Lorne Falkenstein
Biographic Data
| ID | 1145772 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Lorne Falkenstein |
| GIVEN NAMES | Lorne |
| FAMILY NAME | Falkenstein |
| SIGNATURE | FALKENSTEIN L |
| AFFILIATIONS | Western University |
| ORCID | 0009-0003-8618-177X |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 15 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 8 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 15 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1989 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2018 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Reid's Critique of Berkely's Position on the Inverted Image
Reid and Berkeley disagreed over whether we directly perceive objects located outside of us in a surrounding space, commonly revealed by both vision and touch. Berkeley considered a successful account of erect vision to be crucial for deciding this dispute, at one point calling it ‘the principal point in the whole optic theory.’ Reid's critique of Berkeley's position on this topic is very brief, and appears to miss Berkeley's point. I argue that …
Dualism And The Experimentum Crucis
Space and Time
This chapter contains section titled: Extension and Duration Hume's Reply to the Paradox of Composition Hume's Arguments for the Finite Divisibility of Perceptions (T 1.2.1) The Coherence of Hume's Account The Idea of Equality (T 1.2.4) The Infinite Divisibility of Objects (T 1.2.2) Manners of Disposition (T 1.2.3) The Simplicity of the Soul (T 1.4.5) The Idea of Vacuum (T 1.2.5) Hume's Account of Contiguity (T 1.1.5, 1.3.8, 2.3.7) Notes Referenc…
Reid and Smith on Vision
Hume's project in ‘The natural history of religion’
There are good reasons to think that at least a part of Hume's project in the ‘The natural history of religion’ was to buttress a philosophical critique of the reasonableness of religious belief undertaken in other works, and to attack a fundamentalist account of the history of religion and the foundations of morality. But there are also problems with supposing that Hume intended to achieve either of these goals. I argue that two problems in part…
The Role of Material Impressions in Reid's Theory of Vision
The Journal of Scottish Philosophy, 1 (2) 2003, 117–133 ISSN 1479-6651 Reid maintained that the perceptions that we obtain from the senses of smell, taste, hearing, and touch are “suggested” by corresponding sensations. However, he made an exception for the sense of vision. According to Reid, our perceptions of the real figure, position, and magnitude of bodies are suggested by their visible appearances, which are not sensations but objects of pe…
Debate
Rae Langton's main purpose in Kantian Humility is to uncover the reasons that led Kant to claim that we can have no knowledge of things in themselves. As part of this effort, she articulates and attempts to defend a novel and intriguing position on what things in themselves are for Kant, and what it means for him to deny knowledge of them. Though the presentation of these views is lucid and informed by selective citation from a range of Kant's wo…
Reid's Account of Localization
This paper contrasts three different positions taken by 18th century British scholars on how sensations, particularly sensations of colour and touch, come to be localized in space: Berkeley's view (initiated, though not fully executed) that we learn to localize ideas of colour by associating certain purely qualitative features of those ideas with ideas of touch and motion, Hume's view that visual and tangible impressions are originally disposed i…
Kant's Intuitionism
'This is an excellent work on Kant. Falkenstein tries both to determine what it was that Kant was intending to say and then evaluate the plausibility of Kant's arguments. The author is critical, but, at the same time, he goes out of his way to be fair not only to Kant but to rival interpretations of Kant. Anyone interested in Kant will want to read this work.'
A double edged sword? Kant's refutation of Mendelssohn's proof of the immortality of the soul and its implications for his theory of matter
Kant's intuitionism
The Natural and the Normative. Theories of Spatial Perception from Kant to Helmholtz
Kant's Account of Sensation
Kant defined ‘sensation’ (Empfindung) as ‘the effect of an object on the representative capacity, so far as we are affected by it.’ This is, to put it mildly, not one among his more elegant, clear or helpful sayings. And it is merely an instance of a more general malaise. Kant did not say as much about sensation as he should have, and his account-or lack of it-can be seen at the root of many of the difficulties that have plagued his readers
Was Kant a Nativist
It has long been supposed that took space and time to be innately originating forms imposed by the mind on the data given experience. According to Bertrand Russell, Kant maintained that virtue of our mental constitution, we deal with the raw material of sense-impressions by means of certain 'categories' and by arranging it space and time. Both the categories and the space-time arrangement are supplied by us.' Before Russell this opinion was susta…
Is Perceptual Space Monadic
In The Spatial Structure of Perceptual Space,' Albert Casullo argues that the relationist and substantivalist accounts commonly offered of physical space are both inadequate to account for perceptual space. On Casullo's view perceptual space cannot adequately be reduced to the relations of visual items, but neither is it some sort of special entity over and above these items. Perceptual space is reducible to visual items, so it is not substantiva…
Reid's Account of Localization
This paper contrasts three different positions taken by 18th century British scholars on how sensations, particularly sensations of colour and touch, come to be localized in space: Berkeley's view (initiated, though not fully executed) that we learn to localize ideas of colour by associating certain purely qualitative features of those ideas with ideas of touch and motion, Hume's view that visual and tangible impressions are originally disposed i…
Reid and Smith on Vision
The Role of Material Impressions in Reid's Theory of Vision
The Journal of Scottish Philosophy, 1 (2) 2003, 117–133 ISSN 1479-6651 Reid maintained that the perceptions that we obtain from the senses of smell, taste, hearing, and touch are “suggested” by corresponding sensations. However, he made an exception for the sense of vision. According to Reid, our perceptions of the real figure, position, and magnitude of bodies are suggested by their visible appearances, which are not sensations but objects of pe…
