André Ariew
Biographic Data
| ID | 1142760 |
|---|---|
| NAME | André Ariew |
| GIVEN NAMES | André |
| FAMILY NAME | Ariew |
| SIGNATURE | ARIEW A |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Missouri |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-4326-1847 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 16 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 123 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 14 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 2 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1996 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 6 |
Statistical Autonomous Explanations and the Patterns of Nature
Evolutionary Thinking Across Disciplines
Evolutionary Thinking Across Disciplines
Charles Darwin as a statistical thinker
Explanatory schema and the process of model building
Galton, reversion and the quincunx
Autonomous-Statistical Explanations and Natural Selection
Shapiro and Sober ([2007]) claim that Walsh, Ariew, Lewens, and Matthen (henceforth WALM) give a mistaken, a priori defense of natural selection and drift as epiphenomenal. Contrary to Shapiro and Sober’s claims, we first argue that WALM’s explanatory doctrine does not require a defense of epiphenomenalism. We then defend WALM’s explanatory doctrine by arguing that the explanations provided by the modern genetical theory of natural selection are …
Selection and Causation
We have argued elsewhere that natural selection is not a cause of evolution, and that a resolution-of-forces (or vector addition) model does not provide us with a proper understanding of how natural selection combines with other evolutionary influences. These propositions have come in for criticism recently, and here we clarify and defend them. We do so within the broad framework of our own ‘hierarchical realization model’ of how evolutionary inf…
Under the influence of Malthus’s law of population growth
The Confusions of Fitness
The central point of this essay is to demonstrate the incommensurability of ‘Darwinian fitness’ with the numeric values associated with reproductive rates used in population genetics. While sometimes both are called ‘fitness’, they are distinct concepts coming from distinct explanatory schemes. Further, we try to outline a possible answer to the following question: from the natural properties of organisms and a knowledge of their environment, can…
Richard Lewontin as Elvis Costello
Two Ways of Thinking About Fitness and Natural Selection
he concept of fitness is, Philip Kitcher' says, "important both to informal presentations of evolutionary theory and to the mathematical formulations of [population genetics]" (ibid., p. 50).He is absolutely right.The difficulty is to harmonize these very different ways of understanding its role.We examine here how fitness and natural selection relate to the other explanatory factors invoked by evolutionary theory.We argue that the "informal pres…
Platonic and Aristotelian Roots of Teleological Arguments
The authors contributing to this anthology focus on a variety of issues concerning ‘functional explanations’ in both biology and psychology. ‘Functional explanation’ is our chosen term because ‘teleological explanation’ is thought to imply backwards causation or bizarre ontological categories (for example, vital forces) attributable to the teleological theories of Plato and Aristotle. Functional explanation is not so imbued and hence, as opposed …
Functions
In explaining aspects of the natural world, including the aspects of mind, scientists have frequently used the concept of function. But what are functions? Here, 15 leading scholars of philosophy of psychology and philosophy of biology present new essays on functions.
The Trials of Life
We distinguish dynamical and statistical interpretations of evolutionary theory. We argue that only the statistical interpretation preserves the presumed relation between natural selection and drift. On these grounds we claim that the dynamical conception of evolutionary theory as a theory of forces is mistaken. Selection and drift are not forces. Nor do selection and drift explanations appeal to the (sub-population-level) causes of population le…
Innateness and Canalization
Cognitive scientists often employ the notion of innateness without defining it. The issue is, how is innateness defined in biology? Some critics contend that innateness is not a legitimate concept in biology. In this paper I will argue that it is. However, neither the concept of high heritability nor the concept of flat norm of reaction (two popular accounts in the biology literature) define innateness. An adequate account is found in development…
The Trials of Life
We distinguish dynamical and statistical interpretations of evolutionary theory. We argue that only the statistical interpretation preserves the presumed relation between natural selection and drift. On these grounds we claim that the dynamical conception of evolutionary theory as a theory of forces is mistaken. Selection and drift are not forces. Nor do selection and drift explanations appeal to the (sub-population-level) causes of population le…
The Confusions of Fitness
The central point of this essay is to demonstrate the incommensurability of ‘Darwinian fitness’ with the numeric values associated with reproductive rates used in population genetics. While sometimes both are called ‘fitness’, they are distinct concepts coming from distinct explanatory schemes. Further, we try to outline a possible answer to the following question: from the natural properties of organisms and a knowledge of their environment, can…
Selection and Causation
