Vincent Conitzer
Biographic Data
| ID | 1224591 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Vincent Conitzer |
| GIVEN NAMES | Vincent |
| FAMILY NAME | Conitzer |
| SIGNATURE | CONITZER V |
| AFFILIATIONS | Duke University |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-1899-7884 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 7 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 3 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 7 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2012 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2020 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
The Personalized A-Theory of Time and Perspective
A-theorists and B-theorists debate whether the "Now" is metaphysically distinguished from other time slices. Analogously, one may ask whether the "I" is metaphysically distinguished from other perspectives. Few philosophers would answer the second question in the affirmative. An exception is Caspar Hare, who has devoted two papers and a book to arguing for such a positive answer. In this paper, I argue that those who answer the first question in …
Crying about a strategic wolf
Extracting Money from Causal Decision Theorists
Newcomb’s problem has spawned a debate about which variant of expected utility maximisation (if any) should guide rational choice. In this paper, we provide a new argument against what is probably the most popular variant: causal decision theory (CDT). In particular, we provide two scenarios in which CDT voluntarily loses money. In the first, an agent faces a single choice and following CDT’s recommendation yields a loss of money in expectation. …
On Stackelberg mixed strategies
A Dutch book against sleeping beauties who are evidential decision theorists
Can rational choice guide us to correct de se beliefs
Should social network structure be taken into account in elections
Should social network structure be taken into account in elections
A Dutch book against sleeping beauties who are evidential decision theorists
Can rational choice guide us to correct de se beliefs
On Stackelberg mixed strategies
The Personalized A-Theory of Time and Perspective
A-theorists and B-theorists debate whether the "Now" is metaphysically distinguished from other time slices. Analogously, one may ask whether the "I" is metaphysically distinguished from other perspectives. Few philosophers would answer the second question in the affirmative. An exception is Caspar Hare, who has devoted two papers and a book to arguing for such a positive answer. In this paper, I argue that those who answer the first question in …
Crying about a strategic wolf
Extracting Money from Causal Decision Theorists
Newcomb’s problem has spawned a debate about which variant of expected utility maximisation (if any) should guide rational choice. In this paper, we provide a new argument against what is probably the most popular variant: causal decision theory (CDT). In particular, we provide two scenarios in which CDT voluntarily loses money. In the first, an agent faces a single choice and following CDT’s recommendation yields a loss of money in expectation. …
Computer Science (4 works) · Economics (4 works) · Artificial Intelligence (3 works) · Game Theory and Applications (3 works) · Microeconomics (3 works) · Philosophy of language (3 works) · Action (physics) (2 works) · Artificial Intelligence (2 works) · Decision theory (2 works) · Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics (2 works)