Dean S Karlan
Biographic Data
| ID | 1161489 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Dean S Karlan |
| GIVEN NAMES | Dean S |
| FAMILY NAME | Karlan |
| SIGNATURE | KARLAN D S |
| AFFILIATIONS | Yale University |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 6 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 94 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 6 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2005 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2013 |
| H-INDEX | 4 |
Group versus individual liability: Short and long term evidence from Philippine microcredit lending groups
Health education for microcredit clients in Peru: A randomized controlled trial
This study is registered with ClinicalTrials.gov, NCT01047033
List randomization for sensitive behavior: An application for measuring use of loan proceeds
Get-Out-The-Vote Phone Calls: Does Quality Matter
This article reports the results of a field experiment testing the effectiveness of different quality get-out-the-vote (GOTV) nonpartisan phone calls. During the week preceding the November 2004 election, we randomly assigned registered voters in North Carolina and Missouri to one of three live phone calls with varying length and content. The scripts are (1) standard GOTV, (2) interactive GOTV, and (3) interactive GOTV with a request for mobilizi…
Social Connections and Group Banking
Lending to the poor is expensive due to high screening, monitoring and enforcement costs. Group lending advocates believe lenders overcome this by harnessing social connections. Using data from FINCA-Peru, I exploit a quasi-random group formation process to find evidence of peers successfully monitoring and enforcing joint-liability loans. Individuals with stronger social connections to their fellow group members (i.e., either living closer or be…
Using Experimental Economics to Measure Social Capital and Predict Financial Decisions
Questions remain as to whether results from experimental economics are generalizable to real decisions in nonlaboratory settings. Furthermore, questions persist about whether social capital helps mitigate information asymmetries in credit markets. I examine whether behavior in two laboratory games, Trust and a Public Goods, predicts loan repayments to a Peruvian group-lending microfinance program. Since this program relies on social capital to en…
Social Connections and Group Banking
Lending to the poor is expensive due to high screening, monitoring and enforcement costs. Group lending advocates believe lenders overcome this by harnessing social connections. Using data from FINCA-Peru, I exploit a quasi-random group formation process to find evidence of peers successfully monitoring and enforcing joint-liability loans. Individuals with stronger social connections to their fellow group members (i.e., either living closer or be…
Group versus individual liability: Short and long term evidence from Philippine microcredit lending groups
List randomization for sensitive behavior: An application for measuring use of loan proceeds
Get-Out-The-Vote Phone Calls: Does Quality Matter
This article reports the results of a field experiment testing the effectiveness of different quality get-out-the-vote (GOTV) nonpartisan phone calls. During the week preceding the November 2004 election, we randomly assigned registered voters in North Carolina and Missouri to one of three live phone calls with varying length and content. The scripts are (1) standard GOTV, (2) interactive GOTV, and (3) interactive GOTV with a request for mobilizi…
Using Experimental Economics to Measure Social Capital and Predict Financial Decisions
Questions remain as to whether results from experimental economics are generalizable to real decisions in nonlaboratory settings. Furthermore, questions persist about whether social capital helps mitigate information asymmetries in credit markets. I examine whether behavior in two laboratory games, Trust and a Public Goods, predicts loan repayments to a Peruvian group-lending microfinance program. Since this program relies on social capital to en…
Social Connections and Group Banking
Lending to the poor is expensive due to high screening, monitoring and enforcement costs. Group lending advocates believe lenders overcome this by harnessing social connections. Using data from FINCA-Peru, I exploit a quasi-random group formation process to find evidence of peers successfully monitoring and enforcing joint-liability loans. Individuals with stronger social connections to their fellow group members (i.e., either living closer or be…
Get-Out-The-Vote Phone Calls: Does Quality Matter
This article reports the results of a field experiment testing the effectiveness of different quality get-out-the-vote (GOTV) nonpartisan phone calls. During the week preceding the November 2004 election, we randomly assigned registered voters in North Carolina and Missouri to one of three live phone calls with varying length and content. The scripts are (1) standard GOTV, (2) interactive GOTV, and (3) interactive GOTV with a request for mobilizi…
Health education for microcredit clients in Peru: A randomized controlled trial
This study is registered with ClinicalTrials.gov, NCT01047033
List randomization for sensitive behavior: An application for measuring use of loan proceeds
Group versus individual liability: Short and long term evidence from Philippine microcredit lending groups
Business (4 works) · Economic growth (3 works) · Finance (3 works) · Microfinance and Financial Inclusion (3 works) · Political science (3 works) · Economics (2 works) · Enforcement (2 works) · Joint and several liability (2 works) · Law (2 works) · Law (2 works)