Aris Trantidis
Biographic Data
| ID | 1218983 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Aris Trantidis |
| GIVEN NAMES | Aris |
| FAMILY NAME | Trantidis |
| SIGNATURE | TRANTIDIS A |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Lincoln |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-3709-1201 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 17 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 76 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 17 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2014 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 6 |
The Problem of Governance
This essay critically examines Dan Greenwood’s Effective Governance and the Political Economy of Coordination. Greenwood’s book offers a compelling framework for evaluating government policy, drawing insights from the Austrian and Bloomington schools of political economy. His central argument is that governance is more effective at “steering” markets toward broad goals rather than directly providing goods and services. He builds this case on Haye…
Government externalities
Governments are expected to tackle externalities such as pollution, epidemics and environmental catastrophes, but whether and how governments themselves generate externalities is a question equally important for exploring socially beneficial policies and institutional reforms. The problem with defining government externalities is that governments, through regulation and distribution, inevitably allocate costs and benefits asymmetrically due to pr…
Progressive constitutional deliberation
Social inequalities fuel a debate about the meaning of political equality. Formal procedural equality is criticised for reproducing discriminatory outcomes against disadvantaged groups but affirmative action, particularly in the form of group quotas, is also contested. When opposing conceptions of substantive equality support divergent views about which procedural rule genuinely respects political equality, democracies cannot identify a standard …
Is Public Ignorance a Problem? An Epistemic Defense of Really Existing Democracies
Does good governance require citizens to be knowledgeable of basic facts and best policy ideas? Some scholars suggest that it does, and propose disenfranchising the most ‘ignorant’ voters. In contrast, we argue, political systems are complex systems inevitably exhibiting incomplete, imperfect and asymmetric information that is dynamically generated in society from actors with diverse life experiences, antagonistic interests and often profoundly d…
Fallacies of Democratic State-Building
This paper criticizes the epistemic foundations of democratic state-building, which are derived from a model of political transitions according to which liberal democratic institutions will transform a hitherto authoritarian and troubled country into a more prosperous and stable society and, therefore, foreign interventions to establish these institutions are realistic and worthy investments, provided they are properly planned based on knowledge …
Building an authoritarian regime
The article explores the conditions under which incumbent leaders in initially competitive political systems manage to offset democratic resistance and establish an authoritarian regime. Autocratisation – the transition from a competitive political system to a regime dominated by a single political force – is a challenging effort for an incumbent and involves interventions in three ‘arenas’ to achieve (a) public legitimation, (b) institutional re…
The Political Economy of Autocratization
In competitive authoritarian systems, aspiring autocrats must win elections and marginalize the political opposition. In Belarus, President Alexander Lukashenko’s strategy for political hegemony heavily relied on socioeconomic co-optation, offering privileges to supporters and imposing sanctions on dissenters. In an economy dominated by the state, co-optation had a coercive effect on behavior. Without sizable areas of activity autonomous from the…
Network origins of the global economy
Hilton Root's Network origins of the global economy applies the fundamentals of network science to inspire a seminal shift in political economy analysis and institutional economics. Emphasizing the importance of system-wide connectivity while juxtaposing the Chinese imperial dynasties with the European system of intermarried monarchies, Root examines five great transitions in global economics from the perspective of network structure. A number of…
Hayek versus Trump
Hayek’s The Road to Serfdom has been interpreted as a general warning against state intervention in the economy. We review this argument in conjunction with Hayek’s later work and discern an institutional thesis about which forms of state intervention and economic institutions could threaten personal and political freedom. Economic institutions pose a threat if they allow for coercive interventions as described by Hayek in The Constitution of Lib…
The problem of constitutional legitimation
Clientelism and corruption
How do strategies of state capture adapt to tight fiscal conditions? The article uses a historical institutionalist approach and content analysis to study the case of Greece. Three theoretically relevant patterns of institutional adaptation are unearthed: first, limited resources for state capture do indeed trigger self-limitation initiatives as expected, but these initiatives replace costly benefits with less costly ones. Second, different forms…
Is government contestability an integral part of the definition of democracy
