Tim Button
Biographic Data
| ID | 1239674 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Tim Button |
| GIVEN NAMES | Tim |
| FAMILY NAME | Button |
| SIGNATURE | BUTTON T |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Cambridge |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-8913-0968 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 4 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 7 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 4 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2009 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Why Are All the Sets All the Sets
Necessitists about set theory think that the pure sets exists, and are the way they are, as a matter of necessity. They cannot explain why the sets ( de rebus ) are all the sets. This constitutes the Ur‐Objection against necessitism; it is the primary motivation cited by potentialists about set theory. At least three families of potentialism draw motivation from the Ur‐Objection. Contingentists think that any things could form a set even if they …
Symmetric relations, symmetric theories, and Pythagrapheanism
It is a metaphysical orthodoxy that interesting non‐symmetric relations cannot be reduced to symmetric ones. This orthodoxy is wrong. I show this by exploring the expressive power of symmetric theories, i.e. theories which use only symmetric predicates. Such theories are powerful enough to raise the possibility of Pythagrapheanism, i.e. the possibility that the world is just a vast, unlabelled, undirected graph
Deflationary metaphysics and ordinary language
Amie Thomasson and Eli Hirsch have both attempted to deflate metaphysics, by combining Carnapian ideas with an appeal to ordinary language. My main aim in this paper is to critique such deflationary appeals to ordinary language. Focussing on Thomasson, I draw two very general conclusions. First: ordinary language is a wildly complicated phenomenon. Its implicit ontological commitments can only be tackled by invoking a context principle; but this …
SAD Computers and Two Versions of the Church–Turing Thesis
Recent work on hypercomputation has raised new objections against the Church–Turing Thesis. In this paper, I focus on the challenge posed by a particular kind of hypercomputer, namely, SAD computers. I first consider deterministic and probabilistic barriers to the physical possibility of SAD computation. These suggest several ways to defend a Physical version of the Church–Turing Thesis. I then argue against Hogarth's analogy between non-Turing c…
Deflationary metaphysics and ordinary language
Amie Thomasson and Eli Hirsch have both attempted to deflate metaphysics, by combining Carnapian ideas with an appeal to ordinary language. My main aim in this paper is to critique such deflationary appeals to ordinary language. Focussing on Thomasson, I draw two very general conclusions. First: ordinary language is a wildly complicated phenomenon. Its implicit ontological commitments can only be tackled by invoking a context principle; but this …
SAD Computers and Two Versions of the Church–Turing Thesis
Recent work on hypercomputation has raised new objections against the Church–Turing Thesis. In this paper, I focus on the challenge posed by a particular kind of hypercomputer, namely, SAD computers. I first consider deterministic and probabilistic barriers to the physical possibility of SAD computation. These suggest several ways to defend a Physical version of the Church–Turing Thesis. I then argue against Hogarth's analogy between non-Turing c…
Symmetric relations, symmetric theories, and Pythagrapheanism
It is a metaphysical orthodoxy that interesting non‐symmetric relations cannot be reduced to symmetric ones. This orthodoxy is wrong. I show this by exploring the expressive power of symmetric theories, i.e. theories which use only symmetric predicates. Such theories are powerful enough to raise the possibility of Pythagrapheanism, i.e. the possibility that the world is just a vast, unlabelled, undirected graph
SAD Computers and Two Versions of the Church–Turing Thesis
Recent work on hypercomputation has raised new objections against the Church–Turing Thesis. In this paper, I focus on the challenge posed by a particular kind of hypercomputer, namely, SAD computers. I first consider deterministic and probabilistic barriers to the physical possibility of SAD computation. These suggest several ways to defend a Physical version of the Church–Turing Thesis. I then argue against Hogarth's analogy between non-Turing c…
Deflationary metaphysics and ordinary language
Amie Thomasson and Eli Hirsch have both attempted to deflate metaphysics, by combining Carnapian ideas with an appeal to ordinary language. My main aim in this paper is to critique such deflationary appeals to ordinary language. Focussing on Thomasson, I draw two very general conclusions. First: ordinary language is a wildly complicated phenomenon. Its implicit ontological commitments can only be tackled by invoking a context principle; but this …
Symmetric relations, symmetric theories, and Pythagrapheanism
It is a metaphysical orthodoxy that interesting non‐symmetric relations cannot be reduced to symmetric ones. This orthodoxy is wrong. I show this by exploring the expressive power of symmetric theories, i.e. theories which use only symmetric predicates. Such theories are powerful enough to raise the possibility of Pythagrapheanism, i.e. the possibility that the world is just a vast, unlabelled, undirected graph
Why Are All the Sets All the Sets
Necessitists about set theory think that the pure sets exists, and are the way they are, as a matter of necessity. They cannot explain why the sets ( de rebus ) are all the sets. This constitutes the Ur‐Objection against necessitism; it is the primary motivation cited by potentialists about set theory. At least three families of potentialism draw motivation from the Ur‐Objection. Contingentists think that any things could form a set even if they …
Mathematics (3 works) · Philosophy and History of Science (3 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (3 works) · Artificial Intelligence (2 works) · Computer Science (2 works) · Epistemology (2 works) · Metaphysics (2 works) · Philosophy (2 works) · Algorithm (1 works) · Appeal (1 works)