Juliet Norton
Biographic Data
| ID | 115440 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Juliet Norton |
| GIVEN NAMES | Juliet |
| FAMILY NAME | Norton |
| SIGNATURE | NORTON J |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Iceland |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-3029-1788 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 30 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 44 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 30 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1963 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 4 |
Medical Progress
In recent years, notable figures within the medical community have expressed concerns about the rate of medical progress, suggesting that the rapid advances of medicine’s ‘golden age’ are now giving way to an ‘age of disappointment’. While these pessimistic pronouncements about medical progress must–implicitly if not explicitly–appeal to some criteria for what medical progress would be, the task of explicitly defining medical progress has been no…
Memory, anticipation, and future-bias
One proposed explanation for a particular kind of temporal preference lies in a disparity between the emotional intensity of memory compared to anticipation. According to the memory/anticipation disparity explanation, the utility of anticipation of a particular event if that event is future, whether positive or negative, is greater than the utility of retrospection of that same event if it is past, whether positive or negative, and consequently, …
Dejustifying Scientific Progress
Stegenga (forthcoming) formulates and defends a novel account of scientific progress, according to which science makes progress just in case there is a change in scientific justification. Here, we present several problems for Stegenga’s account, concerning, respectively, (i) obtaining misleading evidence, (ii) losses or destruction of evidence, (iii) oscillations in scientific justification, and (iv) the possibility of scientific regress. We conc…
What is philosophical progress
What is it for philosophy to make progress? While various putative forms of philosophical progress have been explored in some depth, this overarching question is rarely addressed explicitly, perhaps because it has been assumed to be intractable or unlikely to have a single, unified answer. In this paper, we aim to show that the question is tractable, that it does admit of a single, unified answer, and that one such answer is plausible. This answe…
Digital tools for local farmers
With the emergence of social distancing, the shutdown of schools and restaurants, and increased anxieties about in-person farmers markets in early 2020, local farmers and food distributors quickly pivoted to digital tools to manage their farms and connect with buyers. In this paper, we explore the role of a seemingly simple digital tool in shaping alternative agrarian relations during the pandemic-induced local food boom: the spreadsheet. Through…
Would Disagreement Undermine Progress
In recent years, several philosophers have argued that their discipline makes no progress (or not enough in comparison to the “hard sciences”). A key argument for this pessimistic position appeals to the purported fact that philosophers widely and systematically disagree on most major philosophical issues. In this paper, we take a step back from the debate about progress in philosophy specifically and consider the general question: How (if at all…
Do the folk represent time as essentially dynamical
Recent research [Latham, Miller, and Norton 2019. “Is our Naïve Theory of Time Dynamical?” Synthese] reveals that a majority of people represent actual time as dynamical. But do they, as suggested by McTaggart and Gödel, represent time as essentially dynamical? This paper distinguishes three interrelated questions. We ask (a) whether the folk representation of time is sensitive or insensitive: i.e. does what satisfies the folk representation of t…
Overview of Efforts to Increase Women Enrollment in the Veterans Affairs Million Veteran Program
Background: Ensuring enhanced delivery of care to women Veterans is a top Veterans Affairs (VA) priority; however, women are historically underrepresented in research that informs evidence-based health care. A primary barrier to women's participation is the inability to engage with research in person due to a number of documented challenges. The VA Million Veteran Program (MVP) is committed to increasing access for women Veterans to participate i…
Against a normative asymmetry between near- and future-bias
Empirical evidence shows that people have multiple time-biases. One is near-bias; another is future-bias. Philosophical theorising about these biases often proceeds on two assumptions. First, that the two biases are independent : that they are explained by different factors (the independence assumption). Second, that there is a normative asymmetry between the two biases: one is rationally impermissible (near-bias) and the other rationally permiss…
Capacity for simulation and mitigation drives hedonic and non-hedonic time biases