Is government contestability an integral part of the definition of democracy? The answer to this question affects the way we classify political systems in which, despite a formally open political structure, a dominant political group faces weak opposition from other political parties and civil society organizations – an indication of a low degree of government contestability. In Robert Dahl’s polyarchy, contestability is an essential dimension of…
Clientelism and Economic Policy
With its deep economic crisis and dramatic political developments Greece has puzzled Europe and the world. What explains its long-standing problems and its incapacity to reform its economy? Using an analytic narrative and a comparative approach, the book studies the pattern of economic reforms in Greece between 1985 and 2015. It finds that clientelism - the allocation of selective benefits by political actors (patrons) to their supporters (client…
Is Age a Case for Electoral Quotas? A Benchmark for Affirmative Action in Politics
Is age a suitable case for electoral quotas on the same grounds invoked for women in politics? If affirmative action should not be arbitrarily applied to a few social groups, we must specify the conditions that could serve as a benchmark which a group must pass in order to qualify for its application. Drawing from the literature on women in politics, this article sets up empirical indicators to examine the political under-representation of younge…
Clientelism and the classification of dominant party systems
The view of clientelism as an abuse of state power casts doubt on the \ndemocratic credentials of highly clientelistic political systems. The question \nis particularly relevant for the classification of dominant party systems that \nheavily rely on clientelism to elicit popular support and retain a relatively \nopen structure of participation. Knowing that clientelism is a widespread \npractice in modern democracies too, how do we evaluate the i…
Clientelism and economic policy
How does clientelism affect policy-making? Can patrons in government discard groups of clients in order to pursue reforms in conditions of crisis? The article argues that clientelism goes beyond the exchange of votes and may permeate organizations with the capacity for collective action such as labour unions. This merger gives rise to a clientelist-collective system that changes both patron-client relations and the context of collective action wi…
Reforms and Collective Action in a Clientelist System
Economic reforms face a collective action problem: they trigger the reaction of groups that expect significant losses, while the government must forge a support coalition among those who anticipate gains. This problem may exhibit a distinct pattern in a clientelist system, when the affected groups are client groups attached to political party networks. The case of the Mitsotakis government in Greece (1990–93) illustrates that collective reaction …
Clientelism and the classification of dominant party systems
The view of clientelism as an abuse of state power casts doubt on the \ndemocratic credentials of highly clientelistic political systems. The question \nis particularly relevant for the classification of dominant party systems that \nheavily rely on clientelism to elicit popular support and retain a relatively \nopen structure of participation. Knowing that clientelism is a widespread \npractice in modern democracies too, how do we evaluate the i…
Clientelism and corruption
How do strategies of state capture adapt to tight fiscal conditions? The article uses a historical institutionalist approach and content analysis to study the case of Greece. Three theoretically relevant patterns of institutional adaptation are unearthed: first, limited resources for state capture do indeed trigger self-limitation initiatives as expected, but these initiatives replace costly benefits with less costly ones. Second, different forms…
Building an authoritarian regime
The article explores the conditions under which incumbent leaders in initially competitive political systems manage to offset democratic resistance and establish an authoritarian regime. Autocratisation – the transition from a competitive political system to a regime dominated by a single political force – is a challenging effort for an incumbent and involves interventions in three ‘arenas’ to achieve (a) public legitimation, (b) institutional re…
Is government contestability an integral part of the definition of democracy
Is government contestability an integral part of the definition of democracy? The answer to this question affects the way we classify political systems in which, despite a formally open political structure, a dominant political group faces weak opposition from other political parties and civil society organizations – an indication of a low degree of government contestability. In Robert Dahl’s polyarchy, contestability is an essential dimension of…
Clientelism and economic policy
How does clientelism affect policy-making? Can patrons in government discard groups of clients in order to pursue reforms in conditions of crisis? The article argues that clientelism goes beyond the exchange of votes and may permeate organizations with the capacity for collective action such as labour unions. This merger gives rise to a clientelist-collective system that changes both patron-client relations and the context of collective action wi…
Is Age a Case for Electoral Quotas? A Benchmark for Affirmative Action in Politics
Is age a suitable case for electoral quotas on the same grounds invoked for women in politics? If affirmative action should not be arbitrarily applied to a few social groups, we must specify the conditions that could serve as a benchmark which a group must pass in order to qualify for its application. Drawing from the literature on women in politics, this article sets up empirical indicators to examine the political under-representation of younge…
Government externalities
