Kenju Kamei
Biographic Data
| ID | 1204253 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Kenju Kamei |
| GIVEN NAMES | Kenju |
| FAMILY NAME | Kamei |
| SIGNATURE | KAMEI K |
| AFFILIATIONS | Keio University |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-8846-7120 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 4 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 2 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 4 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2016 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Collective sanction enforcement: New experimental evidence from two societies
Endogenous monitoring through voluntary reporting in an infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma game: Experimental evidence
Exogenous reputational information is known to improve cooperation. This study experimentally investigates how people create such information by reporting their partner's action choices, and whether endogenous monitoring helps to sustain cooperation, in an indefinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma game with random matching. The experimental results show that most subjects report their opponents' action choices, thereby successfully cooperating whe…
Play It Again: Partner Choice, Reputation Building and Learning From Finitely Repeated Dilemma Games
Often the fuller the reputational record people's actions generate, the greater their incentive to earn a reputation for cooperation. However, inability to “wipe clean” one's past record might trap some agents who initially underappreciate reputation's value in a cycle of bad behaviour, whereas a clean slate could have been followed by their “reforming” themselves. In a laboratory experiment, we investigate what subjects learn from playing a fini…
Promoting Competition or Helping the Less Endowed? Distributional Preferences and Collective Institutional Choices under Intragroup Inequality
Unequally distributed resources are ubiquitous. The decision of whether to promote competition or equality is often debated in societies and organizations. With heterogeneous endowments, we let subjects collectively choose between a public good that most benefits the less endowed and a lottery contest in which only one individual in a group receives a prize. Unlike standard theoretical predictions, the majority of subjects, including a substantia…
Play It Again: Partner Choice, Reputation Building and Learning From Finitely Repeated Dilemma Games
Often the fuller the reputational record people's actions generate, the greater their incentive to earn a reputation for cooperation. However, inability to “wipe clean” one's past record might trap some agents who initially underappreciate reputation's value in a cycle of bad behaviour, whereas a clean slate could have been followed by their “reforming” themselves. In a laboratory experiment, we investigate what subjects learn from playing a fini…
Promoting Competition or Helping the Less Endowed? Distributional Preferences and Collective Institutional Choices under Intragroup Inequality
Unequally distributed resources are ubiquitous. The decision of whether to promote competition or equality is often debated in societies and organizations. With heterogeneous endowments, we let subjects collectively choose between a public good that most benefits the less endowed and a lottery contest in which only one individual in a group receives a prize. Unlike standard theoretical predictions, the majority of subjects, including a substantia…
Promoting Competition or Helping the Less Endowed? Distributional Preferences and Collective Institutional Choices under Intragroup Inequality
Unequally distributed resources are ubiquitous. The decision of whether to promote competition or equality is often debated in societies and organizations. With heterogeneous endowments, we let subjects collectively choose between a public good that most benefits the less endowed and a lottery contest in which only one individual in a group receives a prize. Unlike standard theoretical predictions, the majority of subjects, including a substantia…
Play It Again: Partner Choice, Reputation Building and Learning From Finitely Repeated Dilemma Games
Often the fuller the reputational record people's actions generate, the greater their incentive to earn a reputation for cooperation. However, inability to “wipe clean” one's past record might trap some agents who initially underappreciate reputation's value in a cycle of bad behaviour, whereas a clean slate could have been followed by their “reforming” themselves. In a laboratory experiment, we investigate what subjects learn from playing a fini…
Endogenous monitoring through voluntary reporting in an infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma game: Experimental evidence
Exogenous reputational information is known to improve cooperation. This study experimentally investigates how people create such information by reporting their partner's action choices, and whether endogenous monitoring helps to sustain cooperation, in an indefinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma game with random matching. The experimental results show that most subjects report their opponents' action choices, thereby successfully cooperating whe…
Collective sanction enforcement: New experimental evidence from two societies
Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies (4 works) · Law (4 works) · Political science (4 works) · Culture, Economy, and Development Studies (3 works) · Economics (3 works) · Law (3 works) · Microeconomics (3 works) · Business (2 works) · Complete information (2 works) · Dilemma (2 works)