Mahrad Almotahari
Biographic Data
| ID | 1242517 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Mahrad Almotahari |
| GIVEN NAMES | Mahrad |
| FAMILY NAME | Almotahari |
| SIGNATURE | ALMOTAHARI M |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Illinois Chicago |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-4273-1234 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 6 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 2 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 6 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2011 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Frege cases and rationalizing explanations
Russellians, Relationists, and Fregeans disagree about the nature of propositional‐attitude content. We articulate a framework to characterize and evaluate this disagreement. The framework involves two claims: i) that we should individuate attitude content in whatever way fits best with the explanations that characteristically appeal to it, and ii) that we can understand those explanations by analogy with other ‘higher‐level’ explanations. Using …
Generic cognition: A neglected source of context sensitivity
What is the relationship between the claim that generics articulate psychologically primitive generalizations and the claim that they exhibit a unique form of context sensitivity? This article maintains that the two claims are compatible. It develops and defends an overlooked form of contextualism grounded in the idiosyncrasies of system 1 thought
Semantic deflationism deflated
Not’ Again! Another Essay on the Metaphysics of Material Objects
The Identity of a Material Thing and its Matter
I have both a smaller and a larger aim. The smaller aim is polemical. Kit Fine believes that a material thing—a Romanesque statue, for example, or an open door—can be distinguished from its constituent matter—a piece of alloy, say, or a hunk of plastic—without recourse to modal or temporal considerations. The statue is Romanesque; the piece of alloy is not Romanesque. The door is open; the hunk of plastic is not open. I argue that these considera…
An Antinomy about Anaphora
July 01 2011 An Antinomy about Anaphora In Special Collection: CogNet Mahrad Almotahari Mahrad Almotahari MIT. Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google Scholar Author and Article Information Mahrad Almotahari MIT. Online Issn: 1530-9150 Print Issn: 0024-3892 © 2011 Massachusetts Institute of Technology2011 Linguistic Inquiry (2011) 42 (3): 509–517. https://doi.org/10.1162/LING_a_00056 Cite Icon Cite Permissions Share Icon Share …
Not’ Again! Another Essay on the Metaphysics of Material Objects
The Identity of a Material Thing and its Matter
I have both a smaller and a larger aim. The smaller aim is polemical. Kit Fine believes that a material thing—a Romanesque statue, for example, or an open door—can be distinguished from its constituent matter—a piece of alloy, say, or a hunk of plastic—without recourse to modal or temporal considerations. The statue is Romanesque; the piece of alloy is not Romanesque. The door is open; the hunk of plastic is not open. I argue that these considera…
An Antinomy about Anaphora
July 01 2011 An Antinomy about Anaphora In Special Collection: CogNet Mahrad Almotahari Mahrad Almotahari MIT. Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google Scholar Author and Article Information Mahrad Almotahari MIT. Online Issn: 1530-9150 Print Issn: 0024-3892 © 2011 Massachusetts Institute of Technology2011 Linguistic Inquiry (2011) 42 (3): 509–517. https://doi.org/10.1162/LING_a_00056 Cite Icon Cite Permissions Share Icon Share …
The Identity of a Material Thing and its Matter
I have both a smaller and a larger aim. The smaller aim is polemical. Kit Fine believes that a material thing—a Romanesque statue, for example, or an open door—can be distinguished from its constituent matter—a piece of alloy, say, or a hunk of plastic—without recourse to modal or temporal considerations. The statue is Romanesque; the piece of alloy is not Romanesque. The door is open; the hunk of plastic is not open. I argue that these considera…
Not’ Again! Another Essay on the Metaphysics of Material Objects
Semantic deflationism deflated
Generic cognition: A neglected source of context sensitivity
What is the relationship between the claim that generics articulate psychologically primitive generalizations and the claim that they exhibit a unique form of context sensitivity? This article maintains that the two claims are compatible. It develops and defends an overlooked form of contextualism grounded in the idiosyncrasies of system 1 thought
Frege cases and rationalizing explanations
Russellians, Relationists, and Fregeans disagree about the nature of propositional‐attitude content. We articulate a framework to characterize and evaluate this disagreement. The framework involves two claims: i) that we should individuate attitude content in whatever way fits best with the explanations that characteristically appeal to it, and ii) that we can understand those explanations by analogy with other ‘higher‐level’ explanations. Using …
Philosophy (6 works) · Epistemology (5 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (5 works) · Computer Science (3 works) · Metaphysics (3 works) · Philosophy and History of Science (3 works) · Aesthetics (2 works) · Citation (2 works) · Embodied and Extended Cognition (2 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (2 works)