Governments are expected to tackle externalities such as pollution, epidemics and environmental catastrophes, but whether and how governments themselves generate externalities is a question equally important for exploring socially beneficial policies and institutional reforms. The problem with defining government externalities is that governments, through regulation and distribution, inevitably allocate costs and benefits asymmetrically due to pr…
Reforms and Collective Action in a Clientelist System
Economic reforms face a collective action problem: they trigger the reaction of groups that expect significant losses, while the government must forge a support coalition among those who anticipate gains. This problem may exhibit a distinct pattern in a clientelist system, when the affected groups are client groups attached to political party networks. The case of the Mitsotakis government in Greece (1990–93) illustrates that collective reaction …
Hayek versus Trump
Hayek’s The Road to Serfdom has been interpreted as a general warning against state intervention in the economy. We review this argument in conjunction with Hayek’s later work and discern an institutional thesis about which forms of state intervention and economic institutions could threaten personal and political freedom. Economic institutions pose a threat if they allow for coercive interventions as described by Hayek in The Constitution of Lib…
Is Public Ignorance a Problem? An Epistemic Defense of Really Existing Democracies
Does good governance require citizens to be knowledgeable of basic facts and best policy ideas? Some scholars suggest that it does, and propose disenfranchising the most ‘ignorant’ voters. In contrast, we argue, political systems are complex systems inevitably exhibiting incomplete, imperfect and asymmetric information that is dynamically generated in society from actors with diverse life experiences, antagonistic interests and often profoundly d…
The Political Economy of Autocratization
In competitive authoritarian systems, aspiring autocrats must win elections and marginalize the political opposition. In Belarus, President Alexander Lukashenko’s strategy for political hegemony heavily relied on socioeconomic co-optation, offering privileges to supporters and imposing sanctions on dissenters. In an economy dominated by the state, co-optation had a coercive effect on behavior. Without sizable areas of activity autonomous from the…
Fallacies of Democratic State-Building
This paper criticizes the epistemic foundations of democratic state-building, which are derived from a model of political transitions according to which liberal democratic institutions will transform a hitherto authoritarian and troubled country into a more prosperous and stable society and, therefore, foreign interventions to establish these institutions are realistic and worthy investments, provided they are properly planned based on knowledge …
Progressive constitutional deliberation
Social inequalities fuel a debate about the meaning of political equality. Formal procedural equality is criticised for reproducing discriminatory outcomes against disadvantaged groups but affirmative action, particularly in the form of group quotas, is also contested. When opposing conceptions of substantive equality support divergent views about which procedural rule genuinely respects political equality, democracies cannot identify a standard …
The problem of constitutional legitimation
Reforms and Collective Action in a Clientelist System
Economic reforms face a collective action problem: they trigger the reaction of groups that expect significant losses, while the government must forge a support coalition among those who anticipate gains. This problem may exhibit a distinct pattern in a clientelist system, when the affected groups are client groups attached to political party networks. The case of the Mitsotakis government in Greece (1990–93) illustrates that collective reaction …
Clientelism and the classification of dominant party systems
The view of clientelism as an abuse of state power casts doubt on the \ndemocratic credentials of highly clientelistic political systems. The question \nis particularly relevant for the classification of dominant party systems that \nheavily rely on clientelism to elicit popular support and retain a relatively \nopen structure of participation. Knowing that clientelism is a widespread \npractice in modern democracies too, how do we evaluate the i…
Clientelism and economic policy
How does clientelism affect policy-making? Can patrons in government discard groups of clients in order to pursue reforms in conditions of crisis? The article argues that clientelism goes beyond the exchange of votes and may permeate organizations with the capacity for collective action such as labour unions. This merger gives rise to a clientelist-collective system that changes both patron-client relations and the context of collective action wi…
Clientelism and Economic Policy
With its deep economic crisis and dramatic political developments Greece has puzzled Europe and the world. What explains its long-standing problems and its incapacity to reform its economy? Using an analytic narrative and a comparative approach, the book studies the pattern of economic reforms in Greece between 1985 and 2015. It finds that clientelism - the allocation of selective benefits by political actors (patrons) to their supporters (client…
Is Age a Case for Electoral Quotas? A Benchmark for Affirmative Action in Politics
Is age a suitable case for electoral quotas on the same grounds invoked for women in politics? If affirmative action should not be arbitrarily applied to a few social groups, we must specify the conditions that could serve as a benchmark which a group must pass in order to qualify for its application. Drawing from the literature on women in politics, this article sets up empirical indicators to examine the political under-representation of younge…
