Pedro Dal Bó
Biographic Data
| ID | 1145008 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Pedro Dal Bó |
| GIVEN NAMES | Pedro Dal |
| FAMILY NAME | Bó |
| SIGNATURE | BÓ P D |
| AFFILIATIONS | John Brown University |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 5 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 62 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 5 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1998 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2011 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Workers, Warriors, and Criminals
We incorporate appropriation activities (social conflict) into canonical models of trade and study how economic shocks and policies affect the intensity of conflict. We show that not all shocks that could make society richer reduce conflict: positive shocks to labor-intensive industries diminish conflict, while positive shocks to capital-intensive industries increase it. The key requirement is that conflict activities be more labor intensive than…
Institutions and Behavior
A novel experiment is used to show that the effect of a policy on the level of cooperation is greater when it is chosen democratically by the subjects than when it is exogenously imposed. In contrast to the previous literature, our experimental design allows us to control for selection effects (e.g., those who choose the policy may be affected differently by it). Our finding implies that democratic institutions may affect behavior directly in add…
Political Dynasties
Political dynasties have long been present in democracies, raising concerns that inequality in the distribution of political power may reflect imperfections in democratic representation. However, the persistence of political elites may simply reflect differences in ability or political vocation across families and not their entrenchment in power. We show that dynastic prevalence in the Congress of the U.S. is high compared to that in other occupa…
Plata o Plomo
We present a model where groups attempt to influence policies using both bribes (plata, Spanish for silver) and the threat of punishment (plomo, Spanish for lead). We then use it to make predictions about the quality of a country's public officials and to understand the role of institutions granting politicians with immunity from legal prosecution. The use of punishment lowers the returns from public office and reduces the incentives of high-abil…
Ampliaciones de la red de transmisión de alta tensión en la Argentina. Mecanismos de decisión e incentivos económicos
Plata o Plomo
We present a model where groups attempt to influence policies using both bribes (plata, Spanish for silver) and the threat of punishment (plomo, Spanish for lead). We then use it to make predictions about the quality of a country's public officials and to understand the role of institutions granting politicians with immunity from legal prosecution. The use of punishment lowers the returns from public office and reduces the incentives of high-abil…
Ampliaciones de la red de transmisión de alta tensión en la Argentina. Mecanismos de decisión e incentivos económicos
Plata o Plomo
We present a model where groups attempt to influence policies using both bribes (plata, Spanish for silver) and the threat of punishment (plomo, Spanish for lead). We then use it to make predictions about the quality of a country's public officials and to understand the role of institutions granting politicians with immunity from legal prosecution. The use of punishment lowers the returns from public office and reduces the incentives of high-abil…
Political Dynasties
Political dynasties have long been present in democracies, raising concerns that inequality in the distribution of political power may reflect imperfections in democratic representation. However, the persistence of political elites may simply reflect differences in ability or political vocation across families and not their entrenchment in power. We show that dynastic prevalence in the Congress of the U.S. is high compared to that in other occupa…
Institutions and Behavior
A novel experiment is used to show that the effect of a policy on the level of cooperation is greater when it is chosen democratically by the subjects than when it is exogenously imposed. In contrast to the previous literature, our experimental design allows us to control for selection effects (e.g., those who choose the policy may be affected differently by it). Our finding implies that democratic institutions may affect behavior directly in add…
Workers, Warriors, and Criminals
We incorporate appropriation activities (social conflict) into canonical models of trade and study how economic shocks and policies affect the intensity of conflict. We show that not all shocks that could make society richer reduce conflict: positive shocks to labor-intensive industries diminish conflict, while positive shocks to capital-intensive industries increase it. The key requirement is that conflict activities be more labor intensive than…
Economics (5 works) · Political science (5 works) · Politics (4 works) · Law (3 works) · Affect (linguistics) (2 works) · Corruption and Economic Development (2 works) · Culture, Economy, and Development Studies (2 works) · Democracy (2 works) · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies (2 works) · Political economy (2 works)