Peter Van Elswyk
Datos Biográficos
| ID | 1228261 |
|---|---|
| NOMBRE | Peter Van Elswyk |
| NOMBRES | Peter |
| APELLIDO | Van Elswyk |
| FIRMA | VAN ELSWYK P |
| AFILIACIONES | Northwestern University |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-5618-4652 |
| VERIFICADO | Sí |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 14 |
| TOTAL DE CITAS | 14 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 14 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMER AÑO DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2018 |
| AÑO MÁS RECIENTE DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2026 |
| ÍNDICE H | 2 |
Moore perspective-taking
The philosopher G.E. Moore first observed that making a statement and then denying that one knows or believes that statement is unacceptable. For example, It is raining, but I don't think that is defective. Across six experiments (n = 600), this study investigates the nature and extent of this unacceptability as a way to adjudicate between alternative theoretical explanations of this defectiveness. Results confirm that Moorean conjunctions are ju…
Veridicality and the acquisition of think
Hedging and the Norm of Belief
We argue that knowledge is not the norm of belief given that ‘I believe’ is used to hedge. We explore the consequences of this argument for the normative relationship between belief and assertion
Assertoric mindreading
This essay offers an explanation of how assertions express that the speaker has a propositional attitude toward what's asserted. The explanation is that this feature of assertion is owed to a hearer's spontaneous mindreading. I call this the assertoric mindreading hypothesis . Once developed and defended, the hypothesis is used to investigate which attitude is expressed. Since the attitude expressed is the attitude tracked during mindreading, the…
Hedging in Discourse
Asking Expresses a Desire to Know
A speaker's use of a sentence does more than contribute content to a conversation. It also expresses the speaker's attitude. This essay is about which attitude or attitudes are expressed by using an interrogative sentence to ask a question. With reference to eight lines of data about how questions are circulated in conversation, it is argued that a desire to know the question's answer(s) is expressed
Assertion remains strong
Hedged testimony
Speakers offer testimony. They also hedge. This essay offers an account of how hedging makes a difference to testimony. Two components of testimony are considered: how testimony warrants a hearer's attitude, and how testimony changes a speaker's responsibilities. Starting with a norm‐based approach to testimony where hearer's beliefs are prima facie warranted because of social norms and speakers acquire responsibility from these same norms, I arg…
Expressing belief with evidentials
Why animalism matters
Generic Animalism
The animalist says we are animals. This thesis is commonly understood as the universal generalization that all human persons are human animals. This article proposes an alternative: the thesis is a generic that admits of exceptions. We defend the resulting view, which we call ‘generic animalism’, and show its aptitude for diagnosing the limits of eight case-based objections to animalism
Hedging and the ignorance norm on inquiry
Representing Knowledge
A speaker's use of a declarative sentence in a context has two effects: it expresses a proposition and represents the speaker as knowing that proposition. This article is about how to explain the second effect. The standard explanation is act-based. A speaker is represented as knowing because their use of a declarative in a context tokens the act-type of assertion and assertions represent knowledge in what's asserted. In this article, a semantic …
Contrast and Constitution
The pluralist about material constitution maintains that a lump of clay is not identical with the statue it constitutes. Although pluralism strikes many as extravagant by requiring distinct things to coincide, it can be defended with a simple argument. The monist is less well off. Typically, she has to argue indirectly for her view by finding problems with the pluralist's extravagance. This paper offers a direct argument for monism that illustrat…
Hedging and the ignorance norm on inquiry
Representing Knowledge
A speaker's use of a declarative sentence in a context has two effects: it expresses a proposition and represents the speaker as knowing that proposition. This article is about how to explain the second effect. The standard explanation is act-based. A speaker is represented as knowing because their use of a declarative in a context tokens the act-type of assertion and assertions represent knowledge in what's asserted. In this article, a semantic …
Expressing belief with evidentials
Asking Expresses a Desire to Know
A speaker's use of a sentence does more than contribute content to a conversation. It also expresses the speaker's attitude. This essay is about which attitude or attitudes are expressed by using an interrogative sentence to ask a question. With reference to eight lines of data about how questions are circulated in conversation, it is argued that a desire to know the question's answer(s) is expressed
Contrast and Constitution
The pluralist about material constitution maintains that a lump of clay is not identical with the statue it constitutes. Although pluralism strikes many as extravagant by requiring distinct things to coincide, it can be defended with a simple argument. The monist is less well off. Typically, she has to argue indirectly for her view by finding problems with the pluralist's extravagance. This paper offers a direct argument for monism that illustrat…
Why animalism matters
Generic Animalism
The animalist says we are animals. This thesis is commonly understood as the universal generalization that all human persons are human animals. This article proposes an alternative: the thesis is a generic that admits of exceptions. We defend the resulting view, which we call ‘generic animalism’, and show its aptitude for diagnosing the limits of eight case-based objections to animalism
Hedging and the ignorance norm on inquiry
Representing Knowledge
A speaker's use of a declarative sentence in a context has two effects: it expresses a proposition and represents the speaker as knowing that proposition. This article is about how to explain the second effect. The standard explanation is act-based. A speaker is represented as knowing because their use of a declarative in a context tokens the act-type of assertion and assertions represent knowledge in what's asserted. In this article, a semantic …
Assertion remains strong
Hedged testimony
Speakers offer testimony. They also hedge. This essay offers an account of how hedging makes a difference to testimony. Two components of testimony are considered: how testimony warrants a hearer's attitude, and how testimony changes a speaker's responsibilities. Starting with a norm‐based approach to testimony where hearer's beliefs are prima facie warranted because of social norms and speakers acquire responsibility from these same norms, I arg…
Expressing belief with evidentials
Hedging in Discourse
Asking Expresses a Desire to Know
A speaker's use of a sentence does more than contribute content to a conversation. It also expresses the speaker's attitude. This essay is about which attitude or attitudes are expressed by using an interrogative sentence to ask a question. With reference to eight lines of data about how questions are circulated in conversation, it is argued that a desire to know the question's answer(s) is expressed
Veridicality and the acquisition of think
Hedging and the Norm of Belief
We argue that knowledge is not the norm of belief given that ‘I believe’ is used to hedge. We explore the consequences of this argument for the normative relationship between belief and assertion
Assertoric mindreading
This essay offers an explanation of how assertions express that the speaker has a propositional attitude toward what's asserted. The explanation is that this feature of assertion is owed to a hearer's spontaneous mindreading. I call this the assertoric mindreading hypothesis . Once developed and defended, the hypothesis is used to investigate which attitude is expressed. Since the attitude expressed is the attitude tracked during mindreading, the…
Moore perspective-taking
The philosopher G.E. Moore first observed that making a statement and then denying that one knows or believes that statement is unacceptable. For example, It is raining, but I don't think that is defective. Across six experiments (n = 600), this study investigates the nature and extent of this unacceptability as a way to adjudicate between alternative theoretical explanations of this defectiveness. Results confirm that Moorean conjunctions are ju…
Philosophy (13 obras) · Epistemology (10 obras) · Psychology (7 obras) · Computer Science (6 obras) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (6 obras) · Language, Discourse, Communication Strategies (6 obras) · Linguistics (6 obras) · Metaphysics (5 obras) · Philosophy of language (5 obras) · Child and Animal Learning Development (3 obras)