral proposition. Standard noncognitivists are expressivists in that they claim that the content of a moral sentence is its use to expres…
Fictionalism In Metaphysics
Fictionalism is the view that a serious intellectual inquiry need not aim at truth. Since 1980, fictionalist accounts of science, mathematics, morality, and other domains of inquiry have been developed. In metaphysics fictionalism is now widely regarded as an option worthy of serious consideration. This volume represents a major benchmark in the debate: it brings together an impressive international team of contributors, whose essays (all but one…
Moral Fictionalism
Moral realists maintain that morality has a distinctive subject matter. Specifically, realists maintain that moral discourse is representational, that moral sentences express moral propositions — propositions that attribute moral properties to things. Noncognitivists, in contrast, maintain that the realist imagery associated with morality is a fiction, a reification of our noncognitive attitudes. The thought that there is a distinctively moral su…
Open Questions and the Manifest Image
The essay argues that, on their usual metalinguistic reconstructions, the open question argument and Frege's puzzle are variants of the same argument. Each are arguments to a conclusion about a difference in meaning; each deploy compositionality as a premise; and each deploy a premise linking epistemic features of sentences with their meaning (which, given certain meaning‐platonist assumptions, can be interpreted as a universal instantiation of L…
Realistic Rationalism
Realistic Rationalism
Color Pluralism
Research Article| October 01 2007 Color Pluralism Mark Eli Kalderon Mark Eli Kalderon Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google The Philosophical Review (2007) 116 (4): 563–601. https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-2007-014 Cite Icon Cite Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn MailTo Permissions Search Site Citation Mark Eli Kalderon; Color Pluralism. The Philosophical Review 1 October 2007; 116 (4): 563–601. doi: https://doi.org…
Moral Fictionalism
Moral realists maintain that morality has a distinctive subject matter. Specifically, realists maintain that moral discourse is representational, that moral sentences express moral propositions — propositions that attribute moral properties to things. Noncognitivists, in contrast, maintain that the realist imagery associated with morality is a fiction, a reification of our noncognitive attitudes. The thought that there is a distinctively moral su…
Open Questions and the Manifest Image
The essay argues that, on their usual metalinguistic reconstructions, the open question argument and Frege's puzzle are variants of the same argument. Each are arguments to a conclusion about a difference in meaning; each deploy compositionality as a premise; and each deploy a premise linking epistemic features of sentences with their meaning (which, given certain meaning‐platonist assumptions, can be interpreted as a universal instantiation of L…
Realistic Rationalism
Realistic Rationalism
Open Questions and the Manifest Image
The essay argues that, on their usual metalinguistic reconstructions, the open question argument and Frege's puzzle are variants of the same argument. Each are arguments to a conclusion about a difference in meaning; each deploy compositionality as a premise; and each deploy a premise linking epistemic features of sentences with their meaning (which, given certain meaning‐platonist assumptions, can be interpreted as a universal instantiation of L…
Varieties of Moral Irrealism
This chapter demonstrates that there are forms of noncognitivism that eschew nonfactualism. An important obstacle to standard noncognitivism has been its apparent commitment to an implausible expressivist form of nonfactualism. However, noncognitivism — the claim that moral acceptance is some attitude other than belief — is not the exclusive province of nonfactualism. A novel alternative to moral realism, moral fictionalism, can vindicate noncogn…
Attitude, Affect, and Authority
This chapter argues that renewed moral inquiry might have a number of outcomes. At one end of the spectrum, a revision of moral practice is both theoretically and practically required. At the other end of the spectrum, no such revision is required. But there are interim possibilities. Perhaps moral practice would remain fictionalist even after a renewed moral inquiry but the character of the fiction would change. Perhaps, while benign moral ficti…
Moral Pyrrhonism and Noncognitivism
This chapter argues that moral acceptance is noncognitive. Specifically, moral acceptance centrally involves a certain kind of affect, what Scanlon (1998) describes as a desire in the directed attention sense. In accepting a moral sentence that he understands, a competent speaker reconfigures his affective sensibility so as to render salient, in a phenomenologically vivid manner, the moral reasons apparentlyavailable in the circumstance, as he un…
The Pragmatic Fallacy
Noncognitivism, in its primary sense, is a claim about moral acceptance. However, as standardly developed, it is a part of a syndrome of ideas that include negative and positive claims about moral semantics. Standard noncognitivists are nonfactualists in that they deny that the content of a moral sentence is a moral proposition. Standard noncognitivists are expressivists in that they claim that the content of a moral sentence is its use to expres…
Fictionalism In Metaphysics
Fictionalism is the view that a serious intellectual inquiry need not aim at truth. Since 1980, fictionalist accounts of science, mathematics, morality, and other domains of inquiry have been developed. In metaphysics fictionalism is now widely regarded as an option worthy of serious consideration. This volume represents a major benchmark in the debate: it brings together an impressive international team of contributors, whose essays (all but one…
Moral Fictionalism
Moral realists maintain that morality has a distinctive subject matter. Specifically, realists maintain that moral discourse is representational, that moral sentences express moral propositions — propositions that attribute moral properties to things. Noncognitivists, in contrast, maintain that the realist imagery associated with morality is a fiction, a reification of our noncognitive attitudes. The thought that there is a distinctively moral su…
Color Pluralism
Research Article| October 01 2007 Color Pluralism Mark Eli Kalderon Mark Eli Kalderon Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google The Philosophical Review (2007) 116 (4): 563–601. https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-2007-014 Cite Icon Cite Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn MailTo Permissions Search Site Citation Mark Eli Kalderon; Color Pluralism. The Philosophical Review 1 October 2007; 116 (4): 563–601. doi: https://doi.org…
Summary
Epistemic Relativism
In Fear of Knowledge, Paul Boghossian argues against the very coherence of epistemic relativism. This essay does two things. First, without questioning the truth of his conclusion, it argues that Boghossian's argument for that conclusion fails. Second, it argues that the avowed aim of Fear of Knowledge, to dislodge relativistic conviction, could not be served even if Boghossian's argument worked perfectly on its own terms. The eponymous fear, and…
Form without Matter
"Mark Eli Kalderon presents an original study in the philosophy of perception written in the medium of historiography. He considers the phenomenology and metaphysics of sensory presentation through the examination of an ancient aporia. Specifically, he argues that a puzzle about perception at a distance is behind Empedocles' theory of vision. Empedocles conceives of perception as a mode of material assimilation, but this raises a puzzle about col…
Priscian on Perception
An aporia posed by Theophrastus prompts Priscian to describe the process by which perception formally assimilates to its object as a progressive perfection. I present an interpretation of Priscian’s account of perception’s progressive perfection, and I consider a dilemma for the general class of accounts to which Priscian’s belongs based on related problems raised by Plotinus and Aquinas. Doing so reveals the explanatory structure of Priscian’s a…
Epistemology (12 works) · Philosophy (11 works) · Philosophical Ethics and Theory (7 works) · Linguistics (6 works) · Psychology (6 works) · Computer Science (4 works) · Free Will and Agency (4 works) · Classical Philosophy and Thought (3 works) · Contemporary philosophy (3 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (3 works)