Andrew Wedeman
Biographic Data
| ID | 1244827 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Andrew Wedeman |
| GIVEN NAMES | Andrew |
| FAMILY NAME | Wedeman |
| SIGNATURE | WEDEMAN A |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Nebraska–Lincoln |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-3360-9061 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 16 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 89 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 16 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1999 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2024 |
| H-INDEX | 4 |
Daring to Struggle
Does China Fit the Model
In recent years, China has undertaken a massive crackdown on corruption that has led to charges against a number of high-ranking officials. But should China be considered a kleptocracy? This paper argues that for a country to merit this label, several key features beyond just endemic corruption must be present. A kleptocracy is a regime organized for the purposes of plunder, in which the state leadership acts as a vertically integrated, organized…
China's Corruption Crackdown
Xi's crackdown on corruption has focused new attention on the much deeper issue of the relationship between power and wealth in contemporary China
Bribery with Chinese Characteristics? Corruption, Fuzzy Property Rights, and Rapid Growth
The Dark Side of Business with Chinese Characteristics
Corruption has often been defined as the use of authority for private gain, with authority frequently assumed to be defined as official authority. Private actors, including corporate officers, can also exercise the authority granted them by a firm or other organization for improper private gain. Not only can private parties engage in corrupt transactions with public officials, they may also engage in corrupt transactions with other private partie…
Double Paradox
1. A Double Paradox 2. Developmental Corruption 3. Degenerative Corruption 4. Sequencing and Corruption 5. Systemic Transition and Corruption 6. Anticorruption and Corruption 7. Controlling Corruption and Sustaining Rapid Growth
Double Paradox
According to conventional wisdom, rising corruption reduces economic growth. And yet, between 1978 and 2010, even as officials were looting state coffers, extorting bribes, raking in kickbacks, and scraping off rents at unprecedented rates, the Chinese economy grew at an average annual rate of 9 percent. In Double Paradox, Andrew Wedeman seeks to explain why the Chinese economy performed so well despite widespread corruption at almost kleptocrati…
The Challenge of Commercial Bribery and Organized Crime in China
Corruption has been classically defined as the misuse of public authority for private gain, which implies that corruption necessarily involves official authority and hence public officials. Bribery, however, often involves transactions between officials and private interests, including business interests, whereby the private party seeks to bend public authority to their advantage by paying off their official interlocker. Even in its classic form,…
The Institutional Economics of Corruption and Reform
Anticorruption Campaigns and the Intensification of Corruption in China
Despite repeated crackdowns, over the past two decades corruption in China has become steadily more 'intense' as the amounts of corrupt monies and the number of senior cadres implicated in corruption have increased dramatically, leading many to view China's 'war on corruption' as half-hearted and ineffectual. In this article, I analyze the efficacy of China's campaign-style anticorruption strategy using a combination of formal modeling and empiri…
Selling China
In this book, Yasheng Huang makes a provocative claim: the large absorption of foreign direct investment (FDI) by China is a sign of some substantial weaknesses in the Chinese economy. The primary benefits associated with China's FDI inflows are concerned with the privatization functions supplied by foreign firms, venture capital provisions to credit-constrained private entrepreneurs, and promotion of interregional capital mobility. Huang argues …
Cadres and Corruption
Theoretical Constructs
This article argues that if the US simultaneously accepts the PRC's claim that Taiwan is part of China and supports the ROC's de facto independence from the mainland, cross‐strait relations ought to be relatively stable. Stability obtains, not because either Chinese regime prefers the status quo, but rather because neither can reasonably expect to obtain a better outcome. Maintaining stability, however, depends on two factors: 1) Washington's abi…
Incompetence, Noise, and Fear in Central-Local Relations in China
Budgets, Extra-budgets, and Small Treasuries
In the wake of repeated crackdowns on the 'three disorders' and 'small treasuries', it is obvious that local governments in China collect substantial amounts of illegal monies. What is not immediately obvious is how illegal monies matter. In this article, I assess both the amount of illegal monies that local governments collect and their significance relative to local autonomy. I find that because illegal monies are not rival to legal monies but …
Agency and fiscal dependence in central‐provincial relations in China
The incremental decentralization of economic and fiscal authority within the Chinese state has led to a debate over the extent to which the central government retains authoritative control over the provinces. Using detailed budgetary data, this paper argues that even though fiscal reforms may have given provincial governments independent sources of income, they remain dependent upon the center for budgetary subsidies and that without central subs…
Anticorruption Campaigns and the Intensification of Corruption in China
Despite repeated crackdowns, over the past two decades corruption in China has become steadily more 'intense' as the amounts of corrupt monies and the number of senior cadres implicated in corruption have increased dramatically, leading many to view China's 'war on corruption' as half-hearted and ineffectual. In this article, I analyze the efficacy of China's campaign-style anticorruption strategy using a combination of formal modeling and empiri…
Incompetence, Noise, and Fear in Central-Local Relations in China
Budgets, Extra-budgets, and Small Treasuries
In the wake of repeated crackdowns on the 'three disorders' and 'small treasuries', it is obvious that local governments in China collect substantial amounts of illegal monies. What is not immediately obvious is how illegal monies matter. In this article, I assess both the amount of illegal monies that local governments collect and their significance relative to local autonomy. I find that because illegal monies are not rival to legal monies but …
Double Paradox
According to conventional wisdom, rising corruption reduces economic growth. And yet, between 1978 and 2010, even as officials were looting state coffers, extorting bribes, raking in kickbacks, and scraping off rents at unprecedented rates, the Chinese economy grew at an average annual rate of 9 percent. In Double Paradox, Andrew Wedeman seeks to explain why the Chinese economy performed so well despite widespread corruption at almost kleptocrati…
