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Harold A Feiveson

Biographic Data

ID1211671
NAMEHarold A Feiveson
GIVEN NAMESHarold A
FAMILY NAMEFeiveson
SIGNATUREFEIVESON H A
AFFILIATIONSWoodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars
VERIFIEDNo
TOTAL WORKS7
TOTAL CITATIONS9
AUTHOR COUNT7
EDITOR COUNT0
FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR1977
LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR2009
H-INDEX2
  • A skeptic's view of nuclear energy

    Open Access•Harold A Feiveson•ARTICLE•Daedalus•2009•Cited by: 2

  • A Cutoff in the Production of Fissile Material

    Frans Berkhout, Oleg Bukharin et al.•ARTICLE•International Security•1994•Cited by: 2

    Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva is now considering a convention to prohibit the production of fissile material for weapons. While the UN General Assembly has consistently supported resolutions calling for such a cutoff since 1978, the recent discussions are principally the result of a proposal by President Clinton on September 27, 1993, for a {open_quotes}multilateral convention prohibiting the production of highly enriched uranium or pl…

  • Beyond START: How to Make Much Deeper Cuts

    Harold A Feiveson, Frank von Hippel et al.•ARTICLE•International Security•1990•Cited by: 3

  • A Low-Threshold Nuclear Test Ban

    Frank von Hippel, Frank N von Hippel et al.•ARTICLE•International Security•1987

  • Stopping the Sea-Based Counterforce Threat

    Harold A Feiveson, John S Duffield et al.•ARTICLE•International Security•1984

  • The Dilemma of Theater Nuclear Weapons

    Open Access•Harold A Feiveson•ARTICLE•World Politics•1981•Cited by: 1•References: 8

    Observers have recently challenged the fundamental tenets of NATO's nuclear doctrine, above all its potentially fateful threat—or bluff—to employ theater nuclear weapons to repel Soviet conventional attacks. One group of these commentators has come to view NATO theater nuclear weapons as an anachronism that is neither necessary for deterrence and defense nor usable under any prudent calculation. Another group envisages new weapons and new doctrin…

  • Nuclear Proliferation: Motivations, Capabilities, and Strategies for Control

    George H Quester, Ted Greenwood et al.•ARTICLE•Foreign Affairs•1977•Cited by: 1

    Two possible patterns of proliferation appear to involve the greatest risks for nuclear use or war. The first is proliferation to particular categories of states and the second dangerous possibility is proliferation at a rapid rate. But rapid proliferation could cause instabilities that might be too great for political systems and institutions to handle, making nuclear use of nuclear war more likely. Thus, any strategy for nonproliferation should…

  • Beyond START: How to Make Much Deeper Cuts

    Harold A Feiveson, Frank von Hippel et al.•ARTICLE•International Security•1990•Cited by: 3

  • A skeptic's view of nuclear energy

    Open Access•Harold A Feiveson•ARTICLE•Daedalus•2009•Cited by: 2

  • A Cutoff in the Production of Fissile Material

    Frans Berkhout, Oleg Bukharin et al.•ARTICLE•International Security•1994•Cited by: 2

    Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva is now considering a convention to prohibit the production of fissile material for weapons. While the UN General Assembly has consistently supported resolutions calling for such a cutoff since 1978, the recent discussions are principally the result of a proposal by President Clinton on September 27, 1993, for a {open_quotes}multilateral convention prohibiting the production of highly enriched uranium or pl…

  • The Dilemma of Theater Nuclear Weapons

    Open Access•Harold A Feiveson•ARTICLE•World Politics•1981•Cited by: 1•References: 8

    Observers have recently challenged the fundamental tenets of NATO's nuclear doctrine, above all its potentially fateful threat—or bluff—to employ theater nuclear weapons to repel Soviet conventional attacks. One group of these commentators has come to view NATO theater nuclear weapons as an anachronism that is neither necessary for deterrence and defense nor usable under any prudent calculation. Another group envisages new weapons and new doctrin…

  • Nuclear Proliferation: Motivations, Capabilities, and Strategies for Control

    George H Quester, Ted Greenwood et al.•ARTICLE•Foreign Affairs•1977•Cited by: 1

    Two possible patterns of proliferation appear to involve the greatest risks for nuclear use or war. The first is proliferation to particular categories of states and the second dangerous possibility is proliferation at a rapid rate. But rapid proliferation could cause instabilities that might be too great for political systems and institutions to handle, making nuclear use of nuclear war more likely. Thus, any strategy for nonproliferation should…

  • Nuclear Proliferation: Motivations, Capabilities, and Strategies for Control

    George H Quester, Ted Greenwood et al.•ARTICLE•Foreign Affairs•1977•Cited by: 1

    Two possible patterns of proliferation appear to involve the greatest risks for nuclear use or war. The first is proliferation to particular categories of states and the second dangerous possibility is proliferation at a rapid rate. But rapid proliferation could cause instabilities that might be too great for political systems and institutions to handle, making nuclear use of nuclear war more likely. Thus, any strategy for nonproliferation should…

  • The Dilemma of Theater Nuclear Weapons

    Open Access•Harold A Feiveson•ARTICLE•World Politics•1981•Cited by: 1•References: 8

    Observers have recently challenged the fundamental tenets of NATO's nuclear doctrine, above all its potentially fateful threat—or bluff—to employ theater nuclear weapons to repel Soviet conventional attacks. One group of these commentators has come to view NATO theater nuclear weapons as an anachronism that is neither necessary for deterrence and defense nor usable under any prudent calculation. Another group envisages new weapons and new doctrin…

  • Stopping the Sea-Based Counterforce Threat

    Harold A Feiveson, John S Duffield et al.•ARTICLE•International Security•1984

  • A Low-Threshold Nuclear Test Ban

    Frank von Hippel, Frank N von Hippel et al.•ARTICLE•International Security•1987

  • Beyond START: How to Make Much Deeper Cuts

    Harold A Feiveson, Frank von Hippel et al.•ARTICLE•International Security•1990•Cited by: 3

  • A Cutoff in the Production of Fissile Material

    Frans Berkhout, Oleg Bukharin et al.•ARTICLE•International Security•1994•Cited by: 2

    Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva is now considering a convention to prohibit the production of fissile material for weapons. While the UN General Assembly has consistently supported resolutions calling for such a cutoff since 1978, the recent discussions are principally the result of a proposal by President Clinton on September 27, 1993, for a {open_quotes}multilateral convention prohibiting the production of highly enriched uranium or pl…

  • A skeptic's view of nuclear energy

    Open Access•Harold A Feiveson•ARTICLE•Daedalus•2009•Cited by: 2

Political science (7 works) · Nuclear Issues and Defense (5 works) · Economics (4 works) · Nuclear and radioactivity studies (3 works) · Epistemology (2 works) · Graphite, nuclear technology, radiation studies (2 works) · Law (2 works) · Law (2 works) · Nuclear weapon (2 works) · Philosophy (2 works)

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