Fabrice Correia
Biographic Data
| ID | 1177361 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Fabrice Correia |
| GIVEN NAMES | Fabrice |
| FAMILY NAME | Correia |
| SIGNATURE | CORREIA F |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Geneva |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-4840-8027 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 13 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 68 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 12 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 1 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2005 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 4 |
Worldly Grounding and the Puzzles
Starting with Kit Fine’s article “Some Puzzles of Ground” (2010), grounding has been argued to give rise to serious puzzles. The way the puzzles should be handled, I contend, depends on whether the concepts of grounding involved in the puzzles are worldly or representational. Here I focus on worldly grounding, and I argue that the formally best understood worldly concepts of worldly grounding, which I dub “weak-first”, escape all the currently kn…
Omnipresence
Drawing on recent work on the theory of location, we first develop a general theory of omnipresence, and then apply it to the particular but historically paradigmatic case of divine omnipresence
A New Argument for the Groundedness of Grounding Facts
Many philosophers have recently been impressed by an argument to the effect that all grounding facts about “derivative entities”—e.g. the facts expressed by the (let us suppose) true sentences ‘the fact that Beijing is a concrete entity is grounded in the fact that its parts are concrete’ and ‘the fact that there are cities is grounded in the fact that p’, where ‘p’ is a suitable sentence couched in the language of particle physics—must themselve…
A Theory of Truthmaking
At the core of Jamin Asay’s book is a distinction and a claim. The distinction is between two conceptions of truthmaker theory. On one of them, truthmaker theory aims at “ontological accounting”—that is, “properly coordinating our beliefs and ontological inventories”; on the other conception, it aims at “alethic explanation”—that is, “offering systematic explanations as to why true truth-bearers are true” (31). The claim is that we should embrace…
A kind route from grounding to fundamentality
I offer an account of fundamentality for facts in terms of metaphysical grounding. The account does justice to the idea that whether a fact is absolutely fundamental, and whether a fact is more fundamental than, or as fundamental as, another fact, are a matter of where in a grounding-induced hierarchy of kinds of facts these facts appear
Fundamentality from grounding trees
I provide and defend two natural accounts of (both relative and absolute) fundamentality for facts that do justice to the idea that the “degree of fundamentality” enjoyed by a fact is a matter of how far, from a ground-theoretic perspective, the fact is from the ungrounded facts
The logic of relative fundamentality
Grounding, Essence, and Identity
Recent metaphysics has turned its focus to two notions that are—as well as having a common Aristotelian pedigree—widely thought to be intimately related: grounding and essence. Yet how, exactly, the two are related remains opaque. We develop a unified and uniform account of grounding and essence, one which understands them both in terms of a generalized notion of identity examined in recent work by Fabrice Correia, Cian Dorr, Agustín Rayo, and ot…
Metaphysical Grounding
Some of the most eminent and enduring philosophical questions concern matters of priority: what is prior to what? What 'grounds' what? Is, for instance, matter prior to mind? Recently, a vivid debate has arisen about how such questions have to be understood. Can the relevant notion or notions of priority be spelled out? And how do they relate to other metaphysical notions, such as modality, truth-making or essence? This volume of new essays, by l…
Grounding and explanation
Some of the most eminent and enduring philosophical questions concern matters of priority: what is prior to what? What 'grounds' what? Is, for instance, matter prior to mind? Recently, a vivid debate has arisen about how such questions have to be understood. Can the relevant notion or notions of priority be spelled out? And how do they relate to other metaphysical notions, such as modality, truth-making or essence? This volume of new essays, by l…
On the Reduction of Necessity to Essence
In his influential paper ‘‘Essence and Modality’’, Kit Fine argues that no account of essence framed in terms of metaphysical necessity is possible, and that it is rather metaphysical necessity which is to be understood in terms of essence. On his account, the concept of essence is primitive, and for a proposition to be metaphysically necessary is for it to be true in virtue of the nature of all things. Fine also proposes a reduction of conceptua…
Ontological Dependence
Ontological dependence' is a term of philosophical jargon which stands for a rich family of properties and relations, often taken to be among the most fundamental ontological properties and relations. Notions of ontological dependence are usually thought of as 'carving reality at its ontological joints', and as marking certain forms of ontological 'non-self-sufficiency'. The use of notions of dependence goes back as far as Aristotle's characteriz…
Existential Dependence and Cognate Notions
Grounding, Essence, and Identity
Recent metaphysics has turned its focus to two notions that are—as well as having a common Aristotelian pedigree—widely thought to be intimately related: grounding and essence. Yet how, exactly, the two are related remains opaque. We develop a unified and uniform account of grounding and essence, one which understands them both in terms of a generalized notion of identity examined in recent work by Fabrice Correia, Cian Dorr, Agustín Rayo, and ot…
Ontological Dependence
Ontological dependence' is a term of philosophical jargon which stands for a rich family of properties and relations, often taken to be among the most fundamental ontological properties and relations. Notions of ontological dependence are usually thought of as 'carving reality at its ontological joints', and as marking certain forms of ontological 'non-self-sufficiency'. The use of notions of dependence goes back as far as Aristotle's characteriz…
