Eckhard Janeba
Biographic Data
| ID | 1196907 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Eckhard Janeba |
| GIVEN NAMES | Eckhard |
| FAMILY NAME | Janeba |
| SIGNATURE | JANEBA E |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Mannheim |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-4385-9320 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 13 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 23 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 13 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1997 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2023 |
| H-INDEX | 3 |
Consistent flexibility: Enforcement of deficit rules through political incentives
We study the optimal design of a deficit rule in a model in which the government is present-biased, shocks to tax revenues make rule compliance stochastic, and a rule violation reduces the payoff from holding office. We show that: i) the benchmark policy of the social planner can be always implemented via an optimal nonlinear deficit rule and under certain conditions even under a linear rule; ii) the optimal rule prescribes a zero structural defi…
Incumbency and expectations of fiscal rule compliance: Evidence from surveys of German policy makers
European fiscal reform preferences of parliamentarians in France, Germany and Italy
Using data from a unique survey of members of parliaments in France, Germany and Italy in 2018, we estimate the effects of three dimensions on EU and Euro Area fiscal reform preferences: nationality, political ideology and populism. We predict and confirm that a German populist party on the right is most opposed to a more developed European fiscal union, while a non-populist politician on the political left in France or Italy is most integrationi…
European Monetary Union reform preferences of French and German parliamentarians
We analyze data from an author-conducted survey of members of the French and German parliaments on European Monetary Union reform preferences. We consider three potential drivers of preferences: nationality, ideology, and personal characteristics. For European Monetary Union policies like Eurobonds, the Fiscal Compact, and the European Central Bank asset purchase program we find a robust difference between parliamentarians of both countries if th…
Who Likes to Fend for Oneself? Revenue Autonomy Preferences of Subnational Politicians in Germany
In the context of German federalism and its current reform debate, this article explores the federal reform preferences of members from all sixteen German Länder parliaments. We examine the role of Länder self-interest, party ideology, and individual characteristics to understand the preferences for tax autonomy and fiscal equalization. One clear result is the joint importance of ideology and jurisdictional interests. We use the empirical results…
Tax Policy, Tax Competition, and Fiscal Rules: Insights from a Classroom Experiment and Surveys of Politicians
This paper reviews and extends recent attempts to better understand fiscal policy decision-making. Surveys of politicians are complementary to traditional empirical analyses and can be used to extract beliefs of policymakers. There is much heterogeneity across and also within parties. Often ideology plays an important explanatory part in the beliefs of policymakers, even for questions that appear to be nonideological. Furthermore, I report on a c…
Germany's New Debt Brake: A Blueprint for Europe?
Many policy reforms are introduced with a significant lag between the time of legislative passage and their actual implementation. This is also the case for a new constitutional rule in Germany, referred to as a debt brake (Schuldenbremse), which requires the federal and state governments to run (almost, cyclically adjusted) balanced budgets from 2016 and 2020 onward, respectively. In this context I analyze within a simple political-economy model…
The Welfare Effects of Tax Competition Reconsidered: Politicians and Political Institutions
The views on the welfare effects of tax competition differ widely. Some see the fiscal externalities as the cause for underprovision of public goods, while others see tax competition as the means of reducing government inefficiencies. Using a comparative politics approach we show that tax competition among presidential-congressional democracies is typically welfare improving, while harmful among parliamentary democracies if under the latter publi…
Studiengeb hren in Deutschland: Drei Thesen und ihr empirischer Gehalt
Several Länder in Germany have introduced, or are about to introduce, tuition fees for higher education. We discuss three hypotheses pertaining to (i) their distributional effects, (ii) their effect on the demand for higher education and study behaviour, and (iii) the competition and financial resources effects. We utilize a large number of empirical studies and other country experiences to assess likely effects in Germany. We conclude that fees …
Global corporations and local politics: Income redistribution vs. FDI subsidies
A Citizen-Candidate Model with Sequential Elections
This article develops a citizen-candidate model with sequential elections. The model highlights the strategic considerations associated with the primary process, which hinge on the preferences of party members, in particular the party medians and the party boundaries. It is shown that although electoral competition leads to convergence in platforms, the primary process limits such convergence. Intuitively, this results from candidates having to p…
Tax Evasion, Tax Competition and the Gains From Nondiscrimination: The Case of Interest Taxation in Europe
