Kerah Gordon‐solmon
Biographic Data
| ID | 1233618 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Kerah Gordon‐solmon |
| GIVEN NAMES | Kerah |
| FAMILY NAME | Gordon‐solmon |
| SIGNATURE | SOLMON K G |
| AFFILIATIONS | Queen's University |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 4 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 6 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 4 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2017 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
The Curious Case of Secondary Permissibility
Nonconsequentialists hold it is harder to justify harmfully using a person than to justify harming a person to a moderately greater degree as a side effect. This can be embarrassing. Suppose it is normally permissible to kill a person as a side-effect of saving three others’ lives, but not to crush a person’s legs as a means of doing so. Facing three options—let three people die; kill one as a side effect of saving them; crush the one’s legs as a…
Lesser-Evil Justifications: A Reply to Frowe
Sometimes one can prevent harm only by contravening rights. If the harm one can prevent is great enough, compared to the stringency of the opposing rights, then one has a lesser-evil justification to contravene the rights. Non-consequentialist orthodoxy holds that, most of the time, lesser-evil justifications add to agents’ permissible options without taking any away. Helen Frowe rejects this view. She claims that, almost always, agents must act …
Should Contractualists Decompose
Should Contractualists Decompose?I Contractualist moral theory says an act is permissible just in case the principle licensing it cannot reasonably be rejected by any relevant party.The relevant parties are all of those for whom the principle has implications; i.e., those who will potentially be benefitted or burdened by acts the principle permits.The standard of reasonable rejectability is oftentimes specified by the Greater Burden Standard 1 : …
What Makes a Person Liable to Defensive Harm
On Jeff McMahan's influential ‘responsibility account’ of moral liability to defensive killing, one can forfeit one's right not be killed by engaging in an ordinary, morally permissible risk‐imposing activity, such as driving a car. If, through no fault of hers, a driver's car veers out of control and toward a pedestrian, the account deems it no violation of the driver's right to save the pedestrian's life at the expense of the driver's life. Man…
What Makes a Person Liable to Defensive Harm
On Jeff McMahan's influential ‘responsibility account’ of moral liability to defensive killing, one can forfeit one's right not be killed by engaging in an ordinary, morally permissible risk‐imposing activity, such as driving a car. If, through no fault of hers, a driver's car veers out of control and toward a pedestrian, the account deems it no violation of the driver's right to save the pedestrian's life at the expense of the driver's life. Man…
Should Contractualists Decompose
Should Contractualists Decompose?I Contractualist moral theory says an act is permissible just in case the principle licensing it cannot reasonably be rejected by any relevant party.The relevant parties are all of those for whom the principle has implications; i.e., those who will potentially be benefitted or burdened by acts the principle permits.The standard of reasonable rejectability is oftentimes specified by the Greater Burden Standard 1 : …
What Makes a Person Liable to Defensive Harm
On Jeff McMahan's influential ‘responsibility account’ of moral liability to defensive killing, one can forfeit one's right not be killed by engaging in an ordinary, morally permissible risk‐imposing activity, such as driving a car. If, through no fault of hers, a driver's car veers out of control and toward a pedestrian, the account deems it no violation of the driver's right to save the pedestrian's life at the expense of the driver's life. Man…
Should Contractualists Decompose
Should Contractualists Decompose?I Contractualist moral theory says an act is permissible just in case the principle licensing it cannot reasonably be rejected by any relevant party.The relevant parties are all of those for whom the principle has implications; i.e., those who will potentially be benefitted or burdened by acts the principle permits.The standard of reasonable rejectability is oftentimes specified by the Greater Burden Standard 1 : …
Lesser-Evil Justifications: A Reply to Frowe
Sometimes one can prevent harm only by contravening rights. If the harm one can prevent is great enough, compared to the stringency of the opposing rights, then one has a lesser-evil justification to contravene the rights. Non-consequentialist orthodoxy holds that, most of the time, lesser-evil justifications add to agents’ permissible options without taking any away. Helen Frowe rejects this view. She claims that, almost always, agents must act …
The Curious Case of Secondary Permissibility
Nonconsequentialists hold it is harder to justify harmfully using a person than to justify harming a person to a moderately greater degree as a side effect. This can be embarrassing. Suppose it is normally permissible to kill a person as a side-effect of saving three others’ lives, but not to crush a person’s legs as a means of doing so. Facing three options—let three people die; kill one as a side effect of saving them; crush the one’s legs as a…
Free Will and Agency (3 works) · Harm (3 works) · Law (3 works) · Political science (3 works) · War, Ethics, and Justification (3 works) · Epistemology (2 works) · Law (2 works) · Law and economics (2 works) · Philosophy (2 works) · Political Philosophy and Ethics (2 works)