On the Reduction of Necessity to Essence
In his influential paper ‘‘Essence and Modality’’, Kit Fine argues that no account of essence framed in terms of metaphysical necessity is possible, and that it is rather metaphysical necessity which is to be understood in terms of essence. On his account, the concept of essence is primitive, and for a proposition to be metaphysically necessary is for it to be true in virtue of the nature of all things. Fine also proposes a reduction of conceptua…
Fundamentality from grounding trees
I provide and defend two natural accounts of (both relative and absolute) fundamentality for facts that do justice to the idea that the “degree of fundamentality” enjoyed by a fact is a matter of how far, from a ground-theoretic perspective, the fact is from the ungrounded facts
The logic of relative fundamentality
A kind route from grounding to fundamentality
I offer an account of fundamentality for facts in terms of metaphysical grounding. The account does justice to the idea that whether a fact is absolutely fundamental, and whether a fact is more fundamental than, or as fundamental as, another fact, are a matter of where in a grounding-induced hierarchy of kinds of facts these facts appear
Existential Dependence and Cognate Notions
Ontological Dependence
Ontological dependence' is a term of philosophical jargon which stands for a rich family of properties and relations, often taken to be among the most fundamental ontological properties and relations. Notions of ontological dependence are usually thought of as 'carving reality at its ontological joints', and as marking certain forms of ontological 'non-self-sufficiency'. The use of notions of dependence goes back as far as Aristotle's characteriz…
On the Reduction of Necessity to Essence
In his influential paper ‘‘Essence and Modality’’, Kit Fine argues that no account of essence framed in terms of metaphysical necessity is possible, and that it is rather metaphysical necessity which is to be understood in terms of essence. On his account, the concept of essence is primitive, and for a proposition to be metaphysically necessary is for it to be true in virtue of the nature of all things. Fine also proposes a reduction of conceptua…
Metaphysical Grounding
Some of the most eminent and enduring philosophical questions concern matters of priority: what is prior to what? What 'grounds' what? Is, for instance, matter prior to mind? Recently, a vivid debate has arisen about how such questions have to be understood. Can the relevant notion or notions of priority be spelled out? And how do they relate to other metaphysical notions, such as modality, truth-making or essence? This volume of new essays, by l…
Grounding and explanation
Some of the most eminent and enduring philosophical questions concern matters of priority: what is prior to what? What 'grounds' what? Is, for instance, matter prior to mind? Recently, a vivid debate has arisen about how such questions have to be understood. Can the relevant notion or notions of priority be spelled out? And how do they relate to other metaphysical notions, such as modality, truth-making or essence? This volume of new essays, by l…
Grounding, Essence, and Identity
Recent metaphysics has turned its focus to two notions that are—as well as having a common Aristotelian pedigree—widely thought to be intimately related: grounding and essence. Yet how, exactly, the two are related remains opaque. We develop a unified and uniform account of grounding and essence, one which understands them both in terms of a generalized notion of identity examined in recent work by Fabrice Correia, Cian Dorr, Agustín Rayo, and ot…
A kind route from grounding to fundamentality
I offer an account of fundamentality for facts in terms of metaphysical grounding. The account does justice to the idea that whether a fact is absolutely fundamental, and whether a fact is more fundamental than, or as fundamental as, another fact, are a matter of where in a grounding-induced hierarchy of kinds of facts these facts appear
Fundamentality from grounding trees
I provide and defend two natural accounts of (both relative and absolute) fundamentality for facts that do justice to the idea that the “degree of fundamentality” enjoyed by a fact is a matter of how far, from a ground-theoretic perspective, the fact is from the ungrounded facts
The logic of relative fundamentality
A Theory of Truthmaking
At the core of Jamin Asay’s book is a distinction and a claim. The distinction is between two conceptions of truthmaker theory. On one of them, truthmaker theory aims at “ontological accounting”—that is, “properly coordinating our beliefs and ontological inventories”; on the other conception, it aims at “alethic explanation”—that is, “offering systematic explanations as to why true truth-bearers are true” (31). The claim is that we should embrace…
A New Argument for the Groundedness of Grounding Facts
Many philosophers have recently been impressed by an argument to the effect that all grounding facts about “derivative entities”—e.g. the facts expressed by the (let us suppose) true sentences ‘the fact that Beijing is a concrete entity is grounded in the fact that its parts are concrete’ and ‘the fact that there are cities is grounded in the fact that p’, where ‘p’ is a suitable sentence couched in the language of particle physics—must themselve…
Worldly Grounding and the Puzzles
Starting with Kit Fine’s article “Some Puzzles of Ground” (2010), grounding has been argued to give rise to serious puzzles. The way the puzzles should be handled, I contend, depends on whether the concepts of grounding involved in the puzzles are worldly or representational. Here I focus on worldly grounding, and I argue that the formally best understood worldly concepts of worldly grounding, which I dub “weak-first”, escape all the currently kn…
Omnipresence
Drawing on recent work on the theory of location, we first develop a general theory of omnipresence, and then apply it to the particular but historically paradigmatic case of divine omnipresence
Epistemology (12 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (12 works) · Metaphysics (11 works) · Philosophy (11 works) · Computer Science (5 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (5 works) · Philosophy of language (5 works) · Philosophy of science (5 works) · Classical Philosophy and Thought (4 works) · Physics (4 works)