Manuel Heras-Escribano
Biographic Data
| ID | 1228480 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Manuel Heras-Escribano |
| GIVEN NAMES | Manuel |
| FAMILY NAME | Heras-Escribano |
| SIGNATURE | HERAS-ESCRIBANO M |
| AFFILIATIONS | Universidad de Granada |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-5955-9947 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 10 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 30 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 10 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2018 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 3 |
Lived experience and the naturalization of bodily experience
In this paper we defend the idea that ecological psychology is in a good position for making sense of bodily experience by naturalizing some of the most important features of Husserlian lived experience, such as kinesthetics or proprioception. Some postcognitivist researchers have suggested that the notion of lived experience, originated in Husserl’s phenomenological project, is fundamental to make sense of the concept of bodily experience. Recen…
The Emergence of Ur-Intentionality
Radical enactivism supports radical embodied cognition (REC), which is the idea that basic or fundamental cognition (perception and action) does not need to be understood in representational, contentful terms. REC departs from the idea that the mind can be naturalized through biological functions, but rejects the idea that mental content, which is understood as having a representational nature, can be naturalized. For REC, the natural origins of …
The risk of trivializing affordances
In the last years, we have attended to different attempts to extend the notion of affordance to include mental or cognitive actions. In short, the idea is that our capacity to perform some cognitive functions such as counting, imagining, mathematical reasoning, and so on, is preceded by our awareness of cognitive or mental affordances. In this paper, we analyze two of these attempts, Mental Affordance Hypothesis, and cognitive horizons, and concl…
Places, Sociality, and Ecological Psychology
Pragmatism, enactivism, and ecological psychology
Neither mindful nor mindless, but minded
A widely shared assumption in the literature about skilled motor behavior is that any action that is not blindly automatic and mechanical must be the product of computational processes upon mental representations. To counter this assumption, in this paper we offer a radical embodied (non-representational) account of skilled action that combines ecological psychology and the Deweyan theory of habits. According to our proposal, skilful performance …
Social Cognition
The Philosophy of Affordances
Naturalism, non-factualism, and normative situated behaviour
This paper argues that the normative character of our unreflective situated behaviour is not factual. We highlight a problematic assumption shared by the two most influential trends in contemporary philosophy of cognitive science, reductionism and enactivism. Our intentional, normative explanations are referential, descriptive or factual. Underneath this assumption lies the idea that only facts can make true or false our attributions of cognitive…
Affordances and Landscapes
In this paper we reject the nature-culture dichotomy by means of the idea of affordance or possibility for action, which has important implications for landscape theory. Our hypothesis is that, just as the idea of affordance can serve to overcome the subjective-objective dichotomy, the ideas of landscape and ecological niche, properly defined, would allow us to also transcend the nature-culture dichotomy. First, we introduce an overview of landsc…
Pragmatism, enactivism, and ecological psychology
Affordances and Landscapes
In this paper we reject the nature-culture dichotomy by means of the idea of affordance or possibility for action, which has important implications for landscape theory. Our hypothesis is that, just as the idea of affordance can serve to overcome the subjective-objective dichotomy, the ideas of landscape and ecological niche, properly defined, would allow us to also transcend the nature-culture dichotomy. First, we introduce an overview of landsc…
Neither mindful nor mindless, but minded
A widely shared assumption in the literature about skilled motor behavior is that any action that is not blindly automatic and mechanical must be the product of computational processes upon mental representations. To counter this assumption, in this paper we offer a radical embodied (non-representational) account of skilled action that combines ecological psychology and the Deweyan theory of habits. According to our proposal, skilful performance …
Naturalism, non-factualism, and normative situated behaviour
This paper argues that the normative character of our unreflective situated behaviour is not factual. We highlight a problematic assumption shared by the two most influential trends in contemporary philosophy of cognitive science, reductionism and enactivism. Our intentional, normative explanations are referential, descriptive or factual. Underneath this assumption lies the idea that only facts can make true or false our attributions of cognitive…
Naturalism, non-factualism, and normative situated behaviour
This paper argues that the normative character of our unreflective situated behaviour is not factual. We highlight a problematic assumption shared by the two most influential trends in contemporary philosophy of cognitive science, reductionism and enactivism. Our intentional, normative explanations are referential, descriptive or factual. Underneath this assumption lies the idea that only facts can make true or false our attributions of cognitive…
Affordances and Landscapes
In this paper we reject the nature-culture dichotomy by means of the idea of affordance or possibility for action, which has important implications for landscape theory. Our hypothesis is that, just as the idea of affordance can serve to overcome the subjective-objective dichotomy, the ideas of landscape and ecological niche, properly defined, would allow us to also transcend the nature-culture dichotomy. First, we introduce an overview of landsc…
Social Cognition
The Philosophy of Affordances
Pragmatism, enactivism, and ecological psychology
Neither mindful nor mindless, but minded
A widely shared assumption in the literature about skilled motor behavior is that any action that is not blindly automatic and mechanical must be the product of computational processes upon mental representations. To counter this assumption, in this paper we offer a radical embodied (non-representational) account of skilled action that combines ecological psychology and the Deweyan theory of habits. According to our proposal, skilful performance …
Places, Sociality, and Ecological Psychology
The Emergence of Ur-Intentionality
Radical enactivism supports radical embodied cognition (REC), which is the idea that basic or fundamental cognition (perception and action) does not need to be understood in representational, contentful terms. REC departs from the idea that the mind can be naturalized through biological functions, but rejects the idea that mental content, which is understood as having a representational nature, can be naturalized. For REC, the natural origins of …
The risk of trivializing affordances
In the last years, we have attended to different attempts to extend the notion of affordance to include mental or cognitive actions. In short, the idea is that our capacity to perform some cognitive functions such as counting, imagining, mathematical reasoning, and so on, is preceded by our awareness of cognitive or mental affordances. In this paper, we analyze two of these attempts, Mental Affordance Hypothesis, and cognitive horizons, and concl…
Lived experience and the naturalization of bodily experience
In this paper we defend the idea that ecological psychology is in a good position for making sense of bodily experience by naturalizing some of the most important features of Husserlian lived experience, such as kinesthetics or proprioception. Some postcognitivist researchers have suggested that the notion of lived experience, originated in Husserl’s phenomenological project, is fundamental to make sense of the concept of bodily experience. Recen…
Psychology (9 works) · Embodied and Extended Cognition (8 works) · Cognitive science (7 works) · Epistemology (7 works) · Cognitive psychology (6 works) · Affordance (5 works) · Philosophy (5 works) · Cognition (4 works) · Computer Science (4 works) · Ecological psychology (4 works)