Andreas Stokke
Datos Biográficos
| ID | 1240592 |
|---|---|
| NOMBRE | Andreas Stokke |
| NOMBRES | Andreas |
| APELLIDO | Stokke |
| FIRMA | STOKKE A |
| AFILIACIONES | Uppsala University |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-7467-7263 |
| VERIFICADO | Sí |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 20 |
| TOTAL DE CITAS | 29 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 19 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 1 |
| PRIMER AÑO DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2010 |
| AÑO MÁS RECIENTE DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2025 |
| ÍNDICE H | 3 |
A unified account of semantic and pragmatic infelicity
This paper argues for a unified account of semantic and pragmatic infelicity. It is argued that an utterance is infelicitous when it communicates an inconsistent set of propositions, given the context. In cases of semantic infelicity the relevant utterance expresses a set of inconsistent propositions, whereas pragmatic infelicity is a matter of the utterance conflicting with contextual expectations or assumptions. We spell out this view within th…
Quotative be like
This paper examines a form of talking about speech acts, mental states, and other features so far unexplored in philosophy: quotative be like. Quotative be like is the use of like and to be that occurs in constructions such as “Ellen was like“I’m leaving!”” We argue that neglect of quotative be like represents a gap in our understanding of our ways of characterizing the minds and speech of ourselves and others. Further, we show that quotative be …
Spatial Indexicals
This paper offers a theory of spatial indexicals like here and there on which such expressions are variables associated with presuppositional constraints on their values. I show how this view handles both referential and bound uses of these indexicals, and I propose an account of what counts as the location of the context on a given occasion. The latter is seen to explain a wide range of facts about what the spatial indexicals can refer to
Lies are assertions and presuppositions are not
Most philosophers agree that lies are assertions. Most also agree that to presuppose information is different from asserting it. In a series of papers, Viebahn [2020. “Lying with Presuppositions.” Noûs 54 (4): 731–751; “The Lying-Misleading Distinction: A Commitment-Based Approach.” Journal of Philosophy 118 (6): 298–319], along with an empirical study in Viebahn et al. [2021. “Can a Question be a lie? An Empirical Investigation.” Ergo 8 (7): 175…
Winged horses, rascals and discourse referents
This paper discusses some remarks Kaplan made in ‘Bob and Carol and Ted and Alice’ concerning empty names. I show how his objections to a particular view involving descriptions derived from Ramsification can be avoided by a nearby alternative framed in terms of discourse reference. I offer a treatment of empty names as variables carrying presuppositions concerning unique occupants of roles, or sets of properties, determined by the originating dis…
Fiction as a defeater
This paper argues that no instances of acquiring knowledge from works of literary fiction are instances of the way we ordinarily learn from the testimony of others. The paper argues that the fictional status of a work is a defeater for the justification of beliefs formed on the basis of statements within that work, which must itself be defeated for such beliefs based on fiction to amount to knowledge. This marks a fundamental difference with lear…
Fictional force
This paper argues for an account of fictional force, the central characteristic of the kind of non-assertoric speech act that authors of fictions are engaged in. A distinction is drawn between what is true in a fiction and the fictional record comprising what the audience has been told. The papers argues that to utter a sentence with fictional force is to intend that its content be added to a fictional record. It is shown that this view accounts …
Context as knowledge
It has been argued that common ground information is unsuited to the role that contexts play in the theory of indexical and demonstrative reference. This paper explores an alternative view that identifies shared information with what is common knowledge among the participants. We argue this view of shared information avoids the problems for the common ground approach concerning reference while preserving its advantages in accounting for communica…
Fiction and importation
Importation in fictional discourse is the phenomenon by which audiences include information in the story over and above what is explicitly stated by the narrator. This paper argues that importation is distinct from generation, the phenomenon by which truth in fiction may outstrip what is made explicit, and draws a distinction between fictional truth and fictional records. The latter comprises the audience’s picture of what is true according to th…
Navigation and Indexical Thought
This paper argues for a moderate form of essentialism about indexical thought (also known as de se , first-person, or egocentric thought). According to this moderate essentialism, there is a significant category of intentional action that necessarily involves indexical thought. This category of action is navigation, that is, intentionally moving from one location to another by using public information about the world such as a map or a set of dir…