Until recently, philosophers have supposed that people exhibit a first-person hedonic bias toward the future, but that their non-hedonic and third-person preferences are time-neutral. Recent empirical work, however, suggests that our preferences are more nuanced. There is evidence that third-person preferences exhibit time-neutrality only when the individual with respect to whom we have preferences—the preference target—is a random stranger about…
Thinking about Progress
Is there progress in philosophy? If so, how much? Philosophers have recently argued for a wide range of answers to these questions, from the view that there is no progress whatsoever to the view that philosophy has provided answers to all the big philosophical questions. However, these views are difficult to compare and evaluate, because they rest on very different assumptions about the conditions under which philosophy would make progress. This …
Bias towards the future
All else being equal, most of us typically prefer to have positive experiences in the future rather than the past and negative experiences in the past rather than the future. Recent empirical evidence tends not only to support the idea that people have these preferences, but further, that people tend to prefer more painful experiences in their past rather than fewer in their future (and mutatis mutandis for pleasant experiences). Are such prefere…
The Rationality of Near Bias toward both Future and Past Events
Can time flow at different rates? The differential passage of A-ness
Hedonic and Non-Hedonic Bias toward the Future
It has widely been assumed, by philosophers, that our first-person preferences regarding pleasurable and painful experiences exhibit a bias toward the future (positive and negative hedonic future-bias), and that our preferences regarding non-hedonic events (both positive and negative) exhibit no such bias (non-hedonic time-neutrality). Further, it has been assumed that our third-person preferences are always time-neutral. Some have attempted to u…
Future bias in action
Ditching determination and dependence
Is our naïve theory of time dynamical
On Preferring that Overall, Things are Worse
Philosophers vigorously debate the rationality of hedonic bias toward the future : a systematic preference for pleasurable experiences to be future and painful experiences to be past. The debate over future bias is distinctive in philosophy because arguments made on both sides concern descriptive and empirically tractable claims about patterns of preferences and the psychological mechanisms that could explain these patterns. Most notably, philoso…
Experimental philosophy on time
Appeals to the 'common sense', or 'naïve', or 'folk' concept of time, and the purported phenomenology as of time passing, play a substantial role in philosophical theorising about time. When making these appeals, philosophers have been content to draw upon their own assumptions about how non-philosophers think about time. This paper reviews a series of recent experiments bringing these assumptions into question. The results suggest that the way n…
An Empirical Investigation of Purported Passage Phenomenology
It has widely been assumed, by philosophers, that most people unambiguously have a phenomenology as of time passing, and that this is a datum that philosophical theories must accommodate. Moreover, it has been assumed that the greater the extent to which people have said phenomenology, the more likely they are to endorse a dynamical theory of time. This paper is the first to empirically test these assumptions. Surprisingly, our results do not sup…
A psychologistic theory of metaphysical explanation
A grand challenge for HCI
column Share on A grand challenge for HCI: food + sustainability Authors: Juliet Norton University of California, Irvine University of California, IrvineView Profile , Ankita Raturi University of California, Irvine University of California, IrvineView Profile , Bonnie Nardi University of California, Irvine University of California, IrvineView Profile , Sebastian Prost Open Lab, Newcastle University, UK Open Lab, Newcastle University, UKView Profi…
Bridging communities
In this forum we highlight innovative thought, design, and research in the area of interaction design and sustainability, illustrating the diversity of approaches across HCI communities. --- Lisa Nathan and Samuel Mann, Editors
What if sustainability doesn't work out
The authors Bill Tomlinson, Donald J. Patterson, Yue Pan, Eli Blevis, and Bonnie Nardi share their views on how IT tools can support adaptation to global change. The research named 'adaptation informatics' entails the study, design, and development of sociotechnical systems for use in a future characterized by global change. Key opportunities exist for IT systems to support a high quality of life in these adaptation scenarios. IT systems may enab…
Is our naïve theory of time dynamical
On Preferring that Overall, Things are Worse
Philosophers vigorously debate the rationality of hedonic bias toward the future : a systematic preference for pleasurable experiences to be future and painful experiences to be past. The debate over future bias is distinctive in philosophy because arguments made on both sides concern descriptive and empirically tractable claims about patterns of preferences and the psychological mechanisms that could explain these patterns. Most notably, philoso…
The family's adaptation to childhood leukemia