Does China Fit the Model
In recent years, China has undertaken a massive crackdown on corruption that has led to charges against a number of high-ranking officials. But should China be considered a kleptocracy? This paper argues that for a country to merit this label, several key features beyond just endemic corruption must be present. A kleptocracy is a regime organized for the purposes of plunder, in which the state leadership acts as a vertically integrated, organized…
The Challenge of Commercial Bribery and Organized Crime in China
Corruption has been classically defined as the misuse of public authority for private gain, which implies that corruption necessarily involves official authority and hence public officials. Bribery, however, often involves transactions between officials and private interests, including business interests, whereby the private party seeks to bend public authority to their advantage by paying off their official interlocker. Even in its classic form,…
Agency and fiscal dependence in central‐provincial relations in China
The incremental decentralization of economic and fiscal authority within the Chinese state has led to a debate over the extent to which the central government retains authoritative control over the provinces. Using detailed budgetary data, this paper argues that even though fiscal reforms may have given provincial governments independent sources of income, they remain dependent upon the center for budgetary subsidies and that without central subs…
Bribery with Chinese Characteristics? Corruption, Fuzzy Property Rights, and Rapid Growth
The Institutional Economics of Corruption and Reform
Cadres and Corruption
Agency and fiscal dependence in central‐provincial relations in China
The incremental decentralization of economic and fiscal authority within the Chinese state has led to a debate over the extent to which the central government retains authoritative control over the provinces. Using detailed budgetary data, this paper argues that even though fiscal reforms may have given provincial governments independent sources of income, they remain dependent upon the center for budgetary subsidies and that without central subs…
Budgets, Extra-budgets, and Small Treasuries
In the wake of repeated crackdowns on the 'three disorders' and 'small treasuries', it is obvious that local governments in China collect substantial amounts of illegal monies. What is not immediately obvious is how illegal monies matter. In this article, I assess both the amount of illegal monies that local governments collect and their significance relative to local autonomy. I find that because illegal monies are not rival to legal monies but …
Theoretical Constructs
This article argues that if the US simultaneously accepts the PRC's claim that Taiwan is part of China and supports the ROC's de facto independence from the mainland, cross‐strait relations ought to be relatively stable. Stability obtains, not because either Chinese regime prefers the status quo, but rather because neither can reasonably expect to obtain a better outcome. Maintaining stability, however, depends on two factors: 1) Washington's abi…
Incompetence, Noise, and Fear in Central-Local Relations in China
Cadres and Corruption
Anticorruption Campaigns and the Intensification of Corruption in China
Despite repeated crackdowns, over the past two decades corruption in China has become steadily more 'intense' as the amounts of corrupt monies and the number of senior cadres implicated in corruption have increased dramatically, leading many to view China's 'war on corruption' as half-hearted and ineffectual. In this article, I analyze the efficacy of China's campaign-style anticorruption strategy using a combination of formal modeling and empiri…
Selling China
In this book, Yasheng Huang makes a provocative claim: the large absorption of foreign direct investment (FDI) by China is a sign of some substantial weaknesses in the Chinese economy. The primary benefits associated with China's FDI inflows are concerned with the privatization functions supplied by foreign firms, venture capital provisions to credit-constrained private entrepreneurs, and promotion of interregional capital mobility. Huang argues …
The Institutional Economics of Corruption and Reform
Double Paradox
1. A Double Paradox 2. Developmental Corruption 3. Degenerative Corruption 4. Sequencing and Corruption 5. Systemic Transition and Corruption 6. Anticorruption and Corruption 7. Controlling Corruption and Sustaining Rapid Growth
Double Paradox
According to conventional wisdom, rising corruption reduces economic growth. And yet, between 1978 and 2010, even as officials were looting state coffers, extorting bribes, raking in kickbacks, and scraping off rents at unprecedented rates, the Chinese economy grew at an average annual rate of 9 percent. In Double Paradox, Andrew Wedeman seeks to explain why the Chinese economy performed so well despite widespread corruption at almost kleptocrati…
The Challenge of Commercial Bribery and Organized Crime in China
Corruption has been classically defined as the misuse of public authority for private gain, which implies that corruption necessarily involves official authority and hence public officials. Bribery, however, often involves transactions between officials and private interests, including business interests, whereby the private party seeks to bend public authority to their advantage by paying off their official interlocker. Even in its classic form,…
The Dark Side of Business with Chinese Characteristics
Corruption has often been defined as the use of authority for private gain, with authority frequently assumed to be defined as official authority. Private actors, including corporate officers, can also exercise the authority granted them by a firm or other organization for improper private gain. Not only can private parties engage in corrupt transactions with public officials, they may also engage in corrupt transactions with other private partie…
China's Corruption Crackdown
Xi's crackdown on corruption has focused new attention on the much deeper issue of the relationship between power and wealth in contemporary China
Bribery with Chinese Characteristics? Corruption, Fuzzy Property Rights, and Rapid Growth
Does China Fit the Model
In recent years, China has undertaken a massive crackdown on corruption that has led to charges against a number of high-ranking officials. But should China be considered a kleptocracy? This paper argues that for a country to merit this label, several key features beyond just endemic corruption must be present. A kleptocracy is a regime organized for the purposes of plunder, in which the state leadership acts as a vertically integrated, organized…
Daring to Struggle
Political science (14 works) · China (12 works) · Law (11 works) · Corruption and Economic Development (10 works) · Law (9 works) · Language change (8 works) · Business (7 works) · China's Socioeconomic Reforms and Governance (7 works) · Economics (7 works) · Political economy (5 works)