Elijah Chudnoff
Biographic Data
| ID | 1141567 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Elijah Chudnoff |
| GIVEN NAMES | Elijah |
| FAMILY NAME | Chudnoff |
| SIGNATURE | CHUDNOFF E |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Miami |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-0577-901X |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 9 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 26 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 9 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2011 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2024 |
| H-INDEX | 3 |
The nature and value of firsthand insight
You can be convinced that something is true but still desire to see it for yourself. A trusted critic makes some observations about a movie, now you want to watch it with them in mind. A proof demonstrates the validity of a formula, but you are not satisfied until you see how the formula works. In these cases, we place special value on knowing by what Sosa (Epistemic explanations: A theory of telic normativity, and what it explains, Oxford Univer…
The Epistemic Role of Consciousness
Epistemology and philosophy of mind are areas of philosophy where one expects to find significant cross-fertilization. We know with our minds. So, knowledge is the sort of thing that our minds can have. And our minds are the sort of thing that can have knowledge. What one will make of all that, however, turns on the positions taken in some of the main debates that structure the epistemological playing field.Both internalists and externalists will…
Epistemic Elitism and Other Minds
Experiences justify beliefs about our environment. Sometimes the justification is immediate: seeing a red light immediately justifies believing there is a red light. Other times the justification is mediate: seeing a red light justifies believing one should brake in a way that is mediated by background knowledge of traffic signals. How does this distinction map onto the distinction between what is and what isn't part of the content of experience?…
Phenomenal Contrast Arguments for Cognitive Phenomenology
According to proponents of irreducible cognitive phenomenology some cognitive states put one in phenomenal states for which no wholly sensory states suffice. One of the main approaches to defending the view that there is irreducible cognitive phenomenology is to give a phenomenal contrast argument. In this paper I distinguish three kinds of phenomenal contrast argument: what I call pure—represented by Strawson's Jack/Jacques argument—hypothetical…
Cognitive Phenomenology
The Rational Roles of Intuition
Intuitions are inputs to theoretical reasoning. According to the view developed in this book they play this role because they are justifiers. Intuitions are sometimes thought of as evidence. It is not always clear how to calibrate talk about justification and talk about evidence. Section 5.1 explores how the view of intuition developed in this book might relate to the view of intuitions as evidence. The main aim of the chapter, however, is to arg…
Intuition
Elijah Chudnoff elaborates and defends a view of intuition according to which intuition purports to, and reveals, how matters stand in abstract reality by making us aware of that reality through the intellect. He explores the experience of having an intuition; justification for beliefs that derives from intuition; and contact with abstract reality.
Is Intuition Based On Understanding
According to the most popular non‐skeptical views about intuition, intuitions justify beliefs because they are based on understanding. More precisely: if intuiting that p justifies you in believing that p it does so because your intuition is based on your understanding of the proposition that p. The aim of this paper is to raise some challenges for accounts of intuitive justification along these lines. I pursue this project from a non‐skeptical p…
What Intuitions Are Like 1
What Intuitions Are Like 1
Epistemic Elitism and Other Minds
Experiences justify beliefs about our environment. Sometimes the justification is immediate: seeing a red light immediately justifies believing there is a red light. Other times the justification is mediate: seeing a red light justifies believing one should brake in a way that is mediated by background knowledge of traffic signals. How does this distinction map onto the distinction between what is and what isn't part of the content of experience?…
Phenomenal Contrast Arguments for Cognitive Phenomenology
According to proponents of irreducible cognitive phenomenology some cognitive states put one in phenomenal states for which no wholly sensory states suffice. One of the main approaches to defending the view that there is irreducible cognitive phenomenology is to give a phenomenal contrast argument. In this paper I distinguish three kinds of phenomenal contrast argument: what I call pure—represented by Strawson's Jack/Jacques argument—hypothetical…
Is Intuition Based On Understanding
According to the most popular non‐skeptical views about intuition, intuitions justify beliefs because they are based on understanding. More precisely: if intuiting that p justifies you in believing that p it does so because your intuition is based on your understanding of the proposition that p. The aim of this paper is to raise some challenges for accounts of intuitive justification along these lines. I pursue this project from a non‐skeptical p…
What Intuitions Are Like 1
Is Intuition Based On Understanding
According to the most popular non‐skeptical views about intuition, intuitions justify beliefs because they are based on understanding. More precisely: if intuiting that p justifies you in believing that p it does so because your intuition is based on your understanding of the proposition that p. The aim of this paper is to raise some challenges for accounts of intuitive justification along these lines. I pursue this project from a non‐skeptical p…
The Rational Roles of Intuition
Intuitions are inputs to theoretical reasoning. According to the view developed in this book they play this role because they are justifiers. Intuitions are sometimes thought of as evidence. It is not always clear how to calibrate talk about justification and talk about evidence. Section 5.1 explores how the view of intuition developed in this book might relate to the view of intuitions as evidence. The main aim of the chapter, however, is to arg…
Intuition
Elijah Chudnoff elaborates and defends a view of intuition according to which intuition purports to, and reveals, how matters stand in abstract reality by making us aware of that reality through the intellect. He explores the experience of having an intuition; justification for beliefs that derives from intuition; and contact with abstract reality.
Phenomenal Contrast Arguments for Cognitive Phenomenology
According to proponents of irreducible cognitive phenomenology some cognitive states put one in phenomenal states for which no wholly sensory states suffice. One of the main approaches to defending the view that there is irreducible cognitive phenomenology is to give a phenomenal contrast argument. In this paper I distinguish three kinds of phenomenal contrast argument: what I call pure—represented by Strawson's Jack/Jacques argument—hypothetical…
Cognitive Phenomenology
Epistemic Elitism and Other Minds
Experiences justify beliefs about our environment. Sometimes the justification is immediate: seeing a red light immediately justifies believing there is a red light. Other times the justification is mediate: seeing a red light justifies believing one should brake in a way that is mediated by background knowledge of traffic signals. How does this distinction map onto the distinction between what is and what isn't part of the content of experience?…
The Epistemic Role of Consciousness
Epistemology and philosophy of mind are areas of philosophy where one expects to find significant cross-fertilization. We know with our minds. So, knowledge is the sort of thing that our minds can have. And our minds are the sort of thing that can have knowledge. What one will make of all that, however, turns on the positions taken in some of the main debates that structure the epistemological playing field.Both internalists and externalists will…
The nature and value of firsthand insight
You can be convinced that something is true but still desire to see it for yourself. A trusted critic makes some observations about a movie, now you want to watch it with them in mind. A proof demonstrates the validity of a formula, but you are not satisfied until you see how the formula works. In these cases, we place special value on knowing by what Sosa (Epistemic explanations: A theory of telic normativity, and what it explains, Oxford Univer…
Epistemology (8 works) · Philosophy (8 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (7 works) · Psychology (6 works) · Metaphysics (4 works) · Philosophy (4 works) · Philosophy of mind (4 works) · Computer Science (3 works) · Intuition (3 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (3 works)