Future bias in action
Against a normative asymmetry between near- and future-bias
Empirical evidence shows that people have multiple time-biases. One is near-bias; another is future-bias. Philosophical theorising about these biases often proceeds on two assumptions. First, that the two biases are independent : that they are explained by different factors (the independence assumption). Second, that there is a normative asymmetry between the two biases: one is rationally impermissible (near-bias) and the other rationally permiss…
A psychologistic theory of metaphysical explanation
Experimental philosophy on time
Appeals to the 'common sense', or 'naïve', or 'folk' concept of time, and the purported phenomenology as of time passing, play a substantial role in philosophical theorising about time. When making these appeals, philosophers have been content to draw upon their own assumptions about how non-philosophers think about time. This paper reviews a series of recent experiments bringing these assumptions into question. The results suggest that the way n…
Dejustifying Scientific Progress
Stegenga (forthcoming) formulates and defends a novel account of scientific progress, according to which science makes progress just in case there is a change in scientific justification. Here, we present several problems for Stegenga’s account, concerning, respectively, (i) obtaining misleading evidence, (ii) losses or destruction of evidence, (iii) oscillations in scientific justification, and (iv) the possibility of scientific regress. We conc…
Digital tools for local farmers
With the emergence of social distancing, the shutdown of schools and restaurants, and increased anxieties about in-person farmers markets in early 2020, local farmers and food distributors quickly pivoted to digital tools to manage their farms and connect with buyers. In this paper, we explore the role of a seemingly simple digital tool in shaping alternative agrarian relations during the pandemic-induced local food boom: the spreadsheet. Through…
Bias towards the future
All else being equal, most of us typically prefer to have positive experiences in the future rather than the past and negative experiences in the past rather than the future. Recent empirical evidence tends not only to support the idea that people have these preferences, but further, that people tend to prefer more painful experiences in their past rather than fewer in their future (and mutatis mutandis for pleasant experiences). Are such prefere…
Ditching determination and dependence
Effect on Anxiety of Increasing the Plasma Hydrocortisone Level
Hydrocortisone and a placebo were administered on separate occasions to a group of 32 normal men in a 2 x 2, double-blind, cross-over design. The hydrocortisone did not increase the mean Affect Adjective Check List scores but did raise the Institute for Personality and Ability Testing's Anxiety Scale scores and Sum C of the Rorschach test. These findings were taken to indicate that anxiety-proneness rather than current anxiety were elevated by th…
Advaita and Visistadvaita
Indian Philosophical Studies
Yatindramatadipika
The family's adaptation to childhood leukemia
What if sustainability doesn't work out
The authors Bill Tomlinson, Donald J. Patterson, Yue Pan, Eli Blevis, and Bonnie Nardi share their views on how IT tools can support adaptation to global change. The research named 'adaptation informatics' entails the study, design, and development of sociotechnical systems for use in a future characterized by global change. Key opportunities exist for IT systems to support a high quality of life in these adaptation scenarios. IT systems may enab…
Bridging communities
In this forum we highlight innovative thought, design, and research in the area of interaction design and sustainability, illustrating the diversity of approaches across HCI communities. --- Lisa Nathan and Samuel Mann, Editors
A grand challenge for HCI
column Share on A grand challenge for HCI: food + sustainability Authors: Juliet Norton University of California, Irvine University of California, IrvineView Profile , Ankita Raturi University of California, Irvine University of California, IrvineView Profile , Bonnie Nardi University of California, Irvine University of California, IrvineView Profile , Sebastian Prost Open Lab, Newcastle University, UK Open Lab, Newcastle University, UKView Profi…
A psychologistic theory of metaphysical explanation
An Empirical Investigation of Purported Passage Phenomenology
It has widely been assumed, by philosophers, that most people unambiguously have a phenomenology as of time passing, and that this is a datum that philosophical theories must accommodate. Moreover, it has been assumed that the greater the extent to which people have said phenomenology, the more likely they are to endorse a dynamical theory of time. This paper is the first to empirically test these assumptions. Surprisingly, our results do not sup…
The Rationality of Near Bias toward both Future and Past Events
Can time flow at different rates? The differential passage of A-ness
Hedonic and Non-Hedonic Bias toward the Future