This paper uses a game–theoretic approach to analyse the taxation of interest income in Europe in the presence of tax evasion. The model allows us to assess the success of various reform proposals. We argue that the tax treatment of nonresidents' interest income plays a crucial role. When decisions on discrimination and on withholding tax rates are made non‐cooperatively, the outcome is similar to a prisoners' dilemma. All countries discriminate,…
International Tax Competition
International Tax Competition
A Citizen-Candidate Model with Sequential Elections
This article develops a citizen-candidate model with sequential elections. The model highlights the strategic considerations associated with the primary process, which hinge on the preferences of party members, in particular the party medians and the party boundaries. It is shown that although electoral competition leads to convergence in platforms, the primary process limits such convergence. Intuitively, this results from candidates having to p…
European Monetary Union reform preferences of French and German parliamentarians
We analyze data from an author-conducted survey of members of the French and German parliaments on European Monetary Union reform preferences. We consider three potential drivers of preferences: nationality, ideology, and personal characteristics. For European Monetary Union policies like Eurobonds, the Fiscal Compact, and the European Central Bank asset purchase program we find a robust difference between parliamentarians of both countries if th…
Who Likes to Fend for Oneself? Revenue Autonomy Preferences of Subnational Politicians in Germany
In the context of German federalism and its current reform debate, this article explores the federal reform preferences of members from all sixteen German Länder parliaments. We examine the role of Länder self-interest, party ideology, and individual characteristics to understand the preferences for tax autonomy and fiscal equalization. One clear result is the joint importance of ideology and jurisdictional interests. We use the empirical results…
Tax Evasion, Tax Competition and the Gains From Nondiscrimination: The Case of Interest Taxation in Europe
This paper uses a game–theoretic approach to analyse the taxation of interest income in Europe in the presence of tax evasion. The model allows us to assess the success of various reform proposals. We argue that the tax treatment of nonresidents' interest income plays a crucial role. When decisions on discrimination and on withholding tax rates are made non‐cooperatively, the outcome is similar to a prisoners' dilemma. All countries discriminate,…
European fiscal reform preferences of parliamentarians in France, Germany and Italy
Using data from a unique survey of members of parliaments in France, Germany and Italy in 2018, we estimate the effects of three dimensions on EU and Euro Area fiscal reform preferences: nationality, political ideology and populism. We predict and confirm that a German populist party on the right is most opposed to a more developed European fiscal union, while a non-populist politician on the political left in France or Italy is most integrationi…
The Welfare Effects of Tax Competition Reconsidered: Politicians and Political Institutions
The views on the welfare effects of tax competition differ widely. Some see the fiscal externalities as the cause for underprovision of public goods, while others see tax competition as the means of reducing government inefficiencies. Using a comparative politics approach we show that tax competition among presidential-congressional democracies is typically welfare improving, while harmful among parliamentary democracies if under the latter publi…
International Tax Competition
International Tax Competition
Tax Evasion, Tax Competition and the Gains From Nondiscrimination: The Case of Interest Taxation in Europe
This paper uses a game–theoretic approach to analyse the taxation of interest income in Europe in the presence of tax evasion. The model allows us to assess the success of various reform proposals. We argue that the tax treatment of nonresidents' interest income plays a crucial role. When decisions on discrimination and on withholding tax rates are made non‐cooperatively, the outcome is similar to a prisoners' dilemma. All countries discriminate,…
A Citizen-Candidate Model with Sequential Elections
This article develops a citizen-candidate model with sequential elections. The model highlights the strategic considerations associated with the primary process, which hinge on the preferences of party members, in particular the party medians and the party boundaries. It is shown that although electoral competition leads to convergence in platforms, the primary process limits such convergence. Intuitively, this results from candidates having to p…
Global corporations and local politics: Income redistribution vs. FDI subsidies
Studiengeb hren in Deutschland: Drei Thesen und ihr empirischer Gehalt
Several Länder in Germany have introduced, or are about to introduce, tuition fees for higher education. We discuss three hypotheses pertaining to (i) their distributional effects, (ii) their effect on the demand for higher education and study behaviour, and (iii) the competition and financial resources effects. We utilize a large number of empirical studies and other country experiences to assess likely effects in Germany. We conclude that fees …
The Welfare Effects of Tax Competition Reconsidered: Politicians and Political Institutions
The views on the welfare effects of tax competition differ widely. Some see the fiscal externalities as the cause for underprovision of public goods, while others see tax competition as the means of reducing government inefficiencies. Using a comparative politics approach we show that tax competition among presidential-congressional democracies is typically welfare improving, while harmful among parliamentary democracies if under the latter publi…
Germany's New Debt Brake: A Blueprint for Europe?
