Gloria Andrada
Biographic Data
| ID | 1229977 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Gloria Andrada |
| GIVEN NAMES | Gloria |
| FAMILY NAME | Andrada |
| SIGNATURE | ANDRADA G |
| AFFILIATIONS | Universidade Nova de Lisboa |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-2320-9176 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 7 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 4 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 7 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2021 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Mind-Technology Problems for Know-How Anti-Intellectualism
Clowes, Gärtner, and Hipólito (2021) describe the Mind-Technology Problem as a new constellation of philosophical problems about the nature of mind generated by advances in technology we increasingly rely on to meet both theoretical and practical aims. We agree with Clowes, Gärtner, and Hipólito that the problems they identify frame a timely and worthwhile new research programme. We aim to contribute to this research programme by motivating and c…
Does know-how need to be autonomous
In chapter 4 of Autonomous Knowledge: Radical Enhancement, Autonomy and the Future of Knowing (OUP, 2021), Carter takes on the question of whether there is an epistemic autonomy condition on know-how, e.g. one that might rule out cases of radical performance enhancement as genuine cases of know-how. In this paper, I examine Carter’s proposal and identify an asymmetry in the way his epistemic autonomy condition is applied to enhanced and non-enhan…
Intentional action, knowledge, and cognitive extension
Intentional actions exhibit control in a way that mere lucky successes do not. A longstanding tradition in action theory characterizes actional control in terms of the knowledge with which one acts when acting intentionally. Given that action theorists, no less than epistemologists, typically take for granted the orthodox thesis that knowledge is in the head (viz., realized exclusively by brainbound cognition), the idea that intentional action is…
Extending knowledge-how
This paper examines what it takes for a state of knowledge-how to be extended (i.e. partly constituted by entities external to the organism) within an anti-intellectualist approach to knowledge-how. I begin by examining an account of extended knowledge-how developed by Carter, J. Adam, and Boleslaw Czarnecki. 2016 [“Extended Knowledge-How.” Erkenntnis 81 (2): 259–273], and argue that it fails to properly distinguish between cognitive outsourcing …
Varieties of transparency: Exploring agency within AI systems
Phenomenal transparency and the extended mind
Proponents of the extended mind have suggested that phenomenal transparency may be important to the way we evaluate putative cases of cognitive extension. In particular, it has been suggested that in order for a bio-external resource to count as part of the machinery of the mind, it must qualify as a form of transparent equipment or transparent technology. The present paper challenges this claim. It also challenges the idea that phenomenological …
Mind the notebook
Phenomenal transparency and the extended mind
Proponents of the extended mind have suggested that phenomenal transparency may be important to the way we evaluate putative cases of cognitive extension. In particular, it has been suggested that in order for a bio-external resource to count as part of the machinery of the mind, it must qualify as a form of transparent equipment or transparent technology. The present paper challenges this claim. It also challenges the idea that phenomenological …
Mind the notebook
Mind the notebook
Phenomenal transparency and the extended mind
Proponents of the extended mind have suggested that phenomenal transparency may be important to the way we evaluate putative cases of cognitive extension. In particular, it has been suggested that in order for a bio-external resource to count as part of the machinery of the mind, it must qualify as a form of transparent equipment or transparent technology. The present paper challenges this claim. It also challenges the idea that phenomenological …
Extending knowledge-how
This paper examines what it takes for a state of knowledge-how to be extended (i.e. partly constituted by entities external to the organism) within an anti-intellectualist approach to knowledge-how. I begin by examining an account of extended knowledge-how developed by Carter, J. Adam, and Boleslaw Czarnecki. 2016 [“Extended Knowledge-How.” Erkenntnis 81 (2): 259–273], and argue that it fails to properly distinguish between cognitive outsourcing …
Varieties of transparency: Exploring agency within AI systems
Does know-how need to be autonomous
In chapter 4 of Autonomous Knowledge: Radical Enhancement, Autonomy and the Future of Knowing (OUP, 2021), Carter takes on the question of whether there is an epistemic autonomy condition on know-how, e.g. one that might rule out cases of radical performance enhancement as genuine cases of know-how. In this paper, I examine Carter’s proposal and identify an asymmetry in the way his epistemic autonomy condition is applied to enhanced and non-enhan…
Intentional action, knowledge, and cognitive extension
Intentional actions exhibit control in a way that mere lucky successes do not. A longstanding tradition in action theory characterizes actional control in terms of the knowledge with which one acts when acting intentionally. Given that action theorists, no less than epistemologists, typically take for granted the orthodox thesis that knowledge is in the head (viz., realized exclusively by brainbound cognition), the idea that intentional action is…
Mind-Technology Problems for Know-How Anti-Intellectualism
Clowes, Gärtner, and Hipólito (2021) describe the Mind-Technology Problem as a new constellation of philosophical problems about the nature of mind generated by advances in technology we increasingly rely on to meet both theoretical and practical aims. We agree with Clowes, Gärtner, and Hipólito that the problems they identify frame a timely and worthwhile new research programme. We aim to contribute to this research programme by motivating and c…
Embodied and Extended Cognition (7 works) · Epistemology (5 works) · Philosophy (5 works) · Computer Science (4 works) · Psychology (4 works) · Cognitive science (3 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (3 works) · Metaphysics (3 works) · Philosophy of language (3 works) · Philosophy of mind (3 works)