Jean Baccelli
Biographic Data
| ID | 1166523 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Jean Baccelli |
| GIVEN NAMES | Jean |
| FAMILY NAME | Baccelli |
| SIGNATURE | BACCELLI J |
| AFFILIATIONS | Munich School of Philosophy |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-0275-0377 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 12 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 7 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 12 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2013 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2024 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Ordinal utility differences
It is widely held that under ordinal utility, utility differences are ill-defined. Allegedly, for these to be well-defined (without turning to choice under risk or the like), one should adopt as a new kind of primitive quaternary relations, instead of the traditional binary relations underlying ordinal utility functions. Correlatively, it is also widely held that the key structural properties of quaternary relations are entirely arbitrary from an…
Interpersonal Comparisons of What
I examine the once popular claim according to which interpersonal comparisons of welfare are necessary for social choice. I side with current social choice theorists in emphasizing that, on a narrow construal, this necessity claim is refuted beyond appeal. However, I depart from the opinion presently prevailing in social choice theory in highlighting that on a broader construal, this claim proves not only compatible with, but even comforted by, t…
Risk aversion over finite domains
We investigate risk attitudes when the underlying domain of payoffs is finite and the payoffs are, in general, not numerical. In such cases, the traditional notions of absolute risk attitudes, that are designed for convex domains of numerical payoffs, are not applicable. We introduce comparative notions of weak and strong risk attitudes that remain applicable. We examine how they are characterized within the rank-dependent utility model, thus inc…
Can redescriptions of outcomes salvage the axioms of decision theory
Philippe Mongin (1950–2020)
Expected utility theory, Jeffrey’s decision theory, and the paradoxes
The Problem of State-Dependent Utility
State-dependent utility is a problem for the behavioural branch of decision theory under uncertainty. It questions the very possibility that beliefs be revealed by choice data. According to the current literature, all models of beliefs are equally exposed to the problem. Moreover, the problem is solvable only when the decision-maker can influence the resolution of uncertainty. This article gives grounds to reject these two views. The various mode…
Frank Ramsey
Book Review| October 01 2021 Frank Ramsey: A Sheer Excess of Powers by Cheryl Misak Frank Ramsey: A Sheer Excess of Powers. By Misak, Cheryl. New York: Oxford University Press, 2020. xxxvi; 544 pp. $32.95. Jean Baccelli Jean Baccelli Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google History of Political Economy (2021) 53 (5): 949–951. https://doi.org/10.1215/00182702-9395128 Cite Icon Cite Share …
Beyond the metrological viewpoint
Do bets reveal beliefs
L’analyse axiomatique et l’attitude par rapport au risque
Cette note épistémologique porte sur le statut, en théorie de la décision, des concepts d’attitude par rapport au risque. À première vue, l’analyse axiomatique ne les exploite pas, ce qui reflète une certaine neutralité des modèles de décision au sujet de l’attitude par rapport au risque. Mais un examen plus poussé met en valeur la variation conditionnelle et le renforcement de l’attitude par rapport au risque, qui rattachent les concepts d’attit…
Le comportement et le concept de choix
Cette note examine la partie conceptuelle d’un article de Sen, «Internal Consistency of Choice». Elle isole deux thèses parmi celles que Sen défend. Une première, négative, est qu’aucune condition formelle de cohérence du choix n’est normativement valable sans exception. Une seconde, positive, est qu’une condition formelle de cohérence du choix n’est normativement valable que sous des suppositions faisant intervenir la préférence. Nous procédons …
Le comportement et le concept de choix
Cette note examine la partie conceptuelle d’un article de Sen, «Internal Consistency of Choice». Elle isole deux thèses parmi celles que Sen défend. Une première, négative, est qu’aucune condition formelle de cohérence du choix n’est normativement valable sans exception. Une seconde, positive, est qu’une condition formelle de cohérence du choix n’est normativement valable que sous des suppositions faisant intervenir la préférence. Nous procédons …
L’analyse axiomatique et l’attitude par rapport au risque
Cette note épistémologique porte sur le statut, en théorie de la décision, des concepts d’attitude par rapport au risque. À première vue, l’analyse axiomatique ne les exploite pas, ce qui reflète une certaine neutralité des modèles de décision au sujet de l’attitude par rapport au risque. Mais un examen plus poussé met en valeur la variation conditionnelle et le renforcement de l’attitude par rapport au risque, qui rattachent les concepts d’attit…
Do bets reveal beliefs
Beyond the metrological viewpoint
Philippe Mongin (1950–2020)
Expected utility theory, Jeffrey’s decision theory, and the paradoxes
The Problem of State-Dependent Utility
State-dependent utility is a problem for the behavioural branch of decision theory under uncertainty. It questions the very possibility that beliefs be revealed by choice data. According to the current literature, all models of beliefs are equally exposed to the problem. Moreover, the problem is solvable only when the decision-maker can influence the resolution of uncertainty. This article gives grounds to reject these two views. The various mode…
Frank Ramsey
Book Review| October 01 2021 Frank Ramsey: A Sheer Excess of Powers by Cheryl Misak Frank Ramsey: A Sheer Excess of Powers. By Misak, Cheryl. New York: Oxford University Press, 2020. xxxvi; 544 pp. $32.95. Jean Baccelli Jean Baccelli Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google History of Political Economy (2021) 53 (5): 949–951. https://doi.org/10.1215/00182702-9395128 Cite Icon Cite Share …
Risk aversion over finite domains
We investigate risk attitudes when the underlying domain of payoffs is finite and the payoffs are, in general, not numerical. In such cases, the traditional notions of absolute risk attitudes, that are designed for convex domains of numerical payoffs, are not applicable. We introduce comparative notions of weak and strong risk attitudes that remain applicable. We examine how they are characterized within the rank-dependent utility model, thus inc…
Can redescriptions of outcomes salvage the axioms of decision theory
Interpersonal Comparisons of What
I examine the once popular claim according to which interpersonal comparisons of welfare are necessary for social choice. I side with current social choice theorists in emphasizing that, on a narrow construal, this necessity claim is refuted beyond appeal. However, I depart from the opinion presently prevailing in social choice theory in highlighting that on a broader construal, this claim proves not only compatible with, but even comforted by, t…
Ordinal utility differences
It is widely held that under ordinal utility, utility differences are ill-defined. Allegedly, for these to be well-defined (without turning to choice under risk or the like), one should adopt as a new kind of primitive quaternary relations, instead of the traditional binary relations underlying ordinal utility functions. Correlatively, it is also widely held that the key structural properties of quaternary relations are entirely arbitrary from an…
Computer Science (9 works) · Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics (8 works) · Mathematical economics (7 works) · Mathematics (7 works) · Philosophy (7 works) · Economics (6 works) · Epistemology (5 works) · Expected utility hypothesis (4 works) · Microeconomics (4 works) · Philosophy of science (3 works)