It has widely been assumed, by philosophers, that our first-person preferences regarding pleasurable and painful experiences exhibit a bias toward the future (positive and negative hedonic future-bias), and that our preferences regarding non-hedonic events (both positive and negative) exhibit no such bias (non-hedonic time-neutrality). Further, it has been assumed that our third-person preferences are always time-neutral. Some have attempted to u…
Future bias in action
Ditching determination and dependence
Is our naïve theory of time dynamical
On Preferring that Overall, Things are Worse
Philosophers vigorously debate the rationality of hedonic bias toward the future : a systematic preference for pleasurable experiences to be future and painful experiences to be past. The debate over future bias is distinctive in philosophy because arguments made on both sides concern descriptive and empirically tractable claims about patterns of preferences and the psychological mechanisms that could explain these patterns. Most notably, philoso…
Experimental philosophy on time
Appeals to the 'common sense', or 'naïve', or 'folk' concept of time, and the purported phenomenology as of time passing, play a substantial role in philosophical theorising about time. When making these appeals, philosophers have been content to draw upon their own assumptions about how non-philosophers think about time. This paper reviews a series of recent experiments bringing these assumptions into question. The results suggest that the way n…
Capacity for simulation and mitigation drives hedonic and non-hedonic time biases
Until recently, philosophers have supposed that people exhibit a first-person hedonic bias toward the future, but that their non-hedonic and third-person preferences are time-neutral. Recent empirical work, however, suggests that our preferences are more nuanced. There is evidence that third-person preferences exhibit time-neutrality only when the individual with respect to whom we have preferences—the preference target—is a random stranger about…
Thinking about Progress
Is there progress in philosophy? If so, how much? Philosophers have recently argued for a wide range of answers to these questions, from the view that there is no progress whatsoever to the view that philosophy has provided answers to all the big philosophical questions. However, these views are difficult to compare and evaluate, because they rest on very different assumptions about the conditions under which philosophy would make progress. This …
Bias towards the future
All else being equal, most of us typically prefer to have positive experiences in the future rather than the past and negative experiences in the past rather than the future. Recent empirical evidence tends not only to support the idea that people have these preferences, but further, that people tend to prefer more painful experiences in their past rather than fewer in their future (and mutatis mutandis for pleasant experiences). Are such prefere…
Would Disagreement Undermine Progress
In recent years, several philosophers have argued that their discipline makes no progress (or not enough in comparison to the “hard sciences”). A key argument for this pessimistic position appeals to the purported fact that philosophers widely and systematically disagree on most major philosophical issues. In this paper, we take a step back from the debate about progress in philosophy specifically and consider the general question: How (if at all…
Do the folk represent time as essentially dynamical
Recent research [Latham, Miller, and Norton 2019. “Is our Naïve Theory of Time Dynamical?” Synthese] reveals that a majority of people represent actual time as dynamical. But do they, as suggested by McTaggart and Gödel, represent time as essentially dynamical? This paper distinguishes three interrelated questions. We ask (a) whether the folk representation of time is sensitive or insensitive: i.e. does what satisfies the folk representation of t…
Overview of Efforts to Increase Women Enrollment in the Veterans Affairs Million Veteran Program
Background: Ensuring enhanced delivery of care to women Veterans is a top Veterans Affairs (VA) priority; however, women are historically underrepresented in research that informs evidence-based health care. A primary barrier to women's participation is the inability to engage with research in person due to a number of documented challenges. The VA Million Veteran Program (MVP) is committed to increasing access for women Veterans to participate i…
Against a normative asymmetry between near- and future-bias
Empirical evidence shows that people have multiple time-biases. One is near-bias; another is future-bias. Philosophical theorising about these biases often proceeds on two assumptions. First, that the two biases are independent : that they are explained by different factors (the independence assumption). Second, that there is a normative asymmetry between the two biases: one is rationally impermissible (near-bias) and the other rationally permiss…
Philosophy (19 works) · Epistemology (17 works) · Psychology (11 works) · Computer Science (10 works) · Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics (8 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (8 works) · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment (8 works) · Economics (7 works) · Metaphysics (7 works) · Philosophy of language (7 works)