Wesley H Holliday
Biographic Data
| ID | 1175967 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Wesley H Holliday |
| GIVEN NAMES | Wesley H |
| FAMILY NAME | Holliday |
| SIGNATURE | HOLLIDAY W H |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of California, Berkeley |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-6054-9052 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 12 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 11 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 12 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2012 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
An extension of May’s Theorem to three alternatives
May’s Theorem [K. O. May, Econometrica 20 (1952) 680-684] characterizes majority voting on two alternatives as the unique preferential voting method satisfying several simple axioms. Here we show that by adding some desirable axioms to May’s axioms, we can uniquely determine how to vote on three alternatives (setting aside tiebreaking). In particular, we add two axioms stating that the voting method should mitigate spoiler effects and the so-call…
An axiomatic characterization of Split Cycle
A number of rules for resolving majority cycles in elections have been proposed in the literature. Recently, Holliday and Pacuit (J Theor Polit 33:475–524, 2021) axiomatically characterized the class of rules refined by one such cycle-resolving rule, dubbed Split Cycle: in each majority cycle, discard the majority preferences with the smallest majority margin. They showed that any rule satisfying five standard axioms plus a weakening of Arrow’s I…
Escaping Arrow’s theorem
There is an extensive literature in social choice theory studying the consequences of weakening the assumptions of Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem. Much of this literature suggests that there is no escape from Arrow-style impossibility theorems, while remaining in an ordinal preference setting, unless one drastically violates the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA). In this paper, we present a more positive outlook. We propose a model of …
A Simple Condorcet Voting Method for Final Four Elections
Stable Voting
We propose a new single-winner voting system using ranked ballots: Stable Voting. The motivating principle of Stable Voting is that if a candidate A would win without another candidate B in the election, and A beats B in a head-to-head majority comparison, then A should still win in the election with B included (unless there is another candidate $$A'$$ A ′ who has the same kind of claim to winning, in which case a tiebreaker may choose between su…
Split Cycle
We propose a Condorcet-consistent voting method that we call Split Cycle. Split Cycle belongs to the small family of known voting methods satisfying the anti-vote-splitting criterion of independence of clones . In this family, only Split Cycle satisfies a new criterion we call immunity to spoilers , which concerns adding candidates to elections, as well as the known criteria of positive involvement and negative involvement , which concern adding …
Axioms for defeat in democratic elections
We propose six axioms concerning when one candidate should defeat another in a democratic election involving two or more candidates. Five of the axioms are widely satisfied by known voting procedures. The sixth axiom is a weakening of Kenneth Arrow’s famous condition of the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA). We call this weakening Coherent IIA. We prove that the five axioms plus Coherent IIA single out a method of determining defeats …
A note on Murakami’s theorems and incomplete social choice without the Pareto principle
Inferring probability comparisons
Symposium on the Fixity of the Past
This paper provides further motivation for a principle relating freedom and modality that appeared in ‘Freedom and the Fixity of the Past’ (The Philosophical Review, Vol. 121), where the principle was used to argue for incompatibilism about freedom and determinism. Roughly, the principle states that an agent cannot perform an action of a given type if there is no possible world in which an agent performs an action of that type. The paper also rep…
Information dynamics and uniform substitution
Freedom and the Fixity of the Past
According to the Principle of the Fixity of the Past (FP), no one can now do anything that would require the past to have unfolded differently than it actually did, for the past is fixed, over and done with. Why might doing something in the future require the past to be different? Because if determinism is true—if the laws of nature and the initial conditions of the Big Bang determined a unique future for our universe—then doing anything other th…
Stable Voting
We propose a new single-winner voting system using ranked ballots: Stable Voting. The motivating principle of Stable Voting is that if a candidate A would win without another candidate B in the election, and A beats B in a head-to-head majority comparison, then A should still win in the election with B included (unless there is another candidate $$A'$$ A ′ who has the same kind of claim to winning, in which case a tiebreaker may choose between su…
Axioms for defeat in democratic elections
