David Pérez‐castrillo
Biographic Data
| ID | 1194064 |
|---|---|
| NAME | David Pérez‐castrillo |
| GIVEN NAMES | David |
| FAMILY NAME | Pérez‐castrillo |
| SIGNATURE | CASTRILLO D P |
| AFFILIATIONS | Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-1840-7621 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 11 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 23 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 11 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1991 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2021 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Goal-oriented agents in a market
We consider a market where “standard” risk-neutral agents coexist with “goal-oriented” agents who, in addition to the expected income, seek a high-enough monetary payoff (the “trigger”) to fulfill a goal. We analyze a two-sided one-to-one matching model where the matching between principals and agents and incentive contracts are endogenous. In any equilibrium contract, goal-oriented agents are matched with the principals with best projects and re…
Complex Social and Behavioral Systems
Les étapes du financement de la recherche académique
Les agences de financement de la recherche allouent des ressources (rares) selon un processus bottom-up concurrentiel. Cet article analyse les déterminants et les conséquences des choix réalisés à chaque étape du processus de financement. En mobilisant des recherches passées (Banal-Estañol, Macho-Stadler et Pérez-Castrillo [2013], [2018] et [2019]), nous présentons de nouveaux résultats en utilisant une base de données provenant de l’une des plus…
Settlement in Tax Evasion Prosecution
It is often argued that, even if optimal ex post , settlement dilutes deterrence ex ante . We analyse the interest for the tax authority of committing, ex ante , to a settlement strategy. We show that to commit to the use of settlements is ex ante optimal when the tax authority receives signals that provide statistical information about the taxpayers' true tax liability. The more informative the signal, the larger the additional expected revenue …
A general analysis of rent-seeking games
An Introduction to the Economics of Information
In this revised second edition, An Introduction to the Economics of Information covers the consequences for the character and efficiency of the interaction between individuals and organizations when one party has more or better information on some aspect of the relationship. This is the condition of asymmetric information, under which the information gap will be exploited if, by doing so, the better-informed party can achieve some advantage. The …
Stable Multilateral Trade Agreements
We analyse multilateral tariff negotiations as a game in coalition form. In a model with three identical countries that produce and trade an homogeneous commodity, and where countries’ aggregated welfare can weight differently their different components, we analyse how changes in the countries’ objective affects the stability of coalitions. In other words, we characterize what tariff‐agreements, if any, are stable (i.e. lie in the core)
Spatial competition in the banking system
A general analysis of rent-seeking games
Moral hazard and cooperation
La structure industrielle dans une course au brevet avec coûts fixes et coûts variables
Verdier Thierry, Pérez-Castrillo J. David. La structure industrielle dans une course au brevet avec coûts fixes et coûts variables. In: Revue économique, volume 42, n°6, 1991. pp. 1111-1140
A general analysis of rent-seeking games
Goal-oriented agents in a market
We consider a market where “standard” risk-neutral agents coexist with “goal-oriented” agents who, in addition to the expected income, seek a high-enough monetary payoff (the “trigger”) to fulfill a goal. We analyze a two-sided one-to-one matching model where the matching between principals and agents and incentive contracts are endogenous. In any equilibrium contract, goal-oriented agents are matched with the principals with best projects and re…
Settlement in Tax Evasion Prosecution
It is often argued that, even if optimal ex post , settlement dilutes deterrence ex ante . We analyse the interest for the tax authority of committing, ex ante , to a settlement strategy. We show that to commit to the use of settlements is ex ante optimal when the tax authority receives signals that provide statistical information about the taxpayers' true tax liability. The more informative the signal, the larger the additional expected revenue …
Stable Multilateral Trade Agreements
We analyse multilateral tariff negotiations as a game in coalition form. In a model with three identical countries that produce and trade an homogeneous commodity, and where countries’ aggregated welfare can weight differently their different components, we analyse how changes in the countries’ objective affects the stability of coalitions. In other words, we characterize what tariff‐agreements, if any, are stable (i.e. lie in the core)
Moral hazard and cooperation
La structure industrielle dans une course au brevet avec coûts fixes et coûts variables
Verdier Thierry, Pérez-Castrillo J. David. La structure industrielle dans une course au brevet avec coûts fixes et coûts variables. In: Revue économique, volume 42, n°6, 1991. pp. 1111-1140
A general analysis of rent-seeking games
Spatial competition in the banking system
Stable Multilateral Trade Agreements
We analyse multilateral tariff negotiations as a game in coalition form. In a model with three identical countries that produce and trade an homogeneous commodity, and where countries’ aggregated welfare can weight differently their different components, we analyse how changes in the countries’ objective affects the stability of coalitions. In other words, we characterize what tariff‐agreements, if any, are stable (i.e. lie in the core)
A general analysis of rent-seeking games
An Introduction to the Economics of Information
In this revised second edition, An Introduction to the Economics of Information covers the consequences for the character and efficiency of the interaction between individuals and organizations when one party has more or better information on some aspect of the relationship. This is the condition of asymmetric information, under which the information gap will be exploited if, by doing so, the better-informed party can achieve some advantage. The …
Settlement in Tax Evasion Prosecution
It is often argued that, even if optimal ex post , settlement dilutes deterrence ex ante . We analyse the interest for the tax authority of committing, ex ante , to a settlement strategy. We show that to commit to the use of settlements is ex ante optimal when the tax authority receives signals that provide statistical information about the taxpayers' true tax liability. The more informative the signal, the larger the additional expected revenue …
Les étapes du financement de la recherche académique
Les agences de financement de la recherche allouent des ressources (rares) selon un processus bottom-up concurrentiel. Cet article analyse les déterminants et les conséquences des choix réalisés à chaque étape du processus de financement. En mobilisant des recherches passées (Banal-Estañol, Macho-Stadler et Pérez-Castrillo [2013], [2018] et [2019]), nous présentons de nouveaux résultats en utilisant une base de données provenant de l’une des plus…
Complex Social and Behavioral Systems
Goal-oriented agents in a market
We consider a market where “standard” risk-neutral agents coexist with “goal-oriented” agents who, in addition to the expected income, seek a high-enough monetary payoff (the “trigger”) to fulfill a goal. We analyze a two-sided one-to-one matching model where the matching between principals and agents and incentive contracts are endogenous. In any equilibrium contract, goal-oriented agents are matched with the principals with best projects and re…
Economics (7 works) · Computer Science (6 works) · Microeconomics (5 works) · Political science (5 works) · Economic theories and models (4 works) · Business (3 works) · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies (3 works) · Finance (3 works) · Law (3 works) · Actuarial science (2 works)