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Daniel E Ponder

Biographic Data

ID1238074
NAMEDaniel E Ponder
GIVEN NAMESDaniel E
FAMILY NAMEPonder
SIGNATUREPONDER D E
AFFILIATIONSDrury University
ORCID0000-0003-4272-0041
VERIFIEDYes
TOTAL WORKS8
TOTAL CITATIONS7
WORKS AS AUTHOR8
WORKS AS EDITOR0
FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR1993
LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR2024
H-INDEX2
  • Updating Presidential Leverage

    Daniel E Ponder•ARTICLE•Congress & the Presidency•2024•References: 18

    This article seeks to accomplish two things. First, I update the Index of Presidential Leverage (IPL) published in Presidential Leverage (Ponder Citation2018), which analyzed presidential action from Kennedy to the end of Obama's first term. This article brings the analysis through the end of the Trump administration and replicates the book's analysis of executive orders to determine if that measure still exhibits explanatory capacity. Second, I …

  • The Variable “Catholic” Influence on US Presidential and Abortion Politics

    Open Access•Brian Robert Calfano, Daniel E Ponder•ARTICLE•Religions•2023

    We demonstrate that, in comparison to religious groups showing reliable, contemporary voting tendencies (e.g., white evangelical Protestants voting Republican, Jews and Muslims voting Democratic), Roman Catholics show far less consistency in supporting one major party over the other. After reviewing relevant literature Catholic public political preferences and behavior, we delve into a basic overview of the history of the Catholic Church in the U…

  • Public Opinion and Democratic Party Ownership of Prosperity

    Open Access•Daniel E Ponder, Christopher A Simon et al.•ARTICLE•American Politics Research•2015•Cited by: 1•References: 50

    Recently, there has been renewed interest in the question of party ownership of economic prosperity, which Petrocik argued was a performance issue subject to the flow of events over which administrations have no control. Using Gallup Polls administered between 1955 and 2013, we investigate public opinion on whether Republicans or Democrats would do a better job of keeping the country prosperous. Using error correction analysis, we test political …

  • Presidential Leverage and the Politics of Policy Formulation

    Open Access•Daniel E Ponder•ARTICLE•Presidential Studies Quarterly•2012•Cited by: 2•References: 21

    This article applies a concept of “presidential leverage” to the inner workings of the White House, specifically decisions regarding the location of policy formulation. The guiding question addresses how a president's leverage in the political system influences decisions regarding policy making. Findings support the propositions that (1) leverage has a systematic impact on presidential policy formation, (2) divided government has little or no imp…

  • A Tale of Three Variables

    Daniel E Ponder, Carol Moon et al.•ARTICLE•Congress & the Presidency•2005•Cited by: 2•References: 14

    This study explores the impact of three distinct measures of public approval on congressional voting. Specifically, we test for the relative impact of a president's national approval, his partisan approval, and his district- (or state-) level approval on congressional support, measured at the level of individual members of Congress. Though we remain consistent with other arguments that hold presidential approval is likely to act as a background v…

  • The Presidency as a Learning Organization

    Open Access•Daniel E Ponder•ARTICLE•Presidential Studies Quarterly•1999

  • Three Strategies of Presidential Policy Making

    Daniel E Ponder•ARTICLE•Congress & the Presidency•1996•References: 15

    Literature on presidential policy making has emphasized the tendency of presidents to centralize decision making authority in the White House or via a politicized bureaucracy However, given time and resource constraints, presidential priorities often are delegated to bureaucratic staffers bevond the control of political agents. Still other policy priorities are promulgated by mixing the efforts of White House staffers and bureaucratic agents. Thi…

  • Congressional Term Limits, State Legislative Term Limits and Congressional Turnover

    Open Access•Patrick J Fett, Daniel E Ponder•ARTICLE•PS Political Science & Politics•1993•Cited by: 2•References: 6

    During the first Congress of the United States, two measures to amend Article I of the Constitution were considered which, if ratified, would have limited the number of successive terms held by senators and representatives. Those measures were defeated and the issue was not considered again for over 150 years. However, since 1943 when the proposal was first resurrected in Congress, interest in the idea has grown to the point that from January 198…

  • Presidential Leverage and the Politics of Policy Formulation

    Open Access•Daniel E Ponder•ARTICLE•Presidential Studies Quarterly•2012•Cited by: 2•References: 21

    This article applies a concept of “presidential leverage” to the inner workings of the White House, specifically decisions regarding the location of policy formulation. The guiding question addresses how a president's leverage in the political system influences decisions regarding policy making. Findings support the propositions that (1) leverage has a systematic impact on presidential policy formation, (2) divided government has little or no imp…

  • A Tale of Three Variables

    Daniel E Ponder, Carol Moon et al.•ARTICLE•Congress & the Presidency•2005•Cited by: 2•References: 14

    This study explores the impact of three distinct measures of public approval on congressional voting. Specifically, we test for the relative impact of a president's national approval, his partisan approval, and his district- (or state-) level approval on congressional support, measured at the level of individual members of Congress. Though we remain consistent with other arguments that hold presidential approval is likely to act as a background v…

