Tore Ellingsen
Dados Biográficos
| ID | 1157046 |
|---|---|
| NOME | Tore Ellingsen |
| PRENOMES | Tore |
| SOBRENOME | Ellingsen |
| ASSINATURA | ELLINGSEN T |
| AFILIAÇÕES | Stockholm School of Economics |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-9501-0137 |
| VERIFICADO | Sim |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 9 |
| TOTAL DE CITAÇÕES | 66 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 9 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMEIRO ANO DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2003 |
| ANO MAIS RECENTE DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2025 |
| ÍNDICE H | 4 |
A Model of Social Duties
Positive Interactions Promote Public Cooperation
Carrots Are Better Than Sticks The challenge of dealing with freeloaders—who benefit from a common good but refuse to pay their “fair share” of the costs—has often been met in theoretical and laboratory studies by sanctioning costly punishment, in which contributors pay a portion of their benefit so that freeloaders lose theirs. Rand et al. (p. 1272 ; see the news story by Pennisi and the cover) added a private interaction session after each roun…
Trust and Truth
In a laboratory experiment, we create relationships between pairs of anonymous subjects through a Prisoners' dilemma game. Thereafter the same subjects play a private values bargaining game with or without communication. Communication substantially increases bargaining efficiency among subjects who cooperated in the Prisoners' dilemma but has no significant effect on bargaining outcomes when one subject defected. Subjects who cooperated in the Pr…
Anticipated verbal feedback induces altruistic behavior
Paying Respect
Why do people work? Economic theory generally, and the principal-agent model specifically, emphasize the role of material incentives. But many academics, for example, work diligently year after year for a nearly fixed real salary, continuing to work hard as they approach retirement, although financial incentives are usually absent. We will argue that while economists have been right to focus on incentives, they have been wrong to focus so exclusi…
Does Impartial Deliberation Breed Fair Behavior
We experimentally test whether impartial deliberation leads to stronger concern for fairness in bargaining. In the experiment a seller can invest some of his/her time in order to generate potential gains from trade with a buyer. Conditional on investment the seller proposes how to split the gain. The buyer either accepts or rejects the seller's offer. To vary the degree of impartiality, subjects are assigned to their roles as sellers or buyers ei…
Promises, Threats and Fairness
We present experimental evidence that promises and threats mitigate the hold–up problem. While investors rely as much on their own threats as on their trading partner’s promises, the latter are more credible. Building on recent work in psychology and behavioral economics, we then present a simple model within which agents are concerned about both fairness and consistency. The model can account for several of our experimental findings. Its most st…
In-Kind Finance
It is typically less profitable for an opportunistic borrower to divert inputs than to divert cash. Therefore, suppliers may lend more liberally than banks. This simple argument is at the core of our contract theoretic model of trade credit in competitive markets. The model implies that trade credit and bank credit can be either complements or substitutes. Among other things, the model explains why trade credit has short maturity, why trade credi…
Fixed or Flexible? Wage‐setting in Search Equilibrium
Why do some vacancies offer a posted wage whereas others offer a negotiable wage? The paper endogenizes the choice of wage policy in a standard sequential search model with heterogeneous workers. In particular, we identify circumstances such that there exists an equilibrium in which all firms negotiate wages. We find that this equilibrium exists if and only if the labour market is sufficiently tight and worker heterogeneity is sufficiently large
Promises, Threats and Fairness
We present experimental evidence that promises and threats mitigate the hold–up problem. While investors rely as much on their own threats as on their trading partner’s promises, the latter are more credible. Building on recent work in psychology and behavioral economics, we then present a simple model within which agents are concerned about both fairness and consistency. The model can account for several of our experimental findings. Its most st…
In-Kind Finance
It is typically less profitable for an opportunistic borrower to divert inputs than to divert cash. Therefore, suppliers may lend more liberally than banks. This simple argument is at the core of our contract theoretic model of trade credit in competitive markets. The model implies that trade credit and bank credit can be either complements or substitutes. Among other things, the model explains why trade credit has short maturity, why trade credi…
Paying Respect
Why do people work? Economic theory generally, and the principal-agent model specifically, emphasize the role of material incentives. But many academics, for example, work diligently year after year for a nearly fixed real salary, continuing to work hard as they approach retirement, although financial incentives are usually absent. We will argue that while economists have been right to focus on incentives, they have been wrong to focus so exclusi…