We have argued elsewhere that natural selection is not a cause of evolution, and that a resolution-of-forces (or vector addition) model does not provide us with a proper understanding of how natural selection combines with other evolutionary influences. These propositions have come in for criticism recently, and here we clarify and defend them. We do so within the broad framework of our own ‘hierarchical realization model’ of how evolutionary inf…
Autonomous-Statistical Explanations and Natural Selection
Shapiro and Sober ([2007]) claim that Walsh, Ariew, Lewens, and Matthen (henceforth WALM) give a mistaken, a priori defense of natural selection and drift as epiphenomenal. Contrary to Shapiro and Sober’s claims, we first argue that WALM’s explanatory doctrine does not require a defense of epiphenomenalism. We then defend WALM’s explanatory doctrine by arguing that the explanations provided by the modern genetical theory of natural selection are …
Innateness and Canalization
Cognitive scientists often employ the notion of innateness without defining it. The issue is, how is innateness defined in biology? Some critics contend that innateness is not a legitimate concept in biology. In this paper I will argue that it is. However, neither the concept of high heritability nor the concept of flat norm of reaction (two popular accounts in the biology literature) define innateness. An adequate account is found in development…
Galton, reversion and the quincunx
Under the influence of Malthus’s law of population growth
Charles Darwin as a statistical thinker
Explanatory schema and the process of model building
Richard Lewontin as Elvis Costello
Innateness and Canalization
Cognitive scientists often employ the notion of innateness without defining it. The issue is, how is innateness defined in biology? Some critics contend that innateness is not a legitimate concept in biology. In this paper I will argue that it is. However, neither the concept of high heritability nor the concept of flat norm of reaction (two popular accounts in the biology literature) define innateness. An adequate account is found in development…
Two Ways of Thinking About Fitness and Natural Selection
he concept of fitness is, Philip Kitcher' says, "important both to informal presentations of evolutionary theory and to the mathematical formulations of [population genetics]" (ibid., p. 50).He is absolutely right.The difficulty is to harmonize these very different ways of understanding its role.We examine here how fitness and natural selection relate to the other explanatory factors invoked by evolutionary theory.We argue that the "informal pres…
Platonic and Aristotelian Roots of Teleological Arguments
The authors contributing to this anthology focus on a variety of issues concerning ‘functional explanations’ in both biology and psychology. ‘Functional explanation’ is our chosen term because ‘teleological explanation’ is thought to imply backwards causation or bizarre ontological categories (for example, vital forces) attributable to the teleological theories of Plato and Aristotle. Functional explanation is not so imbued and hence, as opposed …
Functions
In explaining aspects of the natural world, including the aspects of mind, scientists have frequently used the concept of function. But what are functions? Here, 15 leading scholars of philosophy of psychology and philosophy of biology present new essays on functions.
The Trials of Life
We distinguish dynamical and statistical interpretations of evolutionary theory. We argue that only the statistical interpretation preserves the presumed relation between natural selection and drift. On these grounds we claim that the dynamical conception of evolutionary theory as a theory of forces is mistaken. Selection and drift are not forces. Nor do selection and drift explanations appeal to the (sub-population-level) causes of population le…
Richard Lewontin as Elvis Costello
The Confusions of Fitness
The central point of this essay is to demonstrate the incommensurability of ‘Darwinian fitness’ with the numeric values associated with reproductive rates used in population genetics. While sometimes both are called ‘fitness’, they are distinct concepts coming from distinct explanatory schemes. Further, we try to outline a possible answer to the following question: from the natural properties of organisms and a knowledge of their environment, can…
Under the influence of Malthus’s law of population growth
Selection and Causation
We have argued elsewhere that natural selection is not a cause of evolution, and that a resolution-of-forces (or vector addition) model does not provide us with a proper understanding of how natural selection combines with other evolutionary influences. These propositions have come in for criticism recently, and here we clarify and defend them. We do so within the broad framework of our own ‘hierarchical realization model’ of how evolutionary inf…
Autonomous-Statistical Explanations and Natural Selection
Shapiro and Sober ([2007]) claim that Walsh, Ariew, Lewens, and Matthen (henceforth WALM) give a mistaken, a priori defense of natural selection and drift as epiphenomenal. Contrary to Shapiro and Sober’s claims, we first argue that WALM’s explanatory doctrine does not require a defense of epiphenomenalism. We then defend WALM’s explanatory doctrine by arguing that the explanations provided by the modern genetical theory of natural selection are …
Galton, reversion and the quincunx
Explanatory schema and the process of model building
Charles Darwin as a statistical thinker
Evolutionary Thinking Across Disciplines
Evolutionary Thinking Across Disciplines
Statistical Autonomous Explanations and the Patterns of Nature
Philosophy (13 works) · Epistemology (12 works) · Computer Science (10 works) · Mathematics (8 works) · Philosophy and History of Science (8 works) · Biology (7 works) · Evolution and Genetic Dynamics (6 works) · Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation (6 works) · Natural (archaeology) (5 works) · Natural selection (5 works)