A double edged sword? Kant's refutation of Mendelssohn's proof of the immortality of the soul and its implications for his theory of matter
Kant's Account of Sensation
Kant defined ‘sensation’ (Empfindung) as ‘the effect of an object on the representative capacity, so far as we are affected by it.’ This is, to put it mildly, not one among his more elegant, clear or helpful sayings. And it is merely an instance of a more general malaise. Kant did not say as much about sensation as he should have, and his account-or lack of it-can be seen at the root of many of the difficulties that have plagued his readers
Was Kant a Nativist
It has long been supposed that took space and time to be innately originating forms imposed by the mind on the data given experience. According to Bertrand Russell, Kant maintained that virtue of our mental constitution, we deal with the raw material of sense-impressions by means of certain 'categories' and by arranging it space and time. Both the categories and the space-time arrangement are supplied by us.' Before Russell this opinion was susta…
Is Perceptual Space Monadic
In The Spatial Structure of Perceptual Space,' Albert Casullo argues that the relationist and substantivalist accounts commonly offered of physical space are both inadequate to account for perceptual space. On Casullo's view perceptual space cannot adequately be reduced to the relations of visual items, but neither is it some sort of special entity over and above these items. Perceptual space is reducible to visual items, so it is not substantiva…
Kant's Account of Sensation
Kant defined ‘sensation’ (Empfindung) as ‘the effect of an object on the representative capacity, so far as we are affected by it.’ This is, to put it mildly, not one among his more elegant, clear or helpful sayings. And it is merely an instance of a more general malaise. Kant did not say as much about sensation as he should have, and his account-or lack of it-can be seen at the root of many of the difficulties that have plagued his readers
Was Kant a Nativist
It has long been supposed that took space and time to be innately originating forms imposed by the mind on the data given experience. According to Bertrand Russell, Kant maintained that virtue of our mental constitution, we deal with the raw material of sense-impressions by means of certain 'categories' and by arranging it space and time. Both the categories and the space-time arrangement are supplied by us.' Before Russell this opinion was susta…
The Natural and the Normative. Theories of Spatial Perception from Kant to Helmholtz
Kant's intuitionism
Kant's Intuitionism
'This is an excellent work on Kant. Falkenstein tries both to determine what it was that Kant was intending to say and then evaluate the plausibility of Kant's arguments. The author is critical, but, at the same time, he goes out of his way to be fair not only to Kant but to rival interpretations of Kant. Anyone interested in Kant will want to read this work.'
A double edged sword? Kant's refutation of Mendelssohn's proof of the immortality of the soul and its implications for his theory of matter
Reid's Account of Localization
This paper contrasts three different positions taken by 18th century British scholars on how sensations, particularly sensations of colour and touch, come to be localized in space: Berkeley's view (initiated, though not fully executed) that we learn to localize ideas of colour by associating certain purely qualitative features of those ideas with ideas of touch and motion, Hume's view that visual and tangible impressions are originally disposed i…
Debate
Rae Langton's main purpose in Kantian Humility is to uncover the reasons that led Kant to claim that we can have no knowledge of things in themselves. As part of this effort, she articulates and attempts to defend a novel and intriguing position on what things in themselves are for Kant, and what it means for him to deny knowledge of them. Though the presentation of these views is lucid and informed by selective citation from a range of Kant's wo…
Hume's project in ‘The natural history of religion’
There are good reasons to think that at least a part of Hume's project in the ‘The natural history of religion’ was to buttress a philosophical critique of the reasonableness of religious belief undertaken in other works, and to attack a fundamentalist account of the history of religion and the foundations of morality. But there are also problems with supposing that Hume intended to achieve either of these goals. I argue that two problems in part…
The Role of Material Impressions in Reid's Theory of Vision
The Journal of Scottish Philosophy, 1 (2) 2003, 117–133 ISSN 1479-6651 Reid maintained that the perceptions that we obtain from the senses of smell, taste, hearing, and touch are “suggested” by corresponding sensations. However, he made an exception for the sense of vision. According to Reid, our perceptions of the real figure, position, and magnitude of bodies are suggested by their visible appearances, which are not sensations but objects of pe…
Reid and Smith on Vision
Space and Time
This chapter contains section titled: Extension and Duration Hume's Reply to the Paradox of Composition Hume's Arguments for the Finite Divisibility of Perceptions (T 1.2.1) The Coherence of Hume's Account The Idea of Equality (T 1.2.4) The Infinite Divisibility of Objects (T 1.2.2) Manners of Disposition (T 1.2.3) The Simplicity of the Soul (T 1.4.5) The Idea of Vacuum (T 1.2.5) Hume's Account of Contiguity (T 1.1.5, 1.3.8, 2.3.7) Notes Referenc…
Dualism And The Experimentum Crucis
Reid's Critique of Berkely's Position on the Inverted Image
Reid and Berkeley disagreed over whether we directly perceive objects located outside of us in a surrounding space, commonly revealed by both vision and touch. Berkeley considered a successful account of erect vision to be crucial for deciding this dispute, at one point calling it ‘the principal point in the whole optic theory.’ Reid's critique of Berkeley's position on this topic is very brief, and appears to miss Berkeley's point. I argue that …
Epistemology (13 works) · Philosophy (13 works) · Philosophy (9 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (6 works) · Psychology (6 works) · Linguistics (5 works) · Historical Philosophy and Science (4 works) · Perception (4 works) · Philosophical Ethics and Theory (4 works) · Cognitive psychology (3 works)