Kevin Zhengcheng Liu
Biographic Data
| ID | 1139713 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Kevin Zhengcheng Liu |
| GIVEN NAMES | Kevin Zhengcheng |
| FAMILY NAME | Liu |
| SIGNATURE | LIU K Z |
| AFFILIATIONS | Hong Kong University of Science and Technology |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-1424-4845 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 3 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 5 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 3 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2020 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2024 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Discretion, talent allocation, and governance performance: Evidence from China’s imperial bureaucracy
The Making of Bad Gentry: The Abolition of Keju, Local Governance, and Anti-Elite Protests, 1902-1911
This paper investigates the impact of the abolition of the civil service exam on local governance in early twentieth-century China. Before the abolition, local elites collected surtaxes that financed local public goods, but they were supervised by the state and could lose candidacy for higher status if they engaged in corrupt behavior. This prospect of upward mobility (POUM) gave them incentives to behave well, which the abolition of the exam rem…
Taxation, fiscal capacity, and credible commitment in eighteenth-century China: The Effects of the Formalization and Centralization of Informal Surtaxes
This article explores a tax reform in eighteenth-century China that formalized county-level informal surtaxes and centralized control over them in the hands of provincial governors, in an effort to strengthen provincial fiscal capacity. The findings show that this reform increased the frequency of famine relief in cases of exceptional disaster relative to other weather conditions. The study shows that the effects were driven by the new fiscal rev…
Taxation, fiscal capacity, and credible commitment in eighteenth-century China: The Effects of the Formalization and Centralization of Informal Surtaxes
This article explores a tax reform in eighteenth-century China that formalized county-level informal surtaxes and centralized control over them in the hands of provincial governors, in an effort to strengthen provincial fiscal capacity. The findings show that this reform increased the frequency of famine relief in cases of exceptional disaster relative to other weather conditions. The study shows that the effects were driven by the new fiscal rev…
Discretion, talent allocation, and governance performance: Evidence from China’s imperial bureaucracy
The Making of Bad Gentry: The Abolition of Keju, Local Governance, and Anti-Elite Protests, 1902-1911
This paper investigates the impact of the abolition of the civil service exam on local governance in early twentieth-century China. Before the abolition, local elites collected surtaxes that financed local public goods, but they were supervised by the state and could lose candidacy for higher status if they engaged in corrupt behavior. This prospect of upward mobility (POUM) gave them incentives to behave well, which the abolition of the exam rem…
Taxation, fiscal capacity, and credible commitment in eighteenth-century China: The Effects of the Formalization and Centralization of Informal Surtaxes
This article explores a tax reform in eighteenth-century China that formalized county-level informal surtaxes and centralized control over them in the hands of provincial governors, in an effort to strengthen provincial fiscal capacity. The findings show that this reform increased the frequency of famine relief in cases of exceptional disaster relative to other weather conditions. The study shows that the effects were driven by the new fiscal rev…
The Making of Bad Gentry: The Abolition of Keju, Local Governance, and Anti-Elite Protests, 1902-1911
This paper investigates the impact of the abolition of the civil service exam on local governance in early twentieth-century China. Before the abolition, local elites collected surtaxes that financed local public goods, but they were supervised by the state and could lose candidacy for higher status if they engaged in corrupt behavior. This prospect of upward mobility (POUM) gave them incentives to behave well, which the abolition of the exam rem…
Discretion, talent allocation, and governance performance: Evidence from China’s imperial bureaucracy
China (3 works) · Economics (3 works) · Political science (3 works) · Bureaucracy (2 works) · Corporate governance (2 works) · Culture, Economy, and Development Studies (2 works) · Discretion (2 works) · Finance (2 works) · Finance (2 works) · Law (2 works)