Features of referential pronouns and indexical presuppositions
This paper demonstrates that the presuppositions triggered by the 1st and 2nd persons behave differently in important ways from those triggered by the 3rd person and the genders. While the 1st and 2nd persons trigger indexical presuppositions, the 3rd person and the genders do not. I show that the presuppositions triggered by the 1st and 2nd persons are not susceptible to presupposition failure of the kind familiar from ordinary presuppositions. …
Free Indirect Discourse in Non-fiction
This paper considers some uses of Free Indirect Discourse within non-fictional discourse. It is shown that these differ from ordinary uses in that they do not attribute actual thoughts or utterances. I argue that the explanation for this is that these uses of Free Indirect Discourse are not assertoric. Instead, it is argued here that they are fictional uses, that is, they are used with fictional force like utterances used to tell a fictional stor…
Fictional names and individual concepts
This paper defends a version of the realist view that fictional characters exist. It argues for an instance of abstract realist views, according to which fictional characters are roles, constituted by sets of properties. It is argued that fictional names denote individual concepts, functions from worlds to individuals. It is shown that a dynamic framework for understanding the evolution of discourse information can be used to understand how roles…
Lying
Lying: Language, Knowledge, Ethics, and Politics is the first dedicated collection of philosophical essays on the emerging topic of lying. While philosophers have been thinking about lying for several thousand years, only recently has this topic emerged as a sustained locus of inquiry, one which has proved equally of interest to philosophers of language, epistemologists, ethicists, and political philosophers. The essays in this volume embrace the…
Lying and Insincerity
This book is a comprehensive study of lying and insincere language use. Part I is dedicated to developing an account of insincerity qua linguistic phenomenon. It provides a detailed theory of the distinction between lying and ways of speaking insincerely without lying, as well as accounting for the relation between lying and deceiving. A novel theory of assertion in terms of a notion of what is said defined relative to questions under discussion …
Negligent Falsehood, White Ignorance, and False News
There has been considerable attention in philosophy to the deliberate propagation of falsehoods, either through their assertion (as in lying); or through implicating them by way of true assertions (as in misleading). But there are other important ways that falsehoods are propagated. This chapter focuses on ways that falsehoods may be negligently propagated by true utterances, with a particular focus on what happens when this occurs in communities…
Lies, Harm, And Practical Interests
This paper outlines an account of the ethics of lying, which accommodates two main ideas about lying. The first of these, Anti‐Deceptionalism, is the view that lying does not necessarily involve intentions to deceive. The second, Anti‐Absolutism, is the view that lying is not always morally wrong. It is argued that lying is not wrong in itself, but rather the wrong in lying is explained by different factors in different cases. In some cases such …
Lying and Misleading in Discourse
This essay argues that the distinction between lying and misleading while not lying is sensitive to discourse structure. It shows that whether an utterance is a lie or is merely misleading sometimes depends on the topic of conversation, represented by so-called questions under discussion. It argues that to mislead is to disrupt the pursuit of the goal of inquiry—that is, to discover how things are. Lying is seen as a special case requiring assert…
Lying, Deceiving, and Misleading
This article discusses recent work on lying and its relation to deceiving and misleading. Both are discussed in relation to topics in philosophy of language, the epistemology of testimony, and ethics. Critical surveys of recent theories are offered and challenges and open questions for further research are indicated
Intention-sensitive semantics
Lying and Misleading in Discourse
This essay argues that the distinction between lying and misleading while not lying is sensitive to discourse structure. It shows that whether an utterance is a lie or is merely misleading sometimes depends on the topic of conversation, represented by so-called questions under discussion. It argues that to mislead is to disrupt the pursuit of the goal of inquiry—that is, to discover how things are. Lying is seen as a special case requiring assert…
Lying, Deceiving, and Misleading
This article discusses recent work on lying and its relation to deceiving and misleading. Both are discussed in relation to topics in philosophy of language, the epistemology of testimony, and ethics. Critical surveys of recent theories are offered and challenges and open questions for further research are indicated