Trust and Truth
In a laboratory experiment, we create relationships between pairs of anonymous subjects through a Prisoners' dilemma game. Thereafter the same subjects play a private values bargaining game with or without communication. Communication substantially increases bargaining efficiency among subjects who cooperated in the Prisoners' dilemma but has no significant effect on bargaining outcomes when one subject defected. Subjects who cooperated in the Pr…
Does Impartial Deliberation Breed Fair Behavior
We experimentally test whether impartial deliberation leads to stronger concern for fairness in bargaining. In the experiment a seller can invest some of his/her time in order to generate potential gains from trade with a buyer. Conditional on investment the seller proposes how to split the gain. The buyer either accepts or rejects the seller's offer. To vary the degree of impartiality, subjects are assigned to their roles as sellers or buyers ei…
Fixed or Flexible? Wage‐setting in Search Equilibrium
Why do some vacancies offer a posted wage whereas others offer a negotiable wage? The paper endogenizes the choice of wage policy in a standard sequential search model with heterogeneous workers. In particular, we identify circumstances such that there exists an equilibrium in which all firms negotiate wages. We find that this equilibrium exists if and only if the labour market is sufficiently tight and worker heterogeneity is sufficiently large
Fixed or Flexible? Wage‐setting in Search Equilibrium
Why do some vacancies offer a posted wage whereas others offer a negotiable wage? The paper endogenizes the choice of wage policy in a standard sequential search model with heterogeneous workers. In particular, we identify circumstances such that there exists an equilibrium in which all firms negotiate wages. We find that this equilibrium exists if and only if the labour market is sufficiently tight and worker heterogeneity is sufficiently large
Promises, Threats and Fairness
We present experimental evidence that promises and threats mitigate the hold–up problem. While investors rely as much on their own threats as on their trading partner’s promises, the latter are more credible. Building on recent work in psychology and behavioral economics, we then present a simple model within which agents are concerned about both fairness and consistency. The model can account for several of our experimental findings. Its most st…
In-Kind Finance
It is typically less profitable for an opportunistic borrower to divert inputs than to divert cash. Therefore, suppliers may lend more liberally than banks. This simple argument is at the core of our contract theoretic model of trade credit in competitive markets. The model implies that trade credit and bank credit can be either complements or substitutes. Among other things, the model explains why trade credit has short maturity, why trade credi…
Does Impartial Deliberation Breed Fair Behavior
We experimentally test whether impartial deliberation leads to stronger concern for fairness in bargaining. In the experiment a seller can invest some of his/her time in order to generate potential gains from trade with a buyer. Conditional on investment the seller proposes how to split the gain. The buyer either accepts or rejects the seller's offer. To vary the degree of impartiality, subjects are assigned to their roles as sellers or buyers ei…
Paying Respect
Why do people work? Economic theory generally, and the principal-agent model specifically, emphasize the role of material incentives. But many academics, for example, work diligently year after year for a nearly fixed real salary, continuing to work hard as they approach retirement, although financial incentives are usually absent. We will argue that while economists have been right to focus on incentives, they have been wrong to focus so exclusi…
Anticipated verbal feedback induces altruistic behavior
Positive Interactions Promote Public Cooperation
Carrots Are Better Than Sticks The challenge of dealing with freeloaders—who benefit from a common good but refuse to pay their “fair share” of the costs—has often been met in theoretical and laboratory studies by sanctioning costly punishment, in which contributors pay a portion of their benefit so that freeloaders lose theirs. Rand et al. (p. 1272 ; see the news story by Pennisi and the cover) added a private interaction session after each roun…
Trust and Truth
In a laboratory experiment, we create relationships between pairs of anonymous subjects through a Prisoners' dilemma game. Thereafter the same subjects play a private values bargaining game with or without communication. Communication substantially increases bargaining efficiency among subjects who cooperated in the Prisoners' dilemma but has no significant effect on bargaining outcomes when one subject defected. Subjects who cooperated in the Pr…
A Model of Social Duties
Economics (6 obras) · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies (6 obras) · Microeconomics (6 obras) · Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation (5 obras) · Psychology (4 obras) · Social Psychology (4 obras) · Computer Science (3 obras) · Culture, Economy, and Development Studies (3 obras) · Political science (3 obras) · Business (2 obras)