George Botterill
Biographic Data
| ID | 1241302 |
|---|---|
| NAME | George Botterill |
| GIVEN NAMES | George |
| FAMILY NAME | Botterill |
| SIGNATURE | BOTTERILL G |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Sheffield |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 11 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 13 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 11 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1977 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2023 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Why beliefs are not dispositional stereotypes
In a series of papers, Schwitzgebel has attempted to revive the dispositionalist account of belief by tweaking it a little and claiming a previously unconsidered advantage over representationalism. The tweaks are to include phenomenal and cognitive responses, in addition to overt behaviour, in the manifestations of a given belief; and to soften the account of dispositions by allowing for dispositional stereotypes . The alleged advantage is that d…
Contrastive explanation and the many absences problem
Two Kinds of Causal Explanation
To give a causal explanation is to give information about causal history. But a vast amount of causal history lies behind anything that happens, far too much to be included in any intelligible explanation. This is the Problem of Limitation for explanatory information. To cope with this problem, explanations must select for what is relevant to and adequate for answering particular inquiries. In the present paper this idea is used in order to disti…
Contrast, inference and scientific realism
Hume on Liberty and Necessity
Hume was certainly tackling a ‘long disputed question’ under his heading ‘Of Liberty and Necessity’. If our actions are causally determined, can we still maintain that we are capable of acting freely? Or does our deeply rooted commitment to regarding other people as morally responsible agents also commit us to regarding them as exceptions to the general order of nature and, at some level, somehow exempt from the operation of causal laws? By now t…
The Philosophy of Psychology
What is the relationship between common-sense, or 'folk', psychology and contemporary scientific psychology? Are they in conflict with one another? Or do they perform quite different, though perhaps complementary, roles? George Botterill and Peter Carruthers discuss these questions, defending a robust form of realism about the commitments of folk psychology and about the prospects for integrating those commitments into natural science. Their focu…
The philosophy of psychology
This book presents an original and accessible analysis of the relationship between common-sense, or 'folk', psychology and contemporary scientific psychology, focussing on the ways in which cognitive science presents a challenge to our common-sense self image. It is designed as a textbook for upper-level undergraduate and beginning postgraduate students in philosophy and cognitive science. As a text that not only surveys but advances the debates …
Theories of Theories of Mind
Theories of Theories of Mind brings together contributions by a distinguished international team of philosophers, psychologists, and primatologists, who between them address such questions as: what is it to understand the thoughts, feelings, and intentions of other people? How does such an understanding develop in the normal child? Why, unusually, does it fail to develop? And is any such mentalistic understanding shared by members of other specie…
Beliefs, Functionally Discrete States, and Connectionist Networks: A Comment on Ramsey, Stich, and Garon
Recent Work in Folk Psychology
Journal Article Recent work in Folk Psychology Get access The Future of Folk Psychology: Intentionality and Cognitive Science. Edited By John D. Greenwood. (Cambridge UP, 1991. Pp. x + 293. Price £30.00 h / b , £11.95 p/b.)Mind and Common Sense: Philosophical Essays on Commonsense Psychology. Edited by Radu J. Bogdan. ( Cambridge UP, 1991. Pp. viii + 208. Price £30.00.)Folk Psychology. Edited by Scott M. Christensen and Dale R. Turner. (New Jerse…
Falsification and the Existence of God: A Discussion of Plantinga's Free Will Defence
Journal Article Falsification and the Existence of God: A Discussion of Plantinga’s Free Will Defence Get access George Botterill George Botterill University College of Wales, Aberystwyth Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 27, Issue 107, April 1977, Pages 114–134, https://doi.org/10.2307/2219422 Published: 01 April 1977
Theories of Theories of Mind
Theories of Theories of Mind brings together contributions by a distinguished international team of philosophers, psychologists, and primatologists, who between them address such questions as: what is it to understand the thoughts, feelings, and intentions of other people? How does such an understanding develop in the normal child? Why, unusually, does it fail to develop? And is any such mentalistic understanding shared by members of other specie…
Contrast, inference and scientific realism
Falsification and the Existence of God: A Discussion of Plantinga's Free Will Defence
Journal Article Falsification and the Existence of God: A Discussion of Plantinga’s Free Will Defence Get access George Botterill George Botterill University College of Wales, Aberystwyth Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 27, Issue 107, April 1977, Pages 114–134, https://doi.org/10.2307/2219422 Published: 01 April 1977
Beliefs, Functionally Discrete States, and Connectionist Networks: A Comment on Ramsey, Stich, and Garon
Recent Work in Folk Psychology
Journal Article Recent work in Folk Psychology Get access The Future of Folk Psychology: Intentionality and Cognitive Science. Edited By John D. Greenwood. (Cambridge UP, 1991. Pp. x + 293. Price £30.00 h / b , £11.95 p/b.)Mind and Common Sense: Philosophical Essays on Commonsense Psychology. Edited by Radu J. Bogdan. ( Cambridge UP, 1991. Pp. viii + 208. Price £30.00.)Folk Psychology. Edited by Scott M. Christensen and Dale R. Turner. (New Jerse…
Theories of Theories of Mind
Theories of Theories of Mind brings together contributions by a distinguished international team of philosophers, psychologists, and primatologists, who between them address such questions as: what is it to understand the thoughts, feelings, and intentions of other people? How does such an understanding develop in the normal child? Why, unusually, does it fail to develop? And is any such mentalistic understanding shared by members of other specie…
The Philosophy of Psychology
What is the relationship between common-sense, or 'folk', psychology and contemporary scientific psychology? Are they in conflict with one another? Or do they perform quite different, though perhaps complementary, roles? George Botterill and Peter Carruthers discuss these questions, defending a robust form of realism about the commitments of folk psychology and about the prospects for integrating those commitments into natural science. Their focu…
The philosophy of psychology
This book presents an original and accessible analysis of the relationship between common-sense, or 'folk', psychology and contemporary scientific psychology, focussing on the ways in which cognitive science presents a challenge to our common-sense self image. It is designed as a textbook for upper-level undergraduate and beginning postgraduate students in philosophy and cognitive science. As a text that not only surveys but advances the debates …
Hume on Liberty and Necessity
Hume was certainly tackling a ‘long disputed question’ under his heading ‘Of Liberty and Necessity’. If our actions are causally determined, can we still maintain that we are capable of acting freely? Or does our deeply rooted commitment to regarding other people as morally responsible agents also commit us to regarding them as exceptions to the general order of nature and, at some level, somehow exempt from the operation of causal laws? By now t…
Contrast, inference and scientific realism
Two Kinds of Causal Explanation
To give a causal explanation is to give information about causal history. But a vast amount of causal history lies behind anything that happens, far too much to be included in any intelligible explanation. This is the Problem of Limitation for explanatory information. To cope with this problem, explanations must select for what is relevant to and adequate for answering particular inquiries. In the present paper this idea is used in order to disti…
Contrastive explanation and the many absences problem
Why beliefs are not dispositional stereotypes
In a series of papers, Schwitzgebel has attempted to revive the dispositionalist account of belief by tweaking it a little and claiming a previously unconsidered advantage over representationalism. The tweaks are to include phenomenal and cognitive responses, in addition to overt behaviour, in the manifestations of a given belief; and to soften the account of dispositions by allowing for dispositional stereotypes . The alleged advantage is that d…
Epistemology (10 works) · Philosophy (10 works) · Psychology (6 works) · Sociology (6 works) · Computer Science (5 works) · Cognitive science (4 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (4 works) · Philosophy and History of Science (4 works) · Cognition (3 works) · Cognition (3 works)