The problem of constitutional legitimation
Clientelism and corruption
How do strategies of state capture adapt to tight fiscal conditions? The article uses a historical institutionalist approach and content analysis to study the case of Greece. Three theoretically relevant patterns of institutional adaptation are unearthed: first, limited resources for state capture do indeed trigger self-limitation initiatives as expected, but these initiatives replace costly benefits with less costly ones. Second, different forms…
Is government contestability an integral part of the definition of democracy
Is government contestability an integral part of the definition of democracy? The answer to this question affects the way we classify political systems in which, despite a formally open political structure, a dominant political group faces weak opposition from other political parties and civil society organizations – an indication of a low degree of government contestability. In Robert Dahl’s polyarchy, contestability is an essential dimension of…
Network origins of the global economy
Hilton Root's Network origins of the global economy applies the fundamentals of network science to inspire a seminal shift in political economy analysis and institutional economics. Emphasizing the importance of system-wide connectivity while juxtaposing the Chinese imperial dynasties with the European system of intermarried monarchies, Root examines five great transitions in global economics from the perspective of network structure. A number of…
Hayek versus Trump
Hayek’s The Road to Serfdom has been interpreted as a general warning against state intervention in the economy. We review this argument in conjunction with Hayek’s later work and discern an institutional thesis about which forms of state intervention and economic institutions could threaten personal and political freedom. Economic institutions pose a threat if they allow for coercive interventions as described by Hayek in The Constitution of Lib…
Building an authoritarian regime
The article explores the conditions under which incumbent leaders in initially competitive political systems manage to offset democratic resistance and establish an authoritarian regime. Autocratisation – the transition from a competitive political system to a regime dominated by a single political force – is a challenging effort for an incumbent and involves interventions in three ‘arenas’ to achieve (a) public legitimation, (b) institutional re…
The Political Economy of Autocratization
In competitive authoritarian systems, aspiring autocrats must win elections and marginalize the political opposition. In Belarus, President Alexander Lukashenko’s strategy for political hegemony heavily relied on socioeconomic co-optation, offering privileges to supporters and imposing sanctions on dissenters. In an economy dominated by the state, co-optation had a coercive effect on behavior. Without sizable areas of activity autonomous from the…
Fallacies of Democratic State-Building
This paper criticizes the epistemic foundations of democratic state-building, which are derived from a model of political transitions according to which liberal democratic institutions will transform a hitherto authoritarian and troubled country into a more prosperous and stable society and, therefore, foreign interventions to establish these institutions are realistic and worthy investments, provided they are properly planned based on knowledge …
Government externalities
Governments are expected to tackle externalities such as pollution, epidemics and environmental catastrophes, but whether and how governments themselves generate externalities is a question equally important for exploring socially beneficial policies and institutional reforms. The problem with defining government externalities is that governments, through regulation and distribution, inevitably allocate costs and benefits asymmetrically due to pr…
Progressive constitutional deliberation
Social inequalities fuel a debate about the meaning of political equality. Formal procedural equality is criticised for reproducing discriminatory outcomes against disadvantaged groups but affirmative action, particularly in the form of group quotas, is also contested. When opposing conceptions of substantive equality support divergent views about which procedural rule genuinely respects political equality, democracies cannot identify a standard …
Is Public Ignorance a Problem? An Epistemic Defense of Really Existing Democracies
Does good governance require citizens to be knowledgeable of basic facts and best policy ideas? Some scholars suggest that it does, and propose disenfranchising the most ‘ignorant’ voters. In contrast, we argue, political systems are complex systems inevitably exhibiting incomplete, imperfect and asymmetric information that is dynamically generated in society from actors with diverse life experiences, antagonistic interests and often profoundly d…
The Problem of Governance
This essay critically examines Dan Greenwood’s Effective Governance and the Political Economy of Coordination. Greenwood’s book offers a compelling framework for evaluating government policy, drawing insights from the Austrian and Bloomington schools of political economy. His central argument is that governance is more effective at “steering” markets toward broad goals rather than directly providing goods and services. He builds this case on Haye…
Political science (17 works) · Law (16 works) · Politics (16 works) · Economics (13 works) · Law (13 works) · Democracy (11 works) · Political economy (11 works) · Law and economics (9 works) · Sociology (9 works) · Political Philosophy and Ethics (6 works)