Many policy reforms are introduced with a significant lag between the time of legislative passage and their actual implementation. This is also the case for a new constitutional rule in Germany, referred to as a debt brake (Schuldenbremse), which requires the federal and state governments to run (almost, cyclically adjusted) balanced budgets from 2016 and 2020 onward, respectively. In this context I analyze within a simple political-economy model…
Tax Policy, Tax Competition, and Fiscal Rules: Insights from a Classroom Experiment and Surveys of Politicians
This paper reviews and extends recent attempts to better understand fiscal policy decision-making. Surveys of politicians are complementary to traditional empirical analyses and can be used to extract beliefs of policymakers. There is much heterogeneity across and also within parties. Often ideology plays an important explanatory part in the beliefs of policymakers, even for questions that appear to be nonideological. Furthermore, I report on a c…
Who Likes to Fend for Oneself? Revenue Autonomy Preferences of Subnational Politicians in Germany
In the context of German federalism and its current reform debate, this article explores the federal reform preferences of members from all sixteen German Länder parliaments. We examine the role of Länder self-interest, party ideology, and individual characteristics to understand the preferences for tax autonomy and fiscal equalization. One clear result is the joint importance of ideology and jurisdictional interests. We use the empirical results…
European Monetary Union reform preferences of French and German parliamentarians
We analyze data from an author-conducted survey of members of the French and German parliaments on European Monetary Union reform preferences. We consider three potential drivers of preferences: nationality, ideology, and personal characteristics. For European Monetary Union policies like Eurobonds, the Fiscal Compact, and the European Central Bank asset purchase program we find a robust difference between parliamentarians of both countries if th…
Incumbency and expectations of fiscal rule compliance: Evidence from surveys of German policy makers
European fiscal reform preferences of parliamentarians in France, Germany and Italy
Using data from a unique survey of members of parliaments in France, Germany and Italy in 2018, we estimate the effects of three dimensions on EU and Euro Area fiscal reform preferences: nationality, political ideology and populism. We predict and confirm that a German populist party on the right is most opposed to a more developed European fiscal union, while a non-populist politician on the political left in France or Italy is most integrationi…
Consistent flexibility: Enforcement of deficit rules through political incentives
We study the optimal design of a deficit rule in a model in which the government is present-biased, shocks to tax revenues make rule compliance stochastic, and a rule violation reduces the payoff from holding office. We show that: i) the benchmark policy of the social planner can be always implemented via an optimal nonlinear deficit rule and under certain conditions even under a linear rule; ii) the optimal rule prescribes a zero structural defi…
Economics (13 works) · Political science (7 works) · Local Government Finance and Decentralization (6 works) · Politics (6 works) · Corporate Taxation and Avoidance (5 works) · Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth (5 works) · Political economy (5 works) · Public economics (5 works) · Fiscal Policies and Political Economy (4 works) · German (4 works)