Santiago Sanchez‐page
Biographic Data
| ID | 1145787 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Santiago Sanchez‐page |
| GIVEN NAMES | Santiago |
| FAMILY NAME | Sanchez‐page |
| SIGNATURE | PAGE S S |
| AFFILIATIONS | Barcelona School of Economics |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-2259-0745 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 8 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 28 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 8 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2009 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 4 |
Rebel financing and the commitment problem in civil conflict: An application to Northern Ireland
Why is a peace agreement acceptable at some point in time but not earlier?We argue that the commitment problem combined with the nature of rebelFinancing can help explain this. Crucial to our argument is that the composition of financing between donations and self-generated funds through organised crime and local governance determine the size of anticipated shifts in thefuture power of rebel groups. When donations are the main source of funds,shi…
The face of another: Anonymity and facial symmetry influence cooperation in social dilemmas
Gender Differences and Stereotypes in Strategic Reasoning
Both authors acknowledge financial support from the Spanish Ministry for Science and Innovation research grant ECO2012-33243 and from the Generalitat de Catalunya grant 2009SGR1051
Social capital, conflict and welfare
Do Personality Traits Affect Productivity? Evidence from the Laboratory
The authors acknowledge funding from the ASB Special Research Grant and the ASBLab Small Project Grants Fund. Cubel acknowledges funding from the Spanish Ministry of the Economy and Competitiveness research grant ECO2012-33243
(Don’t) Make My Vote Count
Proponents of proportional electoral rules often argue that majority rule depresses turnout and may lower welfare due to the ‘tyranny of the majority’ problem. The present paper studies the impact of electoral rules on turnout and social welfare. We analyze a model of instrumental voting where citizens have private information over their individual cost of voting and over the alternative they prefer. The electoral rule used to select the winning …
Who is the fairest of them all? The independent effect of attractive features and self-perceived attractiveness on cooperation among women
Conflict as a Part of the Bargaining Process
This article investigates the use of conflict as a bargaining instrument. First, it illustrates the role of confrontation as a source of information by analysing a sample of colonial and imperial wars. Then, it explores a bargaining model with incomplete information where parties can choose the scope of the confrontation they may want to engage in. This model shows that conflict can have a double-edged effect: it may open the door to agreement wh…
Do Personality Traits Affect Productivity? Evidence from the Laboratory
The authors acknowledge funding from the ASB Special Research Grant and the ASBLab Small Project Grants Fund. Cubel acknowledges funding from the Spanish Ministry of the Economy and Competitiveness research grant ECO2012-33243
Social capital, conflict and welfare
Conflict as a Part of the Bargaining Process
This article investigates the use of conflict as a bargaining instrument. First, it illustrates the role of confrontation as a source of information by analysing a sample of colonial and imperial wars. Then, it explores a bargaining model with incomplete information where parties can choose the scope of the confrontation they may want to engage in. This model shows that conflict can have a double-edged effect: it may open the door to agreement wh…
(Don’t) Make My Vote Count
Proponents of proportional electoral rules often argue that majority rule depresses turnout and may lower welfare due to the ‘tyranny of the majority’ problem. The present paper studies the impact of electoral rules on turnout and social welfare. We analyze a model of instrumental voting where citizens have private information over their individual cost of voting and over the alternative they prefer. The electoral rule used to select the winning …
Gender Differences and Stereotypes in Strategic Reasoning
Both authors acknowledge financial support from the Spanish Ministry for Science and Innovation research grant ECO2012-33243 and from the Generalitat de Catalunya grant 2009SGR1051
Conflict as a Part of the Bargaining Process
This article investigates the use of conflict as a bargaining instrument. First, it illustrates the role of confrontation as a source of information by analysing a sample of colonial and imperial wars. Then, it explores a bargaining model with incomplete information where parties can choose the scope of the confrontation they may want to engage in. This model shows that conflict can have a double-edged effect: it may open the door to agreement wh…
Who is the fairest of them all? The independent effect of attractive features and self-perceived attractiveness on cooperation among women
(Don’t) Make My Vote Count
Proponents of proportional electoral rules often argue that majority rule depresses turnout and may lower welfare due to the ‘tyranny of the majority’ problem. The present paper studies the impact of electoral rules on turnout and social welfare. We analyze a model of instrumental voting where citizens have private information over their individual cost of voting and over the alternative they prefer. The electoral rule used to select the winning …
Social capital, conflict and welfare
Do Personality Traits Affect Productivity? Evidence from the Laboratory
The authors acknowledge funding from the ASB Special Research Grant and the ASBLab Small Project Grants Fund. Cubel acknowledges funding from the Spanish Ministry of the Economy and Competitiveness research grant ECO2012-33243
Gender Differences and Stereotypes in Strategic Reasoning
Both authors acknowledge financial support from the Spanish Ministry for Science and Innovation research grant ECO2012-33243 and from the Generalitat de Catalunya grant 2009SGR1051
The face of another: Anonymity and facial symmetry influence cooperation in social dilemmas
Rebel financing and the commitment problem in civil conflict: An application to Northern Ireland
Why is a peace agreement acceptable at some point in time but not earlier?We argue that the commitment problem combined with the nature of rebelFinancing can help explain this. Crucial to our argument is that the composition of financing between donations and self-generated funds through organised crime and local governance determine the size of anticipated shifts in thefuture power of rebel groups. When donations are the main source of funds,shi…
Economics (6 works) · Political science (5 works) · Psychology (4 works) · Social Psychology (4 works) · Law (3 works) · Microeconomics (3 works) · Computer Science (2 works) · Culture, Economy, and Development Studies (2 works) · Developmental psychology (2 works) · Dilemma (2 works)