Intention-sensitive semantics
Fictional names and individual concepts
This paper defends a version of the realist view that fictional characters exist. It argues for an instance of abstract realist views, according to which fictional characters are roles, constituted by sets of properties. It is argued that fictional names denote individual concepts, functions from worlds to individuals. It is shown that a dynamic framework for understanding the evolution of discourse information can be used to understand how roles…
Quotative be like
This paper examines a form of talking about speech acts, mental states, and other features so far unexplored in philosophy: quotative be like. Quotative be like is the use of like and to be that occurs in constructions such as “Ellen was like“I’m leaving!”” We argue that neglect of quotative be like represents a gap in our understanding of our ways of characterizing the minds and speech of ourselves and others. Further, we show that quotative be …
Intention-sensitive semantics
Lying, Deceiving, and Misleading
This article discusses recent work on lying and its relation to deceiving and misleading. Both are discussed in relation to topics in philosophy of language, the epistemology of testimony, and ethics. Critical surveys of recent theories are offered and challenges and open questions for further research are indicated
Lying and Misleading in Discourse
This essay argues that the distinction between lying and misleading while not lying is sensitive to discourse structure. It shows that whether an utterance is a lie or is merely misleading sometimes depends on the topic of conversation, represented by so-called questions under discussion. It argues that to mislead is to disrupt the pursuit of the goal of inquiry—that is, to discover how things are. Lying is seen as a special case requiring assert…
Lies, Harm, And Practical Interests
This paper outlines an account of the ethics of lying, which accommodates two main ideas about lying. The first of these, Anti‐Deceptionalism, is the view that lying does not necessarily involve intentions to deceive. The second, Anti‐Absolutism, is the view that lying is not always morally wrong. It is argued that lying is not wrong in itself, but rather the wrong in lying is explained by different factors in different cases. In some cases such …
Lying
Lying: Language, Knowledge, Ethics, and Politics is the first dedicated collection of philosophical essays on the emerging topic of lying. While philosophers have been thinking about lying for several thousand years, only recently has this topic emerged as a sustained locus of inquiry, one which has proved equally of interest to philosophers of language, epistemologists, ethicists, and political philosophers. The essays in this volume embrace the…
Lying and Insincerity
This book is a comprehensive study of lying and insincere language use. Part I is dedicated to developing an account of insincerity qua linguistic phenomenon. It provides a detailed theory of the distinction between lying and ways of speaking insincerely without lying, as well as accounting for the relation between lying and deceiving. A novel theory of assertion in terms of a notion of what is said defined relative to questions under discussion …
Negligent Falsehood, White Ignorance, and False News
There has been considerable attention in philosophy to the deliberate propagation of falsehoods, either through their assertion (as in lying); or through implicating them by way of true assertions (as in misleading). But there are other important ways that falsehoods are propagated. This chapter focuses on ways that falsehoods may be negligently propagated by true utterances, with a particular focus on what happens when this occurs in communities…
Free Indirect Discourse in Non-fiction
This paper considers some uses of Free Indirect Discourse within non-fictional discourse. It is shown that these differ from ordinary uses in that they do not attribute actual thoughts or utterances. I argue that the explanation for this is that these uses of Free Indirect Discourse are not assertoric. Instead, it is argued here that they are fictional uses, that is, they are used with fictional force like utterances used to tell a fictional stor…
Fictional names and individual concepts
This paper defends a version of the realist view that fictional characters exist. It argues for an instance of abstract realist views, according to which fictional characters are roles, constituted by sets of properties. It is argued that fictional names denote individual concepts, functions from worlds to individuals. It is shown that a dynamic framework for understanding the evolution of discourse information can be used to understand how roles…
Context as knowledge
It has been argued that common ground information is unsuited to the role that contexts play in the theory of indexical and demonstrative reference. This paper explores an alternative view that identifies shared information with what is common knowledge among the participants. We argue this view of shared information avoids the problems for the common ground approach concerning reference while preserving its advantages in accounting for communica…
