Gerald K Harrison
Biographic Data
| ID | 1168557 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Gerald K Harrison |
| GIVEN NAMES | Gerald K |
| FAMILY NAME | Harrison |
| SIGNATURE | HARRISON G K |
| AFFILIATIONS | Massey University |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 6 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 3 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 6 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2005 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Why Ethics Requires a God and Is Safer from Evolutionary Debunking Threats as a Result
Sterba has argued that ethics does not require God and that an atheistic objectivist ethics is compatible with an evolutionary account of our development. This paper argues that though ethics does not require God specifically, it does require a god of some sort, for all normative reasons require a god and moral reasons are simply a subset of normative reasons. Sterba’s criticisms of more orthodox divine command theories of ethics are shown to rai…
Sterba's Problem of Evil and a Penal Colony Theodicy
Sterba argues that God would be ethically bound to implement a set of exceptionless evil prevention requirements. However, he argues that the world as we know it is not as it would be if God were applying them. Sterba concludes that God does not exist. In this paper, I offer a penal colony theodicy that will show how the world as we know it is entirely compatible with God's implementation of such evil prevention requirements
Believable Normative Error Theory
Normative error theory is thought by some to be unbelievable because they suppose the incompatibility of believing a proposition at the same time as believing that one has no normative reason to believe it—which believing in normative error theory would seem to involve. In this article, I argue that normative holism is believable and that a normative holist will believe that the truth of a proposition does not invariably generate a normative reas…
Morality, Inescapable Rational Authority, and a God's Wishes
It is a supposed conceptual truth about moral norms that we have reason to comply with them even if we desire not to. This combination of rational authority and inescapability is thought to be incompatible with instrumentalism about practical reason. This essay argues that there are ways in which norms with inescapable rational authority can exist alongside instrumentalism about practical reason. One way involves positing an afterlife and a power…
Antinatalism, Asymmetry, and an Ethic of Prima Facie Duties 1
Benatar’s central argument for antinatalism develops an asymmetry between the pain and pleasure in a potential life. I am going to present an alternative route to the antinatalist conclusion. I argue that duties require victims and that as a result there is no duty to create the pleasures contained within a prospective life but a duty not to create any of its sufferings. My argument can supplement Benatar’s, but it also enjoys some advantages: it…
Frankfurt-Style Cases and the Question Begging Charge
Antinatalism, Asymmetry, and an Ethic of Prima Facie Duties 1
Benatar’s central argument for antinatalism develops an asymmetry between the pain and pleasure in a potential life. I am going to present an alternative route to the antinatalist conclusion. I argue that duties require victims and that as a result there is no duty to create the pleasures contained within a prospective life but a duty not to create any of its sufferings. My argument can supplement Benatar’s, but it also enjoys some advantages: it…
Frankfurt-Style Cases and the Question Begging Charge
Antinatalism, Asymmetry, and an Ethic of Prima Facie Duties 1
Benatar’s central argument for antinatalism develops an asymmetry between the pain and pleasure in a potential life. I am going to present an alternative route to the antinatalist conclusion. I argue that duties require victims and that as a result there is no duty to create the pleasures contained within a prospective life but a duty not to create any of its sufferings. My argument can supplement Benatar’s, but it also enjoys some advantages: it…
Morality, Inescapable Rational Authority, and a God's Wishes
It is a supposed conceptual truth about moral norms that we have reason to comply with them even if we desire not to. This combination of rational authority and inescapability is thought to be incompatible with instrumentalism about practical reason. This essay argues that there are ways in which norms with inescapable rational authority can exist alongside instrumentalism about practical reason. One way involves positing an afterlife and a power…
Believable Normative Error Theory
Normative error theory is thought by some to be unbelievable because they suppose the incompatibility of believing a proposition at the same time as believing that one has no normative reason to believe it—which believing in normative error theory would seem to involve. In this article, I argue that normative holism is believable and that a normative holist will believe that the truth of a proposition does not invariably generate a normative reas…
Sterba's Problem of Evil and a Penal Colony Theodicy
Sterba argues that God would be ethically bound to implement a set of exceptionless evil prevention requirements. However, he argues that the world as we know it is not as it would be if God were applying them. Sterba concludes that God does not exist. In this paper, I offer a penal colony theodicy that will show how the world as we know it is entirely compatible with God's implementation of such evil prevention requirements
Why Ethics Requires a God and Is Safer from Evolutionary Debunking Threats as a Result
Sterba has argued that ethics does not require God and that an atheistic objectivist ethics is compatible with an evolutionary account of our development. This paper argues that though ethics does not require God specifically, it does require a god of some sort, for all normative reasons require a god and moral reasons are simply a subset of normative reasons. Sterba’s criticisms of more orthodox divine command theories of ethics are shown to rai…
Philosophy (6 works) · Philosophical Ethics and Theory (4 works) · Theology and Philosophy of Evil (4 works) · Environmental ethics (3 works) · Epistemology (3 works) · Sociology (3 works) · Theology (3 works) · Computer Science (2 works) · Free Will and Agency (2 works) · Philosophy (2 works)