We propose six axioms concerning when one candidate should defeat another in a democratic election involving two or more candidates. Five of the axioms are widely satisfied by known voting procedures. The sixth axiom is a weakening of Kenneth Arrow’s famous condition of the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA). We call this weakening Coherent IIA. We prove that the five axioms plus Coherent IIA single out a method of determining defeats …
Split Cycle
We propose a Condorcet-consistent voting method that we call Split Cycle. Split Cycle belongs to the small family of known voting methods satisfying the anti-vote-splitting criterion of independence of clones . In this family, only Split Cycle satisfies a new criterion we call immunity to spoilers , which concerns adding candidates to elections, as well as the known criteria of positive involvement and negative involvement , which concern adding …
Information dynamics and uniform substitution
A Simple Condorcet Voting Method for Final Four Elections
Freedom and the Fixity of the Past
According to the Principle of the Fixity of the Past (FP), no one can now do anything that would require the past to have unfolded differently than it actually did, for the past is fixed, over and done with. Why might doing something in the future require the past to be different? Because if determinism is true—if the laws of nature and the initial conditions of the Big Bang determined a unique future for our universe—then doing anything other th…
Information dynamics and uniform substitution
Symposium on the Fixity of the Past
This paper provides further motivation for a principle relating freedom and modality that appeared in ‘Freedom and the Fixity of the Past’ (The Philosophical Review, Vol. 121), where the principle was used to argue for incompatibilism about freedom and determinism. Roughly, the principle states that an agent cannot perform an action of a given type if there is no possible world in which an agent performs an action of that type. The paper also rep…
Inferring probability comparisons
A note on Murakami’s theorems and incomplete social choice without the Pareto principle
Axioms for defeat in democratic elections
We propose six axioms concerning when one candidate should defeat another in a democratic election involving two or more candidates. Five of the axioms are widely satisfied by known voting procedures. The sixth axiom is a weakening of Kenneth Arrow’s famous condition of the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA). We call this weakening Coherent IIA. We prove that the five axioms plus Coherent IIA single out a method of determining defeats …
Stable Voting
We propose a new single-winner voting system using ranked ballots: Stable Voting. The motivating principle of Stable Voting is that if a candidate A would win without another candidate B in the election, and A beats B in a head-to-head majority comparison, then A should still win in the election with B included (unless there is another candidate $$A'$$ A ′ who has the same kind of claim to winning, in which case a tiebreaker may choose between su…
Split Cycle
We propose a Condorcet-consistent voting method that we call Split Cycle. Split Cycle belongs to the small family of known voting methods satisfying the anti-vote-splitting criterion of independence of clones . In this family, only Split Cycle satisfies a new criterion we call immunity to spoilers , which concerns adding candidates to elections, as well as the known criteria of positive involvement and negative involvement , which concern adding …
An axiomatic characterization of Split Cycle
A number of rules for resolving majority cycles in elections have been proposed in the literature. Recently, Holliday and Pacuit (J Theor Polit 33:475–524, 2021) axiomatically characterized the class of rules refined by one such cycle-resolving rule, dubbed Split Cycle: in each majority cycle, discard the majority preferences with the smallest majority margin. They showed that any rule satisfying five standard axioms plus a weakening of Arrow’s I…
Escaping Arrow’s theorem
There is an extensive literature in social choice theory studying the consequences of weakening the assumptions of Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem. Much of this literature suggests that there is no escape from Arrow-style impossibility theorems, while remaining in an ordinal preference setting, unless one drastically violates the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA). In this paper, we present a more positive outlook. We propose a model of …
A Simple Condorcet Voting Method for Final Four Elections
An extension of May’s Theorem to three alternatives
May’s Theorem [K. O. May, Econometrica 20 (1952) 680-684] characterizes majority voting on two alternatives as the unique preferential voting method satisfying several simple axioms. Here we show that by adding some desirable axioms to May’s axioms, we can uniquely determine how to vote on three alternatives (setting aside tiebreaking). In particular, we add two axioms stating that the voting method should mitigate spoiler effects and the so-call…
Mathematics (10 works) · Mathematical economics (9 works) · Computer Science (8 works) · Game Theory and Voting Systems (8 works) · Law (7 works) · Political science (7 works) · Voting (5 works) · Arrow's impossibility theorem (4 works) · Economics (4 works) · Law (4 works)