Anthony S Gillies
Biographic Data
| ID | 1225534 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Anthony S Gillies |
| GIVEN NAMES | Anthony S |
| FAMILY NAME | Gillies |
| SIGNATURE | GILLIES A S |
| AFFILIATIONS | Rutgers, the State University of New Jersey |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-2978-223X |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 7 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 43 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 7 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2000 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2021 |
| H-INDEX | 3 |
Still going strong
Iffiness
How do ordinary indicative conditionals manage to convey conditional information, information about what might or must be if such-and-such is or turns out to be the case? An old school thesis is that they do this by expressing something iffy: ordinary indicatives express a two-place conditional operator and that is how they convey conditional information. How indicatives interact with epistemic modals seems to be an argument against iffiness and …
On Truth-Conditions for If (but Not Quite Only If )
What we want to be true about ordinary indicative conditionals seems to be more than we can possibly get: there just seems to be no good way to assign truth-conditions to ordinary indicative conditionals. Some take this argument as reason to make our wantings more modest. Others take it to show that indicative conditionals don't have truth-conditions in the first place. But we have overlooked two possibilities for assigning truth-conditions to in…
CIA Leaks
Epistemic modals are standardly taken to be context-dependent quantifiers over possibilities. Thus sentences containing them get truth-values with respect to both a context and an index. But some insist that this relativization is not relative enough: `might'-claims, they say, only get truth-values with respect to contexts, indices, and—the new wrinkle—points of assessment (hence, cia). Here we argue against such “relativist” semantics. We begin …
New foundations for epistemic change
Consciousness and the Limits of Our Imaginations
Belief Revision And Epistemology
CIA Leaks
Epistemic modals are standardly taken to be context-dependent quantifiers over possibilities. Thus sentences containing them get truth-values with respect to both a context and an index. But some insist that this relativization is not relative enough: `might'-claims, they say, only get truth-values with respect to contexts, indices, and—the new wrinkle—points of assessment (hence, cia). Here we argue against such “relativist” semantics. We begin …
On Truth-Conditions for If (but Not Quite Only If )
What we want to be true about ordinary indicative conditionals seems to be more than we can possibly get: there just seems to be no good way to assign truth-conditions to ordinary indicative conditionals. Some take this argument as reason to make our wantings more modest. Others take it to show that indicative conditionals don't have truth-conditions in the first place. But we have overlooked two possibilities for assigning truth-conditions to in…
Still going strong
Belief Revision And Epistemology
New foundations for epistemic change
Consciousness and the Limits of Our Imaginations
Belief Revision And Epistemology
Consciousness and the Limits of Our Imaginations
New foundations for epistemic change
CIA Leaks
Epistemic modals are standardly taken to be context-dependent quantifiers over possibilities. Thus sentences containing them get truth-values with respect to both a context and an index. But some insist that this relativization is not relative enough: `might'-claims, they say, only get truth-values with respect to contexts, indices, and—the new wrinkle—points of assessment (hence, cia). Here we argue against such “relativist” semantics. We begin …
On Truth-Conditions for If (but Not Quite Only If )
What we want to be true about ordinary indicative conditionals seems to be more than we can possibly get: there just seems to be no good way to assign truth-conditions to ordinary indicative conditionals. Some take this argument as reason to make our wantings more modest. Others take it to show that indicative conditionals don't have truth-conditions in the first place. But we have overlooked two possibilities for assigning truth-conditions to in…
Iffiness
How do ordinary indicative conditionals manage to convey conditional information, information about what might or must be if such-and-such is or turns out to be the case? An old school thesis is that they do this by expressing something iffy: ordinary indicatives express a two-place conditional operator and that is how they convey conditional information. How indicatives interact with epistemic modals seems to be an argument against iffiness and …
Still going strong
Epistemology (7 works) · Philosophy (7 works) · Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge (5 works) · Linguistics (4 works) · Metaphysics (4 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (4 works) · Philosophy of language (4 works) · Philosophy of science (4 works) · Computer Science (3 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (3 works)