  • Congressional Term Limits, State Legislative Term Limits and Congressional Turnover

    Open Access•Patrick J Fett, Daniel E Ponder•ARTICLE•PS Political Science & Politics•1993•Cited by: 2•References: 6

    During the first Congress of the United States, two measures to amend Article I of the Constitution were considered which, if ratified, would have limited the number of successive terms held by senators and representatives. Those measures were defeated and the issue was not considered again for over 150 years. However, since 1943 when the proposal was first resurrected in Congress, interest in the idea has grown to the point that from January 198…

  • Public Opinion and Democratic Party Ownership of Prosperity

    Open Access•Daniel E Ponder, Christopher A Simon et al.•ARTICLE•American Politics Research•2015•Cited by: 1•References: 50

    Recently, there has been renewed interest in the question of party ownership of economic prosperity, which Petrocik argued was a performance issue subject to the flow of events over which administrations have no control. Using Gallup Polls administered between 1955 and 2013, we investigate public opinion on whether Republicans or Democrats would do a better job of keeping the country prosperous. Using error correction analysis, we test political …

  • Congressional Term Limits, State Legislative Term Limits and Congressional Turnover

    Open Access•Patrick J Fett, Daniel E Ponder•ARTICLE•PS Political Science & Politics•1993•Cited by: 2•References: 6

    During the first Congress of the United States, two measures to amend Article I of the Constitution were considered which, if ratified, would have limited the number of successive terms held by senators and representatives. Those measures were defeated and the issue was not considered again for over 150 years. However, since 1943 when the proposal was first resurrected in Congress, interest in the idea has grown to the point that from January 198…

  • Three Strategies of Presidential Policy Making

    Daniel E Ponder•ARTICLE•Congress & the Presidency•1996•References: 15

    Literature on presidential policy making has emphasized the tendency of presidents to centralize decision making authority in the White House or via a politicized bureaucracy However, given time and resource constraints, presidential priorities often are delegated to bureaucratic staffers bevond the control of political agents. Still other policy priorities are promulgated by mixing the efforts of White House staffers and bureaucratic agents. Thi…

  • The Presidency as a Learning Organization

    Open Access•Daniel E Ponder•ARTICLE•Presidential Studies Quarterly•1999

  • A Tale of Three Variables

    Daniel E Ponder, Carol Moon et al.•ARTICLE•Congress & the Presidency•2005•Cited by: 2•References: 14

    This study explores the impact of three distinct measures of public approval on congressional voting. Specifically, we test for the relative impact of a president's national approval, his partisan approval, and his district- (or state-) level approval on congressional support, measured at the level of individual members of Congress. Though we remain consistent with other arguments that hold presidential approval is likely to act as a background v…

  • Presidential Leverage and the Politics of Policy Formulation

    Open Access•Daniel E Ponder•ARTICLE•Presidential Studies Quarterly•2012•Cited by: 2•References: 21

    This article applies a concept of “presidential leverage” to the inner workings of the White House, specifically decisions regarding the location of policy formulation. The guiding question addresses how a president's leverage in the political system influences decisions regarding policy making. Findings support the propositions that (1) leverage has a systematic impact on presidential policy formation, (2) divided government has little or no imp…

  • Public Opinion and Democratic Party Ownership of Prosperity

    Open Access•Daniel E Ponder, Christopher A Simon et al.•ARTICLE•American Politics Research•2015•Cited by: 1•References: 50

    Recently, there has been renewed interest in the question of party ownership of economic prosperity, which Petrocik argued was a performance issue subject to the flow of events over which administrations have no control. Using Gallup Polls administered between 1955 and 2013, we investigate public opinion on whether Republicans or Democrats would do a better job of keeping the country prosperous. Using error correction analysis, we test political …

  • The Variable “Catholic” Influence on US Presidential and Abortion Politics

    Open Access•Brian Robert Calfano, Daniel E Ponder•ARTICLE•Religions•2023

    We demonstrate that, in comparison to religious groups showing reliable, contemporary voting tendencies (e.g., white evangelical Protestants voting Republican, Jews and Muslims voting Democratic), Roman Catholics show far less consistency in supporting one major party over the other. After reviewing relevant literature Catholic public political preferences and behavior, we delve into a basic overview of the history of the Catholic Church in the U…

  • Updating Presidential Leverage

    Daniel E Ponder•ARTICLE•Congress & the Presidency•2024•References: 18

    This article seeks to accomplish two things. First, I update the Index of Presidential Leverage (IPL) published in Presidential Leverage (Ponder Citation2018), which analyzed presidential action from Kennedy to the end of Obama's first term. This article brings the analysis through the end of the Trump administration and replicates the book's analysis of executive orders to determine if that measure still exhibits explanatory capacity. Second, I …

Electoral Systems and Political Participation (8 works) · Law (8 works) · Political science (8 works) · Politics (7 works) · Presidential system (6 works) · Law (5 works) · Public Administration (5 works) · Computer Science (4 works) · Economics (4 works) · Fiscal Policies and Political Economy (3 works)

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