Sukaina Hirji
Biographic Data
| ID | 1201554 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Sukaina Hirji |
| GIVEN NAMES | Sukaina |
| FAMILY NAME | Hirji |
| SIGNATURE | HIRJI S |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Pennsylvania |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-0440-2149 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 6 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 7 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 6 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2018 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2024 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Moral agency under oppression
In Huckleberry Finn, a thirteen‐year old white boy in antebellum Missouri escapes from his abusive father and befriends a runaway slave named Jim. On a familiar reading of the novel, both Huck and Jim are, in their own ways, morally impressive, transcending the unjust circumstances in which they find themselves in to treat each other as equals. Huck saves Jim's life from two men looking for runaway slaves, and later Jim risks his chance at freedo…
Oppressive Double Binds
I give an account of the structure of “oppressive double binds,” the double binds that exist in virtue of oppression. I explain how these double binds both are a product of and serve to reinforce oppressive structures. The central feature of double binds, I argue, is that an agent’s own prudential good is bound up with their ability to resist oppression; double binds are choice situations where no matter what an agent does, they become a mechanis…
External Goods and the Complete Exercise of Virtue in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics
In Nicomachean Ethics 1.8, Aristotle seems to argue that certain external goods are needed for happiness because, in the first place, they are needed for virtuous activity. This has puzzled scholars. After all, it seems possible for a virtuous agent to exercise her virtuous character even under conditions of extreme hardship or deprivation. Indeed, it is natural to think these are precisely the conditions under which one’s virtue shines through m…
Aristotle on the Uses of Contemplation
The activity of philosophy is thoroughly useless.This, at any rate, is the view typically attributed to Aristotle.Philosophical contemplation or theo ria, the ultimate end for human beings, consists in the active understanding of eternal and divine objects.Entirely disconnected from human affairs, it is an activity we can engage in only during times of leisure, free from the demands of our material, embodied condition.This conception of philosoph…
What's Aristotelian about neo‐Aristotelian Virtue Ethics
It is commonly assumed that Aristotle's ethical theory shares deep structural similarities with neo‐Aristotelian virtue ethics. I argue that this assumption is a mistake, and that Aristotle's ethical theory is both importantly distinct from the theories his work has inspired, and independently compelling. I take neo‐Aristotelian virtue ethics to be characterized by two central commitments: (i) virtues of character are defined as traits that relia…
Acting virtuously as an end in Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics
Sometimes, in the Nicomachean Ethics (NE), Aristotle describes virtuous actions as the sorts of actions that are ends; it is important for Aristotle to do so if he wants to maintain, as he seems to at least until NE 10.7–8, that virtuous actions are a constituent of eudaimonia. At other times, he claims that virtuous actions are the sorts of actions that are for the sake of ends beyond themselves; after all, no one would choose to go into battle …
What's Aristotelian about neo‐Aristotelian Virtue Ethics
It is commonly assumed that Aristotle's ethical theory shares deep structural similarities with neo‐Aristotelian virtue ethics. I argue that this assumption is a mistake, and that Aristotle's ethical theory is both importantly distinct from the theories his work has inspired, and independently compelling. I take neo‐Aristotelian virtue ethics to be characterized by two central commitments: (i) virtues of character are defined as traits that relia…
Acting virtuously as an end in Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics
Sometimes, in the Nicomachean Ethics (NE), Aristotle describes virtuous actions as the sorts of actions that are ends; it is important for Aristotle to do so if he wants to maintain, as he seems to at least until NE 10.7–8, that virtuous actions are a constituent of eudaimonia. At other times, he claims that virtuous actions are the sorts of actions that are for the sake of ends beyond themselves; after all, no one would choose to go into battle …
What's Aristotelian about neo‐Aristotelian Virtue Ethics
It is commonly assumed that Aristotle's ethical theory shares deep structural similarities with neo‐Aristotelian virtue ethics. I argue that this assumption is a mistake, and that Aristotle's ethical theory is both importantly distinct from the theories his work has inspired, and independently compelling. I take neo‐Aristotelian virtue ethics to be characterized by two central commitments: (i) virtues of character are defined as traits that relia…
Acting virtuously as an end in Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics
Sometimes, in the Nicomachean Ethics (NE), Aristotle describes virtuous actions as the sorts of actions that are ends; it is important for Aristotle to do so if he wants to maintain, as he seems to at least until NE 10.7–8, that virtuous actions are a constituent of eudaimonia. At other times, he claims that virtuous actions are the sorts of actions that are for the sake of ends beyond themselves; after all, no one would choose to go into battle …
Aristotle on the Uses of Contemplation
The activity of philosophy is thoroughly useless.This, at any rate, is the view typically attributed to Aristotle.Philosophical contemplation or theo ria, the ultimate end for human beings, consists in the active understanding of eternal and divine objects.Entirely disconnected from human affairs, it is an activity we can engage in only during times of leisure, free from the demands of our material, embodied condition.This conception of philosoph…
Oppressive Double Binds
I give an account of the structure of “oppressive double binds,” the double binds that exist in virtue of oppression. I explain how these double binds both are a product of and serve to reinforce oppressive structures. The central feature of double binds, I argue, is that an agent’s own prudential good is bound up with their ability to resist oppression; double binds are choice situations where no matter what an agent does, they become a mechanis…
External Goods and the Complete Exercise of Virtue in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics
In Nicomachean Ethics 1.8, Aristotle seems to argue that certain external goods are needed for happiness because, in the first place, they are needed for virtuous activity. This has puzzled scholars. After all, it seems possible for a virtuous agent to exercise her virtuous character even under conditions of extreme hardship or deprivation. Indeed, it is natural to think these are precisely the conditions under which one’s virtue shines through m…
Moral agency under oppression
In Huckleberry Finn, a thirteen‐year old white boy in antebellum Missouri escapes from his abusive father and befriends a runaway slave named Jim. On a familiar reading of the novel, both Huck and Jim are, in their own ways, morally impressive, transcending the unjust circumstances in which they find themselves in to treat each other as equals. Huck saves Jim's life from two men looking for runaway slaves, and later Jim risks his chance at freedo…
Epistemology (6 works) · Philosophy (5 works) · Political science (5 works) · Law (4 works) · Philosophical Ethics and Theory (4 works) · Computer Science (3 works) · Law (3 works) · Philosophy (3 works) · Virtue (3 works) · Virtue ethics (3 works)