Ted Poston
Biographic Data
| ID | 1192802 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Ted Poston |
| GIVEN NAMES | Ted |
| FAMILY NAME | Poston |
| SIGNATURE | POSTON T |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of South Alabama |
| ORCID | 0009-0006-1914-3628 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 8 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 22 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 8 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2007 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Metaphysical symmetry and the modal ontological argument
Fritz, Lo, and Schmid argue that the symmetry problem for the modal ontological argument dissolves in modal logics weaker than S5, where (P1) white medium square left parenthesis g right arrow white medium square g right parenthesis $\square\left( g\rightarrow \square{g} \right)$ ◻ ( g → ◻ g ) , (P2) backslash unicodex 2 upper B 26 g $\unicode{x2B26}{g}$ ⬦ , and (P2*) backslash unicodex 2 upper B 26 not sign g $\unicode{x2B26}\neg g$ ⬦ ¬ g are jo…
Explanatory Reasoning and Informativeness
Bas van Fraassen has argued that explanatory reasoning does not provide confirmation for explanatory hypotheses because explanatory reasoning increases information and increasing information does not provide confirmation. We compare this argument with a skeptical argument that one should never add any beliefs because adding beliefs increases information and increasing information does not provide confirmation. We discuss the similarities between …
Critical Notice
Alex Worsnip's recent book, Fitting Things Together: Coherence and the Demands of Structural Rationality, provides a sustained, wide-ranging defence of dualism about rationality. Worsnip contends that there are two independent kinds of rationality: substantive rationality and structural rationality. Structural rationality is a property manifest in a variety of mental states in virtue of the relations between those states. Substantive rationality,…
Explanatory Coherence and the Impossibility of Confirmation by Coherence
The coherence of independent reports provides a strong reason to believe that the reports are true. This plausible claim has come under attack from recent work in Bayesian epistemology. This work shows that, under certain probabilistic conditions, coherence cannot increase the probability of the target claim. These theorems are taken to demonstrate that epistemic coherentism is untenable. To date no one has investigated how these results bear on …
Know how to be Gettiered
Jason Stanley and Timothy Williamson’s influential article “Knowing How” argues that knowledge‐how is a species of knowledge‐that. One objection to their view is that knowledge‐how is significantly different than knowledge‐that because Gettier cases afflict the latter but not the former. Stanley and Williamson argue that this objection fails. Their response, however, is not adequate. Moreover, I sketch a plausible argument that knowledge‐how is n…
A user's guide to design arguments
We argue that there is a tension between two types of design arguments: the fine-tuning argument (FTA) and the biological design argument (BDA). The tension arises because the strength of each argument is inversely proportional to the value of a certain currently unknown probability. Since the value of that probability is currently unknown, we investigate the properties of the FTA and BDA on different hypothetical values of this probability. If o…
Justification without Awareness
Divine hiddenness and the nature of belief
In this paper we argue that attention to the intricacies relating to belief illustrate crucial difficulties with Schellenberg's hiddenness argument. This issue has been only tangentially discussed in the literature to date. Yet we judge this aspect of Schellenberg's argument deeply significant. We claim that focus on the nature of belief manifests a central flaw in the hiddenness argument. Additionally, attention to doxastic subtleties provides i…
Know how to be Gettiered
Jason Stanley and Timothy Williamson’s influential article “Knowing How” argues that knowledge‐how is a species of knowledge‐that. One objection to their view is that knowledge‐how is significantly different than knowledge‐that because Gettier cases afflict the latter but not the former. Stanley and Williamson argue that this objection fails. Their response, however, is not adequate. Moreover, I sketch a plausible argument that knowledge‐how is n…
Divine hiddenness and the nature of belief
In this paper we argue that attention to the intricacies relating to belief illustrate crucial difficulties with Schellenberg's hiddenness argument. This issue has been only tangentially discussed in the literature to date. Yet we judge this aspect of Schellenberg's argument deeply significant. We claim that focus on the nature of belief manifests a central flaw in the hiddenness argument. Additionally, attention to doxastic subtleties provides i…
A user's guide to design arguments
We argue that there is a tension between two types of design arguments: the fine-tuning argument (FTA) and the biological design argument (BDA). The tension arises because the strength of each argument is inversely proportional to the value of a certain currently unknown probability. Since the value of that probability is currently unknown, we investigate the properties of the FTA and BDA on different hypothetical values of this probability. If o…
Justification without Awareness
Know how to be Gettiered
Jason Stanley and Timothy Williamson’s influential article “Knowing How” argues that knowledge‐how is a species of knowledge‐that. One objection to their view is that knowledge‐how is significantly different than knowledge‐that because Gettier cases afflict the latter but not the former. Stanley and Williamson argue that this objection fails. Their response, however, is not adequate. Moreover, I sketch a plausible argument that knowledge‐how is n…
Explanatory Coherence and the Impossibility of Confirmation by Coherence
The coherence of independent reports provides a strong reason to believe that the reports are true. This plausible claim has come under attack from recent work in Bayesian epistemology. This work shows that, under certain probabilistic conditions, coherence cannot increase the probability of the target claim. These theorems are taken to demonstrate that epistemic coherentism is untenable. To date no one has investigated how these results bear on …
Explanatory Reasoning and Informativeness
Bas van Fraassen has argued that explanatory reasoning does not provide confirmation for explanatory hypotheses because explanatory reasoning increases information and increasing information does not provide confirmation. We compare this argument with a skeptical argument that one should never add any beliefs because adding beliefs increases information and increasing information does not provide confirmation. We discuss the similarities between …
Critical Notice
Alex Worsnip's recent book, Fitting Things Together: Coherence and the Demands of Structural Rationality, provides a sustained, wide-ranging defence of dualism about rationality. Worsnip contends that there are two independent kinds of rationality: substantive rationality and structural rationality. Structural rationality is a property manifest in a variety of mental states in virtue of the relations between those states. Substantive rationality,…
Metaphysical symmetry and the modal ontological argument
Fritz, Lo, and Schmid argue that the symmetry problem for the modal ontological argument dissolves in modal logics weaker than S5, where (P1) white medium square left parenthesis g right arrow white medium square g right parenthesis $\square\left( g\rightarrow \square{g} \right)$ ◻ ( g → ◻ g ) , (P2) backslash unicodex 2 upper B 26 g $\unicode{x2B26}{g}$ ⬦ , and (P2*) backslash unicodex 2 upper B 26 not sign g $\unicode{x2B26}\neg g$ ⬦ ¬ g are jo…
Epistemology (6 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (6 works) · Philosophy (6 works) · Argument (complex analysis) (3 works) · Computer Science (3 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (3 works) · Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge (2 works) · Mathematics (2 works) · Medicine (2 works) · Philosophical Ethics and Theory (2 works)