Fiction and importation
Importation in fictional discourse is the phenomenon by which audiences include information in the story over and above what is explicitly stated by the narrator. This paper argues that importation is distinct from generation, the phenomenon by which truth in fiction may outstrip what is made explicit, and draws a distinction between fictional truth and fictional records. The latter comprises the audience’s picture of what is true according to th…
Navigation and Indexical Thought
This paper argues for a moderate form of essentialism about indexical thought (also known as de se , first-person, or egocentric thought). According to this moderate essentialism, there is a significant category of intentional action that necessarily involves indexical thought. This category of action is navigation, that is, intentionally moving from one location to another by using public information about the world such as a map or a set of dir…
Features of referential pronouns and indexical presuppositions
This paper demonstrates that the presuppositions triggered by the 1st and 2nd persons behave differently in important ways from those triggered by the 3rd person and the genders. While the 1st and 2nd persons trigger indexical presuppositions, the 3rd person and the genders do not. I show that the presuppositions triggered by the 1st and 2nd persons are not susceptible to presupposition failure of the kind familiar from ordinary presuppositions. …
Fictional force
This paper argues for an account of fictional force, the central characteristic of the kind of non-assertoric speech act that authors of fictions are engaged in. A distinction is drawn between what is true in a fiction and the fictional record comprising what the audience has been told. The papers argues that to utter a sentence with fictional force is to intend that its content be added to a fictional record. It is shown that this view accounts …
Spatial Indexicals
This paper offers a theory of spatial indexicals like here and there on which such expressions are variables associated with presuppositional constraints on their values. I show how this view handles both referential and bound uses of these indexicals, and I propose an account of what counts as the location of the context on a given occasion. The latter is seen to explain a wide range of facts about what the spatial indexicals can refer to
Lies are assertions and presuppositions are not
Most philosophers agree that lies are assertions. Most also agree that to presuppose information is different from asserting it. In a series of papers, Viebahn [2020. “Lying with Presuppositions.” Noûs 54 (4): 731–751; “The Lying-Misleading Distinction: A Commitment-Based Approach.” Journal of Philosophy 118 (6): 298–319], along with an empirical study in Viebahn et al. [2021. “Can a Question be a lie? An Empirical Investigation.” Ergo 8 (7): 175…
Winged horses, rascals and discourse referents
This paper discusses some remarks Kaplan made in ‘Bob and Carol and Ted and Alice’ concerning empty names. I show how his objections to a particular view involving descriptions derived from Ramsification can be avoided by a nearby alternative framed in terms of discourse reference. I offer a treatment of empty names as variables carrying presuppositions concerning unique occupants of roles, or sets of properties, determined by the originating dis…
Fiction as a defeater
This paper argues that no instances of acquiring knowledge from works of literary fiction are instances of the way we ordinarily learn from the testimony of others. The paper argues that the fictional status of a work is a defeater for the justification of beliefs formed on the basis of statements within that work, which must itself be defeated for such beliefs based on fiction to amount to knowledge. This marks a fundamental difference with lear…
A unified account of semantic and pragmatic infelicity
This paper argues for a unified account of semantic and pragmatic infelicity. It is argued that an utterance is infelicitous when it communicates an inconsistent set of propositions, given the context. In cases of semantic infelicity the relevant utterance expresses a set of inconsistent propositions, whereas pragmatic infelicity is a matter of the utterance conflicting with contextual expectations or assumptions. We spell out this view within th…
Quotative be like
This paper examines a form of talking about speech acts, mental states, and other features so far unexplored in philosophy: quotative be like. Quotative be like is the use of like and to be that occurs in constructions such as “Ellen was like“I’m leaving!”” We argue that neglect of quotative be like represents a gap in our understanding of our ways of characterizing the minds and speech of ourselves and others. Further, we show that quotative be …
Philosophy (19 obras) · Epistemology (17 obras) · Linguistics (13 obras) · Computer Science (11 obras) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (10 obras) · Psychology (7 obras) · Lying (6 obras) · Metaphysics (6 obras) · Philosophy of language (6 obras